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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the reasons behind the electoral successes of the FPO between 
1986, when Jorg Haider assumed the leadership of the party, and 2000, when the party 
entered into a government coalition with the OVP. A widely held view is that the FPO’s 
rise was caused predominantly by the party’s right-wing extremist tendencies. The 
importance of the role of the party’s populist critique of the Austrian elite has often been 
underestimated. The literature and public debate about the FPO is largely dominated by 
ideological assumptions rather than detailed empirical inquiry. This thesis evaluates the 
relative importance of the right-wing extremist and populist dimensions, drawing on a 
wide range of qualitative and quantitative sources, such as party documents, its 
yearbooks, speeches and statements of prominent members, election results and voter 
surveys.
An in-depth analysis of the data demonstrates that the extent of the expression of right- 
wing extremist views in the party’s rhetoric, programmes and policies was smaller than 
commonly assumed. Voters were drawn towards the party primarily by its critique of the 
SPO/OVP elite rule that had characterised the Austrian political landscape since the 
Second World War. By highlighting and often exaggerating the shortcomings of the elite 
and Austrian corporatism, the party under Jorg Haider managed to appeal to the 
electorate. With their support, the FPO became the second largest political party at the 
national elections in 1999, thereby ending the SPO/OVP dual elite rule. Once the FPO 
joined the OVP-led government, the party quickly started to disintegrate resulting 
ultimately in a split of the party -  a fate shared with other populist parties.
The FPO’s rise to power and particularly the emerging new right-wing extremist parties 
in Europe call for a thorough investigation of the underlying factors behind the parties’ 
success. The analysis and findings of this thesis therefore are of relevance beyond the 
Austrian context.
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Milestones
1949 Founding of Verband der Unabhangigen (VdU) (League of Independents).
1950 Jorg Haider is born in Bad Giosern/Oberosterreich.
1955 Anton Reinthaler, former Nazi, creates Freiheitspartei as a rival to the VdU.
1956 VdU and Freiheitspartei merge into Freiheitiiche Partei Osterreichs (FPO). 
1956 Reinthaler wins a landslide over Kraus. FPO’s liberal wing is marginalised. 
1958 Reinthaler dies and is succeeded by Friedrich Peter, previous SS soldier.
1958 Peter declares that the FPO is a party for nationals and liberals alike.
1964 Salzburger Programm (the Salzburg Programme) adapts a more liberal profile. 
1966 German Nationalist splinter group forms Nationaldemokratische Partei.
1968 Bad Ischl Programm (the Bad Ischl Programme), introducing libertarian views. 
1971 Foundation of Atterseekreis (the Attersee Circle) by young, liberal students. 
1973 Freiheitiiche Manifest gives voice to both liberal and libertarian sentiments. 
1973 Intensification of tension between German Nationalists and modernizers.
1978 Peter looses election to Alexander Gotz, German Nationalist.
1979 The FPO becomes member of the world-wide Liberal International.
1980 The liberal Norbert Steger wins election over the Nationalist Harald Ofner. 
1983 The SPO looses absolute majority, and initiates negotiations with the FPO.. 
1983 Coalition between SPO under Vranitzky and FPO under Steger.
1983 The FPO reaches an all-time-low with 5.3 per cent of votes cast.
1984 In Carinthia, his home region, Haider starts an internal opposition to Steger.
1984 FPO is supported by 16 per cent in the Carinthian local election.
1985 Liberal views are strengthened in the new Salzburg Programme.
1985 Haider refers to WWII as ‘events’ in the Austrian newspaper Profil.
1985 Friedhelm Frischenschlager shakes hand with war criminal Walter Reder,
1986 Steger is outmaneuvered by Jorg Haider, who seizes power of the FPO.
1986 Vranizky terminates coalition with the Freedom Party.
1986 The FPO is supported by 9.7 per cent in the National election.
1991 Haider states that the Nazi regime had a ‘proper unemployment policy’.
1991 As a result, Haider is forced to resign as Head of Provincial Government.
1993 Heide Schmidt, Friedhelm Frischenschlager and other liberals leave FPO. 
1993 The FPO leaves Liberal International followed by anti-liberal campaigning. 
1995 Haider talks at Krumpendorf to war veterans and OVP and SPO politicians.
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1995 Haider refers to concentration camps as ‘punishment camps’.
1997 The Linz Programme erases all references to liberalism.
1999 The FPO achieves 26.9 per cent of votes cast.
1999 Coalition discussions between SPO and OVP unsuccessful.
2000 Government coalition between OVP and FPO
2000 EU-sanctions against OVP/FPO government coalition and against Austria. 
2000 Jorg Haider resigns and is replaced by Susanne Riess-Passer.
2000 Haider tries to retain control over the FPO from Carinthia.
2002 The FPO receives 10 per cent of votes, almost 40% less than 1999.
2005 Split in the FPO. Jorg Haider launches Bundnis Zukunft Austria (BZO). 
2008 Sum of FPO/BZO votes 28.2 per cent in National election.
2008 Haider dies in a car crash as a consequence of high speed and alcohol.
2009 In the EU-election, FPO receives 12.7 per cent and BZO wins 4.6 per cent. 
2009 BZO receives 44.9 per cent of voters in the regional election in Carinthia.
Abbreviations
A T A K A - ‘Attack’, Bulgarian right-wing extremist party.
BZO - Bundnis Zukunft Osterreich
B N P - British National Party
FPO - Freiheitiiche Partei Ostereichs
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GRECE- Groupment de la Recherche dans une Civilization Europeenne
L O - Landsorganisationen
O E C D - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
O V P - Osterreichische Volkspartei
RAI - Italian TV
S P O - Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs
VdU - Verband der Unabhangigen
W H O - World Health Organisation
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Glossary of Non-English terms
Alleanza Nazionale (AN) -  Italian nationalist and right-wing populist party. Headed 
by Gianfranco Fini.
Anschluss -  Political union of Austria with Germany, achieved through annexation 
by Adolf Hitler
Arbeiterzeitung -  Austrian socialist newspaper. Discontinued 1991.
Atterseekreis -  Circle of young students seeking to push the FPO in a liberal 
direction. Founded in 1971.
Bad Ischl -  FPO’s 1968 Party Programme seeking to fuse German National and 
National liberal views
Bundnis Zukunft Osterreich -  Alliance for the future of Austria. Founded in 2005. 
Burschenschaften -  ‘Bursche’, boy, lad; and ‘-schaft’, -community. German or 
Austrian student fraternity, often linked to right-wing extremist views 
Dansk Folkeparti -  Danish right-wing populist party. Headed by Pia Kjaersgaard 
Das Dokumentationsarchiv des Osterreichischen Widerstandes -  Archive for the 
Austrian Resistance
Osterreicherklarung zur Nationalratswahl -  Declaration of Austria at the 1994 
National Election
Dritte Republik -  Recurring political rhetoric of the FPO, aimed at replacing the 
Second Republic. 1945 until present.
Erbgesundsheitspflege -  Racial health care 
Le Figaro -  French conservative newspaper
Faire Marktwirtschaft -  FPO version of market economy emphasising a 
conservative ‘fair’ market instead of a liberal ‘free’ market 
Filzdemokratie -  Sleaze democracy
Framskrittspartiet -  Norwegian right-wing populist party. Headed by Siv Jensen
Freiheitiiche Biidungswerk -  The academic section of the FPO
Freiheitiiche Manifest -  FPO manifest giving voice to liberal views
Freiheitlichen -  An eventually unsuccessful wider movement founded in 1995, in
which the FPO constituted a core
Freiheitspartei -  Rival to the VdU launched in 1955
Freiheit und Verantwortung (Freedom and responsibility) -  Yearbooks of the FPO. 
1993-2001
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Front National -  French nationalist, right-wing populist party. Headed by Jean Marie 
Le Pen.
Gazeta Wyborcza -  Polish left-liberal newspaper
Gemeinschaft -  Community; often with rightist connotations
Groupment de la Recherche dans une Civilization Europeenne -  French ‘new
right’ think tank
Ha’aretz -  Israeli liberal newspaper
Handbuch des Osterreichischen Rechtsextremismus -  Handbook on Austrian 
Right-wing Extremism. Authorised by Archive for the Austrian Resistance. (See 
below).
H istorikerstreit -  ‘Battle of historians’; 1986 West-German intellectual controversy 
about the historical interpretation of the Holocaust
Ideologische Missgeburt -  ‘Ideological freak’. Used by Jorg Haider to describe 
Austria as a part of his pro-German rhetoric.
Jobbik Magyarorszagert Mozgalom -  Movement for a Better Hungary. Hungarian 
nationalist party.
Junge Freiheit-German, right-wing populist/right-wing extremist weekly newspaper 
Junktim  -  Question 1,3,5 is decided by one part, and 2,4,6 etc.. is decided by 
counterpart in a co-operation between two parts
Karntner Nachrichten -  Carinthian conservative/right-wing populist newspaper 
Landsorganisationen -  Swedish Union of Workers 
Landtag -  Regional Parliament in Austria
Lega Nord — Union of rightist and separatist parties in Northern Italy. Headed by 
Umberto Bossi.
Liberale Forum -  Austrian Liberal Party. Headed by Angelica Mlinar
Liberal International -  The world federation of liberal and progressive democratic
political parties. Founded in 1947
Liste Dr Hans-Peter Martin -  EU-critical party founded by the Austrian Hans-Peter 
Martin
Lumpenproletariat -  Trash proletariat 
Nationalrat -  Austrian national assembly
Ny Demokrati -  Swedish right-wing populist party. Active 1991-1994 
‘ordentliche Beschaftigungspolitik’ -  ‘Proper unemployment policy’
‘Osterreich zuerst’ -  ‘Austria First’
13
Die Paritatische Kommission fur Lohn -  und Preisfragen -  The joint commission 
for wages and prices
El Pais -  Spanish leftist-leaning newspaper
Partidul Romania Mare (PRM) -  The Greater Romania Party; expansionist and 
right-wing extremist
Die Presse- Austrian conservative-liberal newspaper
Proporz -  Short for proportional state shared by the SPO and the OVP
Die Republikaner -  German nationalist and right-wing populist party. Headed by
Rolf Schlierer.
Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend-T h e  youth organisation of the Freedom Party 
der Rumpfstaat -  Nickname of Austria after the fall of Habsburg in 1918 
Slovenska narodna strana (SNS) -  Slovak National Party 
Der Stammtisch -  Table of regulars’; metaphor for a place for racist discussions 
Spiegel online -  Online edition of German weekly Der Spiegel 
Sozialpartnerschaft -  Austrian post-war power-sharing between the 
Socialdemocratic Party of Austrian and the Austrian People’s Party 
Svenska Arbetsgivarfdreningen -  Swedish Organisation of Employees 
Svenskt Naringsliv -  Swedish Organisation of Industrialists 
Sverigedemokraterna -  Swedish right-wing populist and nationalist party. Headed 
by Jimmy Akesson.
Standestaatsystem -  A state dominated by corporations, such as the Dollfuss 
government in Austria between 1934 and 1938 
Straflager -  Punishment camp
Verband der Unabhangigen -  League of Independents (1949-1956). Predecessor 
of FPO.
Vlaams Belang -  (Flemish interest), Belgian nationalist and right-wing populist 
political party. Headed by Bruno Valkeniers.
Volkish -  National, ‘originating from “the people"’
Volksgemeinschaft -  Community of a people
Waffen SS -  Combat arm of SS (Schutzstafel), a section of the National Socialist 
Party
Yedioth Ahronot -  Largest newspaper in Israel situated in the political middle- 
ground
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Zur Zeit -  Austrian right-wing populist and nationalist newspaper closely linked to the 
FPO
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Around nine o’clock on Friday night on 10 October 2008, Jorg Haider appeared 
unexpectedly at Le Cabaret, a nightclub in Velden near Worthersee, where Blitzlicht 
Revue -  a new society magazine -  was being launched. Shortly after midnight Jorg 
Haider headed home to attend his mother’s 90th birthday party. In Lambichl, 
Klagenfurt, he overtook another car at high speed. Shortly thereafter Haider’s car hit 
a concrete block at the side of the road, and was tossed around until it finally came to 
rest, severely demolished. Jorg Haider had suffered multiple lethal injuries and died 
shortly after the ambulance arrived at the scene.
His fatal accident made headlines in the international press. The German Spiegel 
online stressed Haider’s slick, telegenetic qualities, his constant desire to provoke 
and shock, and his praise of the Nazi employment policy (Dambeck, 2008). In the 
weekend edition of the conservative French Le Figaro, Haider was labelled The 
leader of the Austrian extreme right’. (Anon. 'Autriche/Extreme-Droite: Mort de 
Haider’ 2008). The Spanish El Pats also named him The leader of the Austrian 
extreme right’, and added his penchant for racist and ultranationalist statements 
(Anon. ‘Jorg Haider Fallece en Accidente de Trafico’ 2008). In Poland, Gazeta 
Wyborcza highlighted Haider’s autocratic style, his anti-immigration policy and praise 
of the Nazi employment policy while labelling the FPO as extreme right and 
nationalist (Buras 2008). In Israel, Ha’aretz (anon. ‘Austria Far-Right Leader Joerg 
Haider Dies in Car Accident’ 2008) drew attention to Haider’s anti-immigration 
campaigns, his praise of the Nazi employment policy, and the naming of 
concentration camps as punitive camps (Straflagei); and Yedioth Ahronot noted that 
Haider ‘triggered widespread condemnation and European Union sanctions’ (Anon. 
‘Austrian Far-Right Leader Dies in Crash’ 2008). The Washington Post described the 
FPO’s far-right ideology, and its leader’s anti-immigration policies. It was also noted 
that Haider had been challenging Austria’s two long-reigning parties, the SPO and 
the OVP (Schudel 2008). Along similar lines, the New York Times referred to Jorg 
Haider as far-rightist, famous for his strong anti-immigrant and anti-European Union 
stance, for a series of statements, for example praising the Waffen SS and the 
employment policy of the Nazi regime. The New York Times also, however,
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highlighted Haider’s critique of the dominance of the SPO and the People’s OVP 
(Freund and Kulish 2008).
In Austria, the Austrian President Heinz Fischer referred to Haider as a ‘politician of 
great talent’, who ‘aroused enthusiasm but also strong criticism’ (Freeman and 
Pancevski 2008). Former chancellor Wolfgang Schussel claimed Haider was an 
‘extremely gifted politician’ who ‘knew how to listen and had a connection with the 
people’ and the Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann called Haider ‘an exceptional 
politician’ (cited in The World Jewish Congress, anon. 2008 ‘Austrian far-right leader, 
Jorg Haider, dies in car crash’). Former Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer described 
Haider as a ‘remarkable person’ and said that one should ‘pay tribute to him’ 
(Weinthal 2008). Heinz-Christian Strache, the leader of the FPO, said that Haider 
had ‘heavily influenced Austrian politics and achieved previously almost 
unimaginable changes within the power monopoly of the Social Democrats and the 
People’s Party.’ Eva Glawischnig, the Green Party leader, whose faction strongly 
opposed Jorg Haider, referred to his abrupt demise as ‘the tragic death of one of the 
most outstanding and controversial Austrian political figures of recent decades’ 
(Freeman and Pancevski 2008). Among his sympathisers, and in particular in his 
home region of Carinthia, the reaction to Haider’s death was one of great shock 
causing an eruption of emotion. Some observers compared it to the mourning in 
Britain after the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997. Stefan Petzner, General 
Secretary of the Party at the time of Haider’s death, openly wept on Austrian 
television, and Gerhard Dorfler, Haider’s deputy at the time, said: ‘In Carinthia, the 
sun has fallen from the sky’ (Dorfler 2008). Even though this was an accident, 
conspiracy theories soon emerged. For instance, Kronen Zeitung, Austria’s biggest 
newspaper, which had often sided with Haider and the FPO, called his last moments 
in life ‘a riddle, adding that many questions still were left unanswered’ (Pandi 2008).
Haider’s sudden demise marked the end of a remarkable political career. In 1986, 
when he took over the leadership of the FPO, the party was on the verge of 
extinction. Within months, however, the party changed its image from an outmoded, 
marginal party to a young and vibrant movement. This was chiefly due to Jorg 
Haider’s personality and leadership style. Already by the time of the national 
elections the same year, the party had won 9.7 percent of the electoral support,
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compared to just 5.0 per cent in the previous election in 1983. The FPO’s rise 
marked the beginning of a transformation of the Austrian political landscape. In the 
following national elections in 1990, the party was supported by 16.6 percent of 
voters, four years later, the party climbed to 22.5 percent, and after the election in 
1995, when the party experienced a modest drop in voter support to 21.9 percent, it 
gained 26.9 percent in the 1999 national elections, putting it on a par with the OVP. 
At the time, it was widely thought that the dual party rule of the SPO and OVP, which 
had characterised Austrian politics since the end of the Second World War, had 
finally been broken.
The FPO under Jorg Haider was the subject of a large amount of scholarly attention, 
not only in Austria, but also internationally. The reactions to Haider’s death went 
beyond what would be expected for a leader of a small party in a rather small 
European country. Evidently, the rise of the party, and its leader, expressed issues of 
considerable general significance and concern.
As the reactions to his death have shown, the rise of Jorg Haider’s and the FPO is 
commonly associated with the party’s right-wing extremist views. The present thesis 
will challenge this view, and through a thorough investigation examine the reasons 
behind the remarkable electoral appeal of the FPO between 1986 and 2000.
In this thesis, a few concepts play an important role, and must therefore be briefly 
defined at this point.
‘Populism’ constitutes the key theoretical concept in the discussion. The most 
widespread definition of populism is as right-wing populism -  a political tactic on the 
rightist fringes of the spectrum. This definition will also be employed here. In general, 
populism has negative connotations, being closely associated with right-wing populist 
tactics and the manipulation of the electorate, allegations based on largely invented 
or exaggerated characteristics of an oppressive elite, etc. This interpretation of 
populism is also essentially based on the same sentiments as Fascism and Nazism. 
While populism can imply right-wing populism, it may also have an egalitarian 
character. Egalitarian populism simply aims at diffusing power to the electorate.
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In the theory of populism, the elite are the opposite of the people. The elite are 
always deceitful, arrogant and corrupt. In the rhetoric of the FPO the elite referred to 
is that of the dual political rule between the SPO and the FPO. In general 
terminology, the elite has rightist connotations, seen as being in favour of the 
(conservative) oppressors and against the left -  the workers, unemployed, 
immigrants, etc. In the present thesis, however, the elite is, in the terminology of the 
FPO, defined primarily as the left -  Social Democrats, the ‘hegemonic power’- while 
the people -  represented by the FPO -  no longer belong to the left but to the right.
‘Right-wing extremism’ constitutes another concept used here to discuss the FPO. 
The most conventional definitions of right-wing extremism, as used for example by 
scholar like Eatwell, Mudde and von Beyme, emphasizes the following elements: 
nationalism, the strong state, racism and anti-democracy (Eatwell 2004, p. 8; Mudde 
1996; von Beyme 1998). Ethnic affiliation to a nation or a racial community is seen as 
being of paramount importance, and all other interests and values, such as liberal 
individualism or universalism, are subordinate or irrelevant. Consequently, right-wing 
extremism constitutes a far rightist version of relativism; i.e. the denial of human 
rights, in favour of an emphasis on collective entities and group rights. In this thesis 
sentiments in favour of ‘nationalism’ are not seen as expressions of right-wing 
extremism. These sentiments can also form the basis for a welfare state critique of 
the negative impacts of globalisation. A policy aimed at merely reducing the number 
of immigrants cannot be seen as right-wing extremist. Such a policy can also be 
driven by economic necessities and be proposed by parties of various ideological 
shades. Views according to which the ‘interests’ of the domestic citizen are seen as 
paramount are not necessarily right-wing extremist views. Often, these views are 
merely an expression of conservatism.
‘Austrian corporatism’ signifies the dual elite political rule between the SPO and the 
OVP, which dominated Austria’s political, social, cultural and economic life from the 
end of the Nazi regime, until 1986, when this arrangement started to lose 
momentum. These two political parties cooperated by dividing vital decision-making 
according to a proportional system -  the so-called Proporz. The basic foundation of 
Austrian Corporatism, however, is constituted by “social partnership”, i.e. a 
systematic and institutionalised cooperation between capital and labour, as
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represented, respectively, by the business associations and trade union 
confederations. Originating as a large-scale attempt to overcome the political 
fragmentation and turmoil of the Second World War period, Austrian Corporatism 
was always characterised by a “post-ideological” pragmatism (Lijphart, 1977, p. 102; 
Lehmbruch, 1967, p. 25).
As an example of this pragmatism, vital economic decisions were dealt with through 
administrative organs ostensibly removed from ideological concerns. Die Paritatische 
Kommission fur Lohn- und Preisfragen -  where increases in wages and prices were 
determined -  is an example of such an administrative organ (for a more detailed 
description of Austrian corporatism, see Chapter 5).
A brief summary of the chapters is presented below.
Chapter 2, ’Right-wing Extremism and Populism -  A Review of the Literature’, will 
present an overview of the academic literature on contemporary European extreme 
right-wing parties, focusing on the causes for their electorate appeal, their underlying 
ideologies and their relations to populism. Moreover, the chapter will assess whether 
and to what extent the literature regards the European right-wing extremist scene as 
a continuation of ‘classic’ right-wing extremism, fascism or Nazism or whether and to 
what extent it is taken to constitute a response and protest to ‘new’ social 
phenomena. Then, the focus will turn to the FPO and the period between 1986 and 
2000, and the factors commonly seen as shaping the party’s success. An analysis of 
right-wing extremism as a core factor will be followed by a discussion of the role of 
populism; here the failings within the Austrian elite are seen as paramount. Two 
different forms of populism will be presented: right-wing populism, expressing and 
exploiting mostly exaggerated flaws within the Austrian elite to maximise voter 
support, and egalitarian populism, pointing at real and substantial defects within the 
Austrian elite.
Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’, discusses the methodology and data sources used in the 
thesis. In seeking to find answers to the questions raised in the thesis, primary 
sources have been considered of particular importance; these include the FPO’s 
yearbooks, party programmes, election results, survey results and exit polls, but also
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statements, speeches and excerpts from books by prominent party members. 
Considerable attention is paid to Jorg Haider’s statements and speeches. Two of his 
books are the focus of a more detailed analysis. Secondary sources dealing with the 
nature and the rise of the FPO offer additional information. As a notable case of 
international response, the 2000 EU-report on Austria and the sanctions are also 
discussed.
Chapter 4, ‘Populism’, outlines the core theoretical concept of the thesis. A common 
denominator of the concept of populism will be suggested. Then, two different 
expressions of populism will be outlined; right-wing populism and egalitarian 
populism. While the former expresses a largely invented and exaggerated critique of 
the elite, the latter builds its critique of the elite on real shortcomings, and advocates 
giving people real power. Therefore, typically populist features, such as the idea of 
the charismatic, larger-than-life leader and the idea of a conspiracy within the elite 
are not necessarily tied to right-wing populism, but can also be associated with an 
egalitarian form of populism. The FPO exhibits features of both forms of populism. 
While its critics largely highlight the characteristics associated with right-wing 
populism, such as the manipulation of voters and other ‘dark’ motives, the FPO sees 
itself as advocating greater political participation of the people.
Chapter 5, ‘Austrian Corporatism -  an Overview’, presents the wider context of the 
corporatist arrangements of the Austrian elite system. Initially, a critical presentation 
of Austrian corporatism will be made. Critics have stressed the widespread 
corruption, the dominance of the SPO and the OVP over the life of the Austrian 
citizen. It has been portrayed as suffocating and stifling, combining high voting 
figures with political apathy. However, the system favoured economic rationality and 
progress as evidenced by Austria’s post-war economic success story. By discussing 
the historical background and the frailty of the state, the importance of Austrian 
corporatism to social cohesion in the aftermath of the Second World War is 
highlighted.
Chapter 6, ‘A Short History of the FPO from 1949 to 1986’ will present the historical 
background and evolution of the party prior to Haider’s leadership. The party’s early 
years, when it mainly was comprised of members affiliated to the former Nazi regime,
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will be addressed. We shall note the ways in which large groups of former National 
Socialists were able to disappear into the bureaucracies of the SPO and the OVP. 
Then, the overview will describe the party’s evolution, which has often taken the form 
of a struggle between German nationalism and more mainstream, liberal ideas. The 
background to and brief existence of the government coalition between the FPO and 
the SPO between 1983 and 1986 will be presented. Due to Jorg Haider’s key role in 
the present thesis, the presentation will stress his political strategy during the years 
preceding the party leader election in 1986, and also the election itself and Jorg 
Haider’s successful coup against the incumbent Norbert Steger. It will also describe 
Haider’s rise to prominence in Carinthia.
In Chapter 7, ‘Analysing the FPO’s Electoral Appeal -  Rhetoric, Party Programme 
and Reactions’, a detailed discussion of right-wing extremism as a cause for the rise 
of the FPO will be conducted. A number of Haider’s controversial statements will be 
highlighted. Party programmes and the party’s yearbooks will be subject to a close 
examination. The chapter seeks to assess to what extent these documents express 
right-wing extremist views or whether they can be said to involve rather more general 
populist themes. In addition, the EU-sanctions against Austria will provide a good 
example of an international, systematic response to, supposedly, a right-wing 
extremist party.
Chapter 8, ‘Analysing the Appeal of the FPO -  the Electorate’, presents a wealth of 
quantitative data to support the findings of the thesis. Election results from elections 
in Haider’s home region of Carinthia and at the national level will present the 
background to the electoral development of the FPO. Data on the socio-economic 
profile of the ‘typical FPO voter’ will be added. Subsequently, public polls describing 
the FPO voter in relation to voters of other parties will be assessed, followed by a 
cross-party comparison of capacities for solidarity. Finally, a thorough investigation of 
key factors for voting for the FPO will be made, based on a number of national 
election polls.
In Chapter 9, ‘The FPO’s Critique of the Elite’, the party’s own critical discussion of 
the Austrian elite system is discussed. Special attention will be assigned to Jorg 
Haider’s 1993 Die Freiheit, die ich meine (1993a) and his 1997 Befreite Zukunft
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(1997b), analysing the extent of the FPO’s populist, anti-elitist critique. A brief 
overview of his cultural critique will be followed by a more elaborate discussion of his 
political critique of the Austrian elite and an overview of his considerably shorter 
economic critique. In addition, the FPO’s 1994 Osterreichserklarung zur 
Nationalratswahl will complement and support the findings in the two books by 
Haider.
The conclusion (Chapter 10) provides a synthesis of the main findings. Thereafter a 
discussion of the events following 2000 and the extent to which they support the 
findings of this thesis will be made. The thesis ends by discussing the FPO in the 
wider European context of right-wing populist and right-wing extremist parties. The 
rise of some of these parties, which underwent a massive increase in several EU 
member states during the last election the European Parliament, shows that the 
observations and conclusions of the thesis have implications beyond Austria.
The academic debate on the rise of the FPO under Jorg Haider has been very 
intense. The majority of these discussions have concluded that the voters were 
above all attracted by the party’s right-wing extremism (Zochling 2000, Bailer- 
Galanda and Neugebauer 1997, Scharsach 2000a, Hainsworth 2000, Griffin 1991, 
Golsan 1998). Other scholars have stressed the party’s protest potential, 
emphasizing that FPO voters were first and foremost anti-elitist and populist (e.g. 
Betz 1994, Pick 2000a, Sully 1997). Nevertheless, these two perspectives and their 
relative importance for explaining the success of the FPO at the ballot boxes have 
not been properly investigated and compared. In particular, there is a lack of 
empirical analysis of data from within the FPO policy circles, as well as systematic 
analyses of factors behind the voting patterns among those who voted for the FPO. 
The majority of studies also leave unanswered the question of the reasons behind 
Jorg Haider’s aggressive political rhetoric. Using a variety of data sources, including 
policy texts and electoral results, this thesis offers a systematic assessment of right- 
wing extremism and populism as the two key explanations for the rise of the FPO 
since 1986. Party Programmes, key party statements and Haider’s own books will be 
subjected to thorough analyses in order to elucidate the relative importance of right- 
wing extremist versus populist themes. The social-political background to the party’s 
rhetoric, and in particular Jorg Haider’s political style, will also be discussed in order
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to elucidate the causes behind the rise of the FPO between 1986 and 2000.The 
thesis also deals with foreign reactions to the rise of the FPO. In particular, it asks 
whether the sanctions against the Austrian government were caused by Austrian 
voters with a right-wing extremist tendency; or if voters instead were motivated by 
populist feelings. The findings in the above investigation will be supported by 
statistical data and voter surveys, particularly exit polls indicating voters’ motivations 
for voting for the FPO during four consecutive elections: 1986, 1990,1994 and 2000. 
Using these data, we can address the question of whether the FPO voter was acting 
from a right-wing extremist foundation, or whether they were voting along lines that 
we could call ‘populist’ or ‘anti-elitist’.
A determination of voter motivation for support of the FPO is not purely an academic 
issue. An understanding of political life requires that we know why the electorate 
moves in various directions, and what reasons these voters give for their decisions. 
These trends reflect basic social changes in society, and will generate diverse 
political responses and social policies. What, for instance, led voters to start 
supporting Green parties in the 1970s? And why have blue collar voters for some 
time been moving from the moderate left to the right? Change in voter behaviour is 
particularly important to understand the dynamics of right-wing parties, such as the 
FPO. Unless the reasons for their popularity are carefully analyzed, the response by 
‘political mainstream’ may be counter-productive, further increasing the voter support 
of these parties. In order to find effective strategies against supposedly undemocratic 
parties and movements, it is necessary to know why they gain strength. Various 
explanations for the rise of these parties call for very different types of responses 
from democratic mainstream. Moreover, at present, Europe is witnessing an 
escalation in support for right-wing parties, particularly in the former Easter Europe. 
These parties, many of which are no longer fringe movements, may not only pose a 
problem in their own countries, but to the democratic foundation of the European 
Union.
There is no denying that the interpretation for the rise of the FPO as a result of an 
increase in right-wing extremist element is important because it brings to light issues 
about the connection between the FPO and its historical link with Nazi Germany and 
the recurring presence of former National Socialists and revisionists within the party.
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It also raises issues about Jorg Haider, who time and again brought notoriety to 
Austria. In this thesis, I argue that viewing the party’s success as purely a 
manifestation of a right-wing extremist tendency is not born out by the data. I will 
argue that Haider’s FPO, rather than appealing to right-wing extremist and elitist 
sentiments, rallied voters primarily through its vociferous, populist anti-elite criticism. 
In assessing the two ‘driving forces’ in the debate about FPO support -  the right-wing 
extremist and the populist -  we can obtain a fuller understanding of the sources of 
support for the rise of the party between 1986 and 2000. However, the issue is 
larger than Haider and the FPO. The FPO case is useful as a means of 
understanding the reasons behind the current appeal of parties on the rightist 
fringes. In particular, if such parties pose a threat to democracy, we need to 
understand the specific nature of this threat -  is it right-wing nationalist or anti­
elitist/populist? Failure to understand the factors behind FPO support may lead to a 
blanket ‘naming and shaming’ of anyone who may find some of Haider’s critiques to 
be plausible. An overly sweeping and inclusive interpretation of racism and right-wing 
extremism only broadens the electoral base for parties such as the FPO. Only 
through more detailed analysis can we avoid succumbing to banalities and 
stereotypical allegations about the FPO and related parties and the appeal of leaders 
such as Haider, who is hardly an exception on the current European political scene. 
We need a more nuanced framework than that of simply concluding that “Yes, he is a 
fascist.” Or “No, he is simply a harmless populist”.
As was previously noted, the vast majority of scholarly work on the FPO has 
emphasized Haider’s and the FPO’s links to right-wing extremism, racism, and 
fascism. This thesis will demonstrate, instead, that Haider and FPO support is rooted 
in voters’ populism rather than right-wing nationalism. Unlike previous studies which 
chiefly have emphasized links between the FPO and right-wing extremism, often 
relyting on and reiterating overly critical secondary sources, the findings of the 
present thesis rest on an analysis of the party’s own policy documents and other first­
hand data such as voter surveys. The use of these primary sources will also 
contribute toward generating new insights and fresh ideas into the debate about the 
sources of right-wing support.
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An analysis of the electoral appeal of the FPO can be conducted in many ways, 
using various research designs. Bellow, a few of these will be compared, and the 
benefits of the present research desiign described. One way of analyzing the appeal 
of the FPO is to identify tendencies toward general right-wing extremism within the 
party (Bailer and Neugebauer 1998; Merkl and Weinberg 1997; Golsan (ed.) 1998; 
Gremliza (ed.) 2000; Gress 1994). A  second strategy is to focus particularly on the 
party’s and Jorg Haider’s links tto anti-Semitism, pointing out statements or 
campaigns which resemble more classic anti-Semitic appeals (Schiedel and 
Neugebauer 2002).
While these research strategies cam certainly generate valuable insights, they have 
as their point of departure a view off the FPO as right-wing extreme. These studies 
only seek to ‘uncover’ or ‘reveal’ the FPO’s extremist character. This thesis will argue 
that the extremist segment of the FPO is confined to the party’s right-wing section -  
both in terms of key politicians and iin terms of why voters support it (here we might 
draw a parallel between the FPO anid social democratic parties, which may contain a 
few genuine socialists and use the rhetoric of ‘workers solidarity’ in their platforms 
and rituals, but whose basic policy and voter support comes from those who do not 
readily have left socialist or commumist ideologies). In the case of the FPO, the views 
held within a certain minor segment cof the party have all too frequently been depicted 
as a valid description of the party as a whole, a conclusion which is never applied to 
social democratic or even Eurosociallist parties. The result is a biased caricature, with 
only scant scientific relevance to tthe party’s core members or sources of voter 
support. An attempt to explain the rrise of the party in its entirety must also seek to 
explain its appeal to the other, ‘leftist’ section of the party. In focusing on the FPO’s 
populism, the present thesis attermpts a more comprehensive description of the 
party’s entire electorate. Populism c'as a political tactic does not rule out right-wing 
extremism, but populism should nott be confused with right-wing extremism or anti- 
Semitism. This means that FPO votters may be voting for the party despite its right- 
wing extremist and anti-semitic tendencies rather than because of them. In short, 
they may be voting for the FPO because of its populist, anti-elite character.
The Viennese Dokumentationsarchiiv des Osterreichischen Widerstandes (Archive of 
the Austrian Resistance or DOW) is  a renowned institution, specializing in analyzing
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war-time and post-war fascism and National Socialism. It also focuses on present 
day movements on the far-rightist scene, including the FPO. However, the DOW, for 
all its exhaustive documentation, exhibits a similar bias as the sources mentioned 
above. While dedicating considerable resources to analyzing the FPO’s connections 
to racism and fascism, it pays little attention to the FPO’s vehement populist criticism 
of the Austrian establishment.1 This means they cannot fully understand the rise of 
the party under the regime of Jorg Haider. The present thesis, therefore, will help 
restore the balance between the extremist-focused and populist-centered 
perspectives on the FPO.
As will be noted in chapter 6 -  ’A Short History of the FPO from 1949 to 1986’ -  the 
party under Jorg Haider was not, as the Danish Dansk Folkeparti or the Belgian 
Vlaams Belang a ‘new’ political movement. Instead, the FPO (under the name of 
VdU) was established already in 1956 -  one year after Austria emerged from Allied 
occupation. This has led many observers to pay special attention to the political 
heritage since the war-time period (Oswalt 1989; Handbuch des Osterreichischen 
Rechtsextremismus 1993). Undeniably, this line of research is fruitful, not least due 
to the fact that the FPO kept exhibiting political programmes which had clear 
elements of right-wing extremist and even National Socialist thinking, and was often 
led by politicians with a more than dubious political repute. Still, it remains unclear 
whether a continuous line of history also means that a party’s central political views 
as well as the predominant appeal of its electorate are based on an ideological 
legacy of the Second World War. This line of reasoning, while feasible, suffers from 
the fact that it is not always underpinned by empirical evidence. This thesis will argue 
that the link between Second World War fascism and the FPO is tenuous, if not 
misleading. Instead, the present thesis will argue that the rise of the FPO under Jorg 
Haider was not linked to the war period, but was caused by circumstances related to 
modern, post-war Austria -  most importantly, a critique of Austrian Corporatism and 
the political compact between the SPO and the OVP. It will be shown that the FPO’s 
populism and anti-elitism, directed against the Austrian establishment, emerged as 
Haider replaced Steger as party leader in 1986. The popularity of the FPO, therefore, 
is a result of the rise of anti-elitism in modern Austria. The ‘enemy’ to whom the FPO
1 In a conversation with Willy Lasek, researcher at the DOW, I asked about material concerning 
sentiments of populism and anti-elitism within the FPO. Lasek answered, however, that 'we do not 
have that here’. (14 Jan, 2002)
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appeals is not the foreigner or the Jew, but the national, urban, corporate, cultural 
elite. The FPO promotes itself as a party of the ‘people’ against this elite.
Jorg Haider, who died in an auto accident in 2008, was always notorious for his blunt, 
and often aggressive statements and proclamations. Therefore, numerous scholars 
have underscored his personal utterances, not only as a key to the persona of the 
FPO, but also as the main explanation behind the party’s popularity at the polls 
between 1986 and 2000 (Tributsch 1994; Bailer-Galanda 1995; Scharsach 2000a; 
Scharsach and Kuch 2000; Zochling 2000). There is no denying that Haider had a 
flair for highly provocative language. Still, the bulk of this line of analysis tends to be 
content with statements about his rhetorical flair and less concerned with their 
meaning. This often leads to conclusions being drawn out of context, where a right- 
wing extremist focus becomes the only possible interpretation. The consequence is a 
situation where the populist nature of Haider’s rhetoric is either downplayed or 
overlooked in favour of the more stigmatized, dangerous, nationalist or rightist views. 
Jorg Haider was a political chameleon, who leaped from advocating nationalism to 
endorsing neo-liberalism. The present thesis will seek to incorporate the complexities 
of Haider’s politics. Instead of exaggerating the radical nature of his rhetoric, we will 
place Haider’s statements in their social-historical context. We will show that what 
appear to be right-wing nationalist, extremist statements and policies are in fact more 
in line with populist, anti-elitist rhetoric. If this is true, we should see traces of popular 
support for Haider not only among traditional right-wing, nationalist groups, but also 
among more populist-oriented segments, even among the traditional supporters of 
the left. This tendency is not peculiar to Austria, of course. European politics is full of 
examples of working class groups who ‘should be’ voting left or social democratic, 
and instead voting for populist or right-wing parties who speak to their anti-elite 
concerns. What makes the Austrian case interesting, however, is the fact that the 
Austrian elite rule between the SPO and the OVP was often seen as a ‘pure’, text­
book case of corporatism, at the same time as the increase in support of blue-collar 
workers during Jorg Haider’s leadership was very clear (See Table 1 -  ‘Support of 
So-called ‘Modernisation Losers’ -  FPO (Austrian Freedom Party), in Comparison 
1995’; Table 8 -  ‘Socio-Demographic Profile of FPO Voters 1986 to 1999’.). 
Moreover, the rise of Jorg Haider and his party presents a very rich case for 
analysing these socio-political trends.
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This leads over to another important contribution of the present thesis. As noted 
above, research highlighting various forms of right-wing extremist tendencies within 
the FPO as the explanation for their electoral success tends to focus only on these 
factors. Similarly, scholars who wish to stress the historical links to Nazism, or 
Haider’s personal utterances, or indeed, any other particular aspect within the FPO, 
will tend to highlight these aspects while paying less attention to other factors. This 
thesis has a different approach. We will analyze a range of different FPO political 
texts, without any preconceived assumption as to the relative weight of different 
factors. In focusing on these primary sources, we can obtain a broader 
understanding of the reasons behind the rise of the FPO between 1986 and 2000. In 
addition, by investigating a wide range of political texts, programmes, policy 
statements and speeches, we will demonstrate that the source of FPO’s popularity 
lay primarily in its anti-elitism and populism. The right-wing, nationalist, ‘fascist’, ‘neo- 
Nazi’ labeling or name calling of these parties does little to explain the source of their 
support, the strength of their electorate, or even why they also decline under certain 
conditions.
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Chapter 2
Right-wing Extremism and Populism -  A Review of the Literature
Ever since Jorg Haider assumed the leadership of the Austrian Freedom Party in 
September 1986 and the party witnessed a dramatic rise in popularity, it has been 
the subject of considerable scholarly attention. The literature on the Austrian 
Freedom Party is marked by a wide variety of perspectives on and interpretations of 
the nature and objectives of the party and the reasons behind its rise; many of them 
critical, others, although considerably fewer, with a more positive view. This chapter 
will provide a short overview of the academic literature on right-wing populist parties, 
with a focus on the Austrian Freedom Party. As a background to the Freedom Party 
in Austria a general discussion of the contemporary extreme right in Europe will be 
presented. This will focus on their ideological underpinnings, the idea and use of 
populism, and various explanations for their electoral appeal over the last decades. 
Thereafter, the different interpretations and perspectives in relation to the reasons 
behind the rise of the Freedom Party during Jorg Haider’s leadership between 1986 
and 2000 will be outlined. This discussion is organised according to the factors most 
commonly described as shaping or contributing to the success of the Austrian 
Freedom Party: the appeal of right-wing extremist ideas, and the party’s and its 
leader’s populist critique of the Austrian establishment.
These various themes will be discussed further in chapters 4 to 6. A detailed, 
empirical analysis of the role of right-wing extremism and populism in the rise of the 
Freedom Party will follow in Chapters 7 to 9. Similarly, the concepts of populism and 
corporatism, which provide the conceptual framework for the analysis, will be dealt 
with in greater detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively.
The literature review will, after a brief consideration of the study and definition of 
right-wing extremism, deal with the ideological underpinnings of right-wing 
extremism, then examine to what extent right-wing extremist parties may also display 
clear populist characteristics. This will be followed by an overview of the literature on 
the factors of electoral appeal of right-wing extremist parties and a review of the 
weight given in the literature to right-wing extremism as a determining factor for the 
electoral success of the Austrian Freedom Party. The review will conclude with a
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discussion of the importance of populism to the electoral success of the Freedom 
Party in the writings about the party.
The Study of Right-wing Extremism
Right-wing extremism, as a concept, has been conventionally defined to include 
right-wing fringe ideologies, such as Fascism/Neo-Fascism, Nazism/Neo-Nazism, 
and radical nationalism. The terms Fascism or Neo-Fascism suggest a continuation 
from or revival of the views prevailing in either Italy from 1923 until the end of the 
Second World War, or, more widely, in Italy and Germany during the inter-war period 
and the Second World War. The terms Nazism or Neo-Nazism refer to a continuation 
or resurgence of the ideology dominating Germany from 1933 until the end of the 
Second World War. Nazism or Neo-Nazism is nearly unanimously regarded as more 
extreme than Fascism. However, Stanley Payne (1997), renowned expert on 
fascism, has argued that fascism can also be seen as an overarching term, covering 
both Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. Scholars disagree as to 
whether the ‘age of fascism’ continued beyond 1945. Some scholars of the field imply 
that it did not. In the eyes of Ernst Nolte (1965, p. 401), scholar of fascism and 
instigator of the German 'Historikerstreit [battle of historians] in the mid 1980’s, Hugh 
Trevor-Roper (1968, p. 18) and Stanley Payne (1980, p. 5) its era ended with the 
defeat of German Nazism and Italian Fascism. Hence, Stanley Payne’s (1997) recent 
authoritative contribution in the field bears the title A History of Fascism 1914-1945. 
Furthermore, the issue of post-war fascism is given scant attention in recent standard 
publications on fascism, such as Walter Laqueur’s Fascism: A Reader’s Guide 
(1979) or George Mosse’s Towards a general theory of Fascism’ (1979) However, 
other academics as well as left-leaning activists and publishers contest these 
conclusions. Stanley Payne’s assertion that fascism was ‘a historical phenomenon 
primarily limited to Europe during the era of the two world wars’ holds true, as pointed 
out by Roger Griffin, ‘only if considerable weight is placed on the word “primarily”’ 
(Griffin 1991, p. 147; see also Payne 1980, p. 176). Then again, the debate about 
whether or not the age of fascism continues to the present seems to be to a great 
extent a matter of definition. If we accept that the fascist epoch is coterminous with 
the reigns of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, then fascism has, of course, ended for
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good. If, however, it means more generally the mere existence of far right tendencies 
in society such as a homogeneous view of the nation and a scorn for certain aspects 
of modernity, then, fascism remains with us, and is likely to do so for the foreseeable 
future.
Right-Wing Extremism -  Ideological Underpinnings
Starting with the ideological underpinnings of these parties, a wide array of plausible 
qualities have been proposed. It should be noted that in the literature there is no 
clear distinction made between parties labeled as right-wing, right-wing extremist, 
neo-Nazi or neo-Fascist/ post-war Fascist. The following overview therefore 
discusses the most common traits.
In the analysis of Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau (Backes and Moreau, 1993), 
extreme right parties share a rejection of egalitarianism, and suggest an ethno- 
biological or spiritual community. Elbers and Fennema (1993, quoted in Ignazi 1997, 
p. 49) define extreme right parties by their opposition to democracy and by nationalist 
and racist attitudes. In discussing ‘the extreme right’, Paul Hainsworth emphasises 
‘ethnocentric, xenophobic, exclusionary and often outright racist representations of 
the nation’ as the background to its opposition to ‘immigration and multiculturalism’ 
(2000, p. 10). In his influential study Roger Griffin (1991, pp. 166-9) divides ‘neo- 
fascist’ movements or parties into four broad categories, namely, revolutionary 
nationalism, crypto-fascism, revisionism and the new right. Accordingly, 
‘revolutionary nationalist’ movements connote groups that reject all inter-war regimes 
as role-models, including National Socialism and Fascism. ‘Crypto-fascists’ are 
movements operating in the grey zone between the far right and the ultra right, 
among them the German Die Republikaner (The Republicans) under Franz 
Schonhuber, the Austrian Freedom Party under Jorg Haider; the Norwegian 
Framskrittspartiet (the Progress Party), and Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People’s 
Party). ‘Revisionist’ movements tend to consciously trivialize the Holocaust. Finally, 
‘the New Right’, most prominently embodied by the French intellectual rightist 
movement GRECE (Groupment de la Recherche dans une Civilization Europeenne) 
seeks to counter the decadence of the modern world by evoking mythical, spiritual 
ideas, such as those of Tolkien. In his exhaustive taxonomy, Cas Mudde examines
no less than 26 different definitions of the post-war extreme right, and brings to 
attention around 58 features that analysts have attributed to it (Mudde 1996, cited in 
Hainsworth 2000, p. 9).
However, as pointed out by both Hainsworth and Roger Eatwell (2004, p. 8), despite 
this richness of plausible core features of the post-war extreme right four main 
components recur in the literature: 1) anti-democracy, 2) nationalism, 3) racism and, 
4) a strong state. These four features have been elaborated by other observers (von 
Beyme 1998; Mudde 1996). At this point, we may contrast the taxonomy of Cas 
Mudde to the one proposed by Piero Ignazi. In contrast to the abundance of factors 
identified by Mudde, mentioned above, Ignazi (1997, p. 49) proposes a radical 
monocausal definition, whereby the extreme right is seen as a ‘political/ideological 
space where fascism is the key reference.’ (See also the discussion in this thesis, 
Chapter 10, ‘Conclusion’.) Apart from these often cited core ideological features of 
these parties, other key qualities have been suggested, such as traditionalism, 
Catholic integralism, and national populism (Duranton-Crabol 1991, pp. 24-7).
An Old or New Phenomena?
In discussing the ideological core of the European extreme right, the division 
between the old and the new right should be brought to attention. The question is: 
should the contemporary extreme right essentially be seen as a new social 
phenomenon in its own right, or merely the continuation of pre-WWII ideologies? 
Those who seek to stress continuity can draw upon a rich variety of indicators. 
According to Walter Laqueur, the salient qualities of fascism ‘were (and are) self- 
evident: nationalism; social Darwinism; racialism; the need for leadership; a new 
aristocracy, and obedience; and the negation of the ideals of the Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution’ (Laqueur 1996, p. 96). Rather than relying on a reasoned 
argument based on cautious analysis of social trends, ‘Fascism has traditionally been 
based on myths, intuition, instinct (such as the will for power and the voice of the 
blood), and the irrational’. This, Laqueur adds, ‘has not changed’ (Laqueur 1996, p. 
96). An alternative answer is suggested by the protagonists of the above mentioned 
‘new right’; an intellectual movement particularly strong in France and Germany, 
where old, traditional, and brutal concepts such as blood and race have been
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replaced by ‘softer’ concepts, such as ‘belonging’, ‘diversity’, and (ethno-)‘pluralism\ 
The key reason as to why this ‘new right’ is seen as a distinctly new political 
phenomenon is its recurring use of the ideas of the ‘Conservative revolution’ from the 
period of the Weimar Republic, and thinkers such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, 
and the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. The new right has been thematised from 
various angles in the literature; Richard Stoss (1980) has dealt with the evolution of 
the new right in (West)-Germany since 1945, while Franz Gress, Hans-Gerd Jaschke 
and Klaus Schonekas (1990) have discussed the contemporary situation in Western 
Europe. Armin Pfahl-Traughber (1998) has analysed the (limited) impact on the 
current extreme right by values from the new right and the conservative revolution. 
Wolfgang Purtscheller (1994) sees the Austrian Freedom Party as within the family of 
the new right.
Right-Wing Extremist Parties -  Populist or not?
As discussed above, the majority of analysts consider parties such as Front National, 
Vlaams Belang (Flemish interest) and the Austrian Freedom Party as extreme right- 
wing parties (See Hainsworth 2000; Hainsworth 2008; Merkl and Weinberg 1997; 
Merkl and Weinberg, 2003; Schain, Zolberg and Hossay 1999; Ignazi 2003; Deze 
2004; Hafeneger 1994; Scharsach and Kuch 2000). Over the last few decades, 
however, this definition has increasingly been challenged. Instead, populism as an 
explanatory factor for their electoral appeal has gradually gained popularity in the 
academic debate (See Dubiel 1986). As pointed out by Roger Eatwell, one reason for 
this has been the fact that very few would label themselves as ‘extreme right’, and 
that the label of ‘extreme right’ as a consequence would merely be used in order to 
delegitimise groups (Eatwell 2004, p. 11). Another, more common reason for this 
conceptual shift is, Eatwell claims, that so-called right-wing extremists in effect are 
not extreme (Eatwell 2004, p. 11; see also Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998; 
Taggart 1995; Taggart 2000). Eatwell’s latter conclusions are also supported by 
Richard Stoss, who suggests that when empirical investigations are taken into 
account, the German Die Republikaner along with a great number of other parties 
commonly labeled as ‘right-wing extremists’ are better described as ‘protest 
phenomena’ (1994, p. 51).
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What, then, are the various definitions of populism in the literature? ‘Radical right- 
wing populism’, according to Hans-Georg Betz (1993), has two ‘faces’: a neo-liberal 
version (including the Danish People’s Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the 
Austrian Freedom Party), and a racist form of populism (comprising Front National, 
Die Republikaner and the Belgian Vlaams Belang). Betz also introduced a slightly 
different definition of an ‘extreme right populism’, including a) a radical, but not 
necessarily violent opposition to the existing political system, b) the rejection of the 
individual and social equality, c) the defense of the ‘common man’, and d) the 
emphasis on ‘common sense’. In his taxonomy of populism, Armin Pfahl-Traughber 
suggests three dimensions: a) a relationship to the ‘people’; b) recourse to an 
unmediated and direct relationship between the ‘people’ and the ‘populist actor’, and 
c) adherence to the naked truths at the table of regulars (Stammtisch) (Pfahl- 
Traughber, cited in Husbands 1999, p. 50) In a different context, Pfahl-Traughber 
makes use of populism in order to label those ‘modernizing right-wing parties’ which 
appeal to prejudices, traditional values and suggest unfeasible and ‘populist’ 
solutions to socioeconomic problems (Pfahl-Traughber, cited in Ignazi 1997) (A more 
thorough discussion of populism will follow in chapter 4.)
This does not, however, mean that the extreme right and populism (in its various 
permutations) must be distinct from one another. Instead, it is often argued that the 
border between them is blurred. As noted by Richard Stoss, the borderline between 
mere protest-politics and the extreme right is vague. This murky terrain between 
populism and the extreme right corresponds to Reinhard Heinisch’s definition of 
populism, whereby a populist movement, ‘even when embracing far-right ideas’, is 
still ‘more designed for maximum popular appeal than ideological rigor’ (2002, p. 93). 
Notably, Stoss adds that political protests may, but need not, be linked to extreme 
rightist views (1994, p. 35). In other words, protest against the elite may occasionally 
rest on reality rather than politically opportune allegations. From an analytical point of 
view, however, the populist protest and right-wing extremist views are different 
because the former attacks the elite from the position of the excluded underdog, 
whereas the latter attacks (other) excluded and marginalised groups, such as ethnic 
minorities, immigrants and homosexuals from a (perceived) elitist position.
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Explaining the Electoral Appeal of Right-Wing Extremist Parties
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the factors contributing to the 
electoral success of the Austrian Freedom Party. Therefore our attention now turns to 
the discussion in the literature of why people vote for extreme right-wing and populist 
parties. The distinction between the nature of these parties and their electoral appeal 
is not always clear. To begin with, there are structural explanations, which can be 
separated into those concerned with a) socioeconomic causes, b) political/cultural 
causes and c) anti-modernist causes.
Immigration and unemployment have featured prominently as key factors contributing 
to the rise of the extreme right in Europe. However, the link between socioeconomic 
factors such as unemployment and immigration and actual data on electoral appeal 
is inconclusive according to Terri E. Givens (2002, p. 138; see also Betz 1994; Kriesi 
1995). Jorg Haider claimed that th«e number of immigrants in Austria had a direct 
impact on the number of unemployed Austrians. In addition, he spoke in favour of a 
reduction of the number of immigrants until Austria had reached full employment. 
Unemployment alone is also brought forth as a central component behind the rise of 
extreme right-wing parties. Richard Stoss observes an overrepresentation of the 
unemployed among extreme right voters. However, he adds, the correlation is weak, 
because unemployment can lead to  a radicalisation in all directions (Stoss 1994, p. 
31). Historically, unemployment has often strengthened a leftist persuasion.
Moving over to political/cultural catuses, Piero Ignazi (1999, p. 30) suggests four 
hypothetical causes of the rise of iright-wing extremist parties: a) the affirmation of 
neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism and a waning leftist hegemony (i.e. a rightward 
trend); b) an increasing political radiicalisation and polarisation (i.e. a widening gap); 
c) the emergence of new issues in the debate, among them immigration, 
globalization and security; and d) ai shrinking public confidence in party politics (i.e. 
tendencies towards populism). In the discussion below, special attention will be 
assigned to factors c) and d). A collectivist, Durkheimian explanation using the 
concept of ‘Urban anomie’ has Ibeen suggested by Nonna Meyer and Pascal 
Perrineau (1989), for whom ‘Urban anomie’ is the end result of a prolonged feeling of
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exclusion and deprivation, and explains, in their analysis, the rise of Le Pen’s Front 
National (See also Heitmeyer 2005, p. 419).
Anti-modernist causes for the electoral appeal of extreme right-wing parties can be 
divided into ‘losers in the process of modernisation’ and ‘opponents to modernisation’ 
(See Table 1, Ch. 4, p. 66). As outlined by Richard Stoss (1994, p. 43), the former 
explanation relates to a general sense of deprivation, for instance associated with 
unemployment and poverty, as wholesale explanations for increased support of 
extreme right-wing parties. The latter explanation, whereby the voters of the extreme 
right are depicted as (less passive) opponents to modernisation, is described by 
Butterwegge: The current extreme right constitutes the negation of a modern form of 
society, including its ‘humanitarian basic values, its democratic and social 
accomplishments (welfare state arrangements, human and citizen’s rights) within the 
framework of the nation’ (Butterwegge 1990, p.16 f). In brief, the theory of opponents 
to modernisation stresses an active desire to replace an egalitarian modernity with a 
hierarchical form of society.
As indicated above, the plausible structural causes for voting for extreme right-wing 
parties are somewhat contradictory. In his thorough investigation of the German the 
Republicans Richard Stoss concluded that the supporters of the extreme right make 
up a very heterogeneous grouping. He observed a shift of voters from many parties; 
a mild tendency towards those of lower education; and no clear tendency regarding 
age, income, or religious persuasion. In the absence of decisive structural 
explanation, Stoss argues that ‘supporters of the extreme right most of all are 
determined by specific political opinions and values’ (1994, p. 34). Among these 
political opinions and values, Stoss includes nationalism, ethnocentrism, racism, anti- 
Semitism and authoritarianism. The electorate appeal for right-wing extremist parties 
is, hence, caused by a penchant for racism and authoritarianism -  i.e. for right-wing 
extremism. It could be argued that as an explanation, this line of reasoning is close to 
circular.
Another central factor behind the rise of the extreme right is brought to attention by 
Walter Laqueur (1996) When old, traditional concepts such as blood and race have 
left the stage for the benefit of more defensive and reasoned arguments such as 
Indo-European values and a (ethno)-pluralist world of many colours, a new style is
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also required. Therefore, Laqueur labels these smartly dressed, tanned and media- 
adapted rightist politicians as members of a new telecratie (1996, p. 93). Jorg Haider 
and Gianfranco Fini would be good illustrations of this.
Right-wing Extremism -  A Determining Factor for the Electoral Success 
of the FPO?
Many observers have claimed that the appeal to the electorate of right-wing extremist 
ideas in their various shades and expressions has been the most important reason 
for the rise in popularity of the Austriian Freedom Party between 1986 and 2000. This 
overview will start with the views expressed in Handbuch des Osterreichischen 
Rechtsextremismus (1993), published by the Viennese Archive for the Austrian 
Resistance.2 The rise of the party since 1986 was, it is argued in the Handbuch, a 
consequence of a drastic shift towards right-wing extremist views, symbolised by, 
among other things, an integration of a large number of Neo-nazis; along with a 
systematic marginalization of Friedhielm Frischenschlager, Heide Schmidt, and other 
members of the party’s liberal wimg. Contrary to what might be expected, this 
radicalisation was accompanied by an increase in voter support, a trend that has 
caused great concern among numierous critical scholars. For example, Wolfgang 
Neugebauer, researcher at the Vieinnese Archive for the Austrian Resistance, has 
concluded that the right-wing extremist character of the Freedom Party under Jorg 
Haider constituted a danger for democracy in Austria (Neugebauer 1997; see also 
Wodak and Neugebauer 1997). In tlhe eyes of the Austrian journalists Hans-Henning 
Scharsach and Kurt Kuch (2000, p. 287), the Freedom Party was ‘right-wing 
extremist’; it invariably managed to attract an audience by making use of right-wing 
extremist rhetoric and socialising witth members of the right-wing extremist scene. As 
for the party leader -  Jorg Haider — Scharsach saw him as a ‘right-wing extremist’ 
(Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 11997, p. 50). The party managed to gain votes 
because it appealed to the fringes of the electorate. This right-wing extremist 
interpretation of the Freedom Party iis shared by Hermann L. Gremliza (2000, p. 11),
2 Das Dokumentationsarchiv des Osterreicthischen Widerstandes, the Archive for the Documentation 
of the Austrian Resistance, was founded in 'Vienna in 1963 by former opponents to the Nazi regime. It 
is an internationally established Austrian research institute focusing on historical and contemporary 
right-wing extremism.
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according to whom the rise of the Freedom Party essentially is to be seen as a sign 
of a right-wing radicalisation of the Austrian electorate.
Some observers attribute the appeal of the party to its Fascist tendencies. According 
to Willibald Holzer, Austrian expert on Historical Fascism, the key attractions for the 
Austrian electorate constituted of: a nationalistic and revisionist view of history; the 
co-existence of old (and brutal) and new (and sophisticated) racism; a simplified 
distinction between friend and foe; a critique of democracy and the parliamentary 
establishment; fierce advocacy in favour of Volksgemeinschaft, an authoritarian 
perception of the state and the strong leader; an aggressive political style and a 
distinctly anti-feminist view (Scharsach and Kuch 2000, p. 287). Holzer’s view of a 
new and sophisticated language is linked to the theory that the extremist ideas of the 
party may not always be apparent as they are often expressed in a codified 
language, disguised behind a veil of modernised rhetoric and a righteous anti-elitist 
‘protest’ agenda only to be understood by a small number of the party’s voters.3 In 
the eyes of Roger Griffin (1991, p. 167), terms such as ‘liberal’, ‘progressive’ and 
‘freedom ‘ are nothing but attempts to hide ‘ultra-right thinking’. Furthermore, the 
‘modernisation-thesis’, which sees the movement towards a ‘New Right’ as a way to 
win over the electorate, has stimulated an interest in the ways in which this is being 
expressed in publications within the power sphere of the party. In this context, 
Reinhold Gartner, Austrian expert in the field of the extreme right and the Freedom 
Party, should be mentioned; in particular his thematic investigation of the 
‘sophisticated’ and ‘intellectualised’ rhetoric in a monthly magazine die Aula, closely 
affiliated to the party (Gartner 1996). The examples above show that the issue of 
rhetoric and use of language remains an area of vital significance among critics of 
the Freedom Party. In particular, research has focused on various ‘discourses of 
exclusion’, be they discourses based on nationalism, racism or anti-Semitism. Ruth 
Wodak, a prominent linguist, has been at the forefront of this approach (e.g. Wodak 
et a l 1990; Wodak 2000). More generally, Brigitte-Bailer Galanda’s Haider Wortlich- 
Fuhrer in die Dritte Republik (1995) offers a critical, systematised overview of the 
political language of the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party. These views 
are shared by Anton Pelinka, Austrian historian and expert on the Austrian party 
system and the ideology of the Freedom Party. The old Nazis and the bourgeois-
3 For a discussion of this transformation from an "old right" to a "new right” furnished with sophisticated 
rhetoric, see Pfahl-Traughber (1998).
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agricultural pan-German camp comprising the party’s historical backbone were, they 
argue, attracted by Haider’s rhetoric. However, Haider also managed to exploit the 
resentment among ‘the losers in the modernisation process’ as well as persuade 
significant parts of the young urban proletariat (See Table 1, Ch. 4, p. 66, and Table 
8, Ch. 8, p. 173). Therefore, Pelinka maintains, along with ‘an old-fashioned 
message’, Haider made use of ‘a successful post-modernist and ’’populist” style’ 
(Pelinka 2008).
Undeniably, these right-wing extremist aspects constitute an important explanatory 
factor for the rise of the Austrian Freedom Party since 1986 when Jorg Haider took 
over as party leader, and researchers, the media and political commentators have 
been greatly influenced by this critical understanding. Still, according to other 
theories, the right-wing extremist aspect does not comprise the entire picture. Right- 
wing extremism does not constitute the primary or sole explanation for the Freedom 
Party’s remarkable electoral appeal during Jorg Haider’s leadership between 1986 
and 2000. The following will present a summary of the literature on the subject. One 
question is: What is meant by Fascism? On what grounds has the Freedom Party so 
often been depicted as fascist? As noted by Walter Laqueur (1996, p. 7), the concept 
of ‘Fascism’ is widely seen as a concept of paramount evil, and it is uncertain to what 
extent the Freedom Party fits into this category (See also Kowalsky 1992, p. 29; Pick 
2000a, p. 277). Insofar as the relation between Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party and 
Fascism is questionable, it casts doubt on the argument that Haider and his party 
would represent a threat to democracy. While a critique of one democratic system 
may constitute an outright attack against democracy perse, this need not necessarily 
be the case. For instance, Hans-Georg Betz (2000, p. 269) has argued that Haider’s 
Freedom Party, rather than seeking to end democracy, was defending it against 
authoritarian oppression.
As mentioned above, some observers have questioned the ‘radicalness’ of the 
rhetoric of Haider and other party members. Extremist statements need not always 
be indicative of an extremist character of the whole party. In fact, the message may 
also occasionally serve the sole purpose of provoking the party’s political 
antagonists. According to Max Riedlsperger (1996a, p. 359), it is important to remain 
composed and not yield to emotions when faced with such rhetoric, because eliciting 
emotional reactions may be part of Haider’s intention. As a final area of controversy,
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this review will touch upon the various perceptions in the literature about the ‘real’ 
intentions of the Freedom Party. It is often assumed that these intentions are 
‘hidden’. Reinhard Heinisch, political scientist and expert on the Austrian party 
system, questions the weight of such an argument. During the international sanctions 
against Austria in 2000, all Austrian leaders, he claims, committed themselves to 
democracy and related principles, and it is very difficult not to take these statements 
at face value (Heinisch 2002, p. 244).
As the review of the literature has highlighted, the reasons for the electoral success 
of the Freedom Party have been the subject of intense debate. While many 
observers have emphasised the appeal of the party’s right-wing ideological 
tendencies, its statements on nationalism, immigration and unemployment, some 
have highlighted other factors such as its populist appeal. While there is an 
abundance of material supporting each perspective, there is a shortage of literature 
concerned with comparing these two perspectives with the support of a thorough 
empirical analysis. This thesis intends to fill this gap by first offering the first 
systematic comparison. The following section will therefore review how the 
importance of populism has been treated in the literature.
Populism -  A Factor of Success for the Party? An Overview of the Literature
Many authors agree that the success of the Austrian Freedom Party is due or at least 
partially due to Haider’s populist appeal. Even though populism as a concept is 
vague, it still has some discernable core tenets, in particular: (at times) a 
stereotypical defense of ‘the people’, and (at times) an equally simplified critique of 
‘the elite’.
Relating to this critique is a second question concerning the intentions of the party 
leaders, i.e., whether this critique of the elite is a tactic or an end in itself. In other 
words, is the party really aiming for increased democracy, or does it have a hidden, 
right-wing populist agenda, whereby democracy is a means to achieve power, and 
populism a mere vote-catching tactic? In order to satisfactorily address these two 
very different questions, it is important to examine the role and performance of the 
Austrian elite. As Chapter 5 will show in greater detail, the post-Second World War
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history of Austria is characterised by the dual rule of the country’s two main political 
parties, the Austrian People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party of Austria. While 
this arrangement has contributed to peaceful social, economic and political 
development in Austria, over the years this system has, according to many scholars, 
started to exhibit democratic deficits and flaws, particularly in the form of a lack of 
transparency and a rubber-stamp parliament (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 104). These 
flaws have been greatly exploited by critics of the system and are key elements of 
Haider’s and the Austrian Freedom Party’s discourse.
The electorate may be attracted either by the right-wing rhetoric, based primarily on 
unfounded allegations against the elite, or by arguments appealing to a more 
egalitarian and just society. Dealing with one of the core components of populism -  
the critique of the elite -  the German and Austrian political theorists Claus Leggewie 
and Rudolf Burger lean towards the latter explanation for the Austrian Freedom 
Party’s popularity (Riedlsperger 1995b). Contrary to more skeptical commentators, 
party sympathisers did not, in their view, support the Freedom Party because they 
craved for a highly centralised and neo-Fascist state. Anyone who instantly brings up 
parallels with a conquered Fascist past, they argue, fails to understand modern 
international realities. Stefan Immerfall, G.erman political sociologist, argues that the 
reason why many Austrian citizens decid ed to vote for the Freedom Party was not 
that they longed for ‘the recrudescemce of fascism’, or ‘a highly centralised, 
neofascist totalitarianism’ but instead because they favoured ‘a smaller government’ 
where the omnipotence of the ruling elite iis broken, and ‘in which the people play(ed) 
a more direct role in governing themselves’ (Betz and Immerfall 1998, p. 27). In other 
words, its electorate wanted more influence, not less. Omnipotent parties effectively 
destroy democracy, as noted by the political journalist Hella Pick. During the period 
of the coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s Party, 
Austria was, she argues, turned into a (democracy without an effective opposition, ‘a 
mockery of democracy’ (Pick 2000a). Witth its tremendous success at the polls, the 
Freedom Party brought this to public attemtion and used it to elicit more support.
Of course, criticising elitism within the Auistrian political system does not necessarily 
imply the endorsing of all, or even the (majority of the rhetorical fire by the Freedom 
Party. As pointed out by Goran Dahl (1999, p. 105), a leading Swedish sociologist in 
the field of political extremism, the party’s  successful ‘anti-establishment profile’ was
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‘not without ground’ (See also Persson 1996). Even though a justified critique of the 
Austrian elite is an important contributing factor in explaining the phenomenal rise in 
popularity of the party, its importance in the literature has largely been underrated.
In the eyes of other commentators, among them Walter Laqueur, Brigitte Bailer- 
Galanda and Hans-Henning Scharsach, the Freedom Party’s ‘liberating’ rhetoric, and 
its defence of ‘the people’s interests’, however, are unconvincing. At this point, we 
must return to the question above: is the party merely seeking to increase popular 
participation, or does it have a hidden agenda? This question could be partly 
addressed by distinguishing between a well-founded critique of the elite and a 
critique based largely on imaginary, fabricated shortcomings of the elite. However, 
the literature on the subject rarely pays attention to this.
In the eyes of Walter Laqueur (1996, p. 218), the Freedom Party had merely created 
‘the illusion of a “participatory democracy”, a euphemism for the manipulation of 
people unhappy with the political parties’ performance.’ In a similar fashion, the 
Austrian journalist Hans-Henning Scharsach describes a betrayal of the party’s 
electorate: ‘Haider’s populist proposals of plebiscitary democracy pervert the very 
nature of this democratic instrument.’ (2000a, p. 208). Whatever its voters had hoped 
for, Haider’s real agenda had nothing to do with increased public participation in 
political matters. Thus, plebiscites cease to be a safety measure in the hands of the 
citizens against elitist tendencies within the political establishment. In contrast, ‘the 
will of the people’ is being exploited for the benefit of hidden authoritarian agendas 
and a malevolent populist elite.
The Importance of the Party Leader
In populist parties, the balance of power between the party leader and his or her 
party is often an essential issue. For our present purpose, we must ask: did the 
personal style, personality and ‘charisma’ (literally meaning ‘gift of grace’) of Jorg 
Haider significantly contribute to the rise of the Freedom Party? (Gerth and Mills 
1997, p. 52). Below, we shall not go into more detail regarding the concept of 
charismatic leadership as, for example, in Max Weber’s classic discussion. For the 
purpose of this thesis it suffices to follow the short definition suggested by Roger
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Eatwell, which defines charisma as: a) the ability to appeal to voters (external 
dimension), and b) the ability to hold a party together (internal definition) (Eatwell 
2003, p. 65; Weber 1997). First, let us consider a few examples of this external 
dimension -  the ability to attract voters. Those who believe that Haider’s charisma 
had a central role in explaining th;e rise of the party often stress the correlation 
between the rise of the party and Haider’s seizing of power in 1986. Throughout its 
existence, the Freedom Party had einjoyed the support of a fairly stable though small 
fraction of the Austrian electorate; but the year 1986 marked a drastic change. As 
noted by Hans-Georg Betz, within thiree months of the election of Jorg Haider in 
Innsbruck the popular support for the party increased from one percent to almost ten 
percent at the federal level (Betz 1994„ p. 12). (For an overview of shares of the vote 
see Table 5 in Chapter 8, p. 166.) Jn the eyes of Goran Dahl, Haider’s role is ‘very 
significant’ for the sudden rise of the Freedom Party, and ‘should not be 
underestimated’ (1999, p. 105). Kurt Richard Luther, British expert on the topic, 
emphasises the fact that the party’s  period of 'populist protest par excellence' 
between 1986 and 1999, coincided wiith Jorg Haider’s leadership (2003, p. 192). In 
his overview of ‘the charismatic leadjer thesis’ for the party’s rise, Roger Eatwell 
emphasises a certain form of external charisma -  manifest in the focus on Haider in 
large sections of the Austrian media (2003, p. 66). Publicity as such, however, does 
not necessarily entail political support.. The perception of Jorg Haider in the Austrian 
media contains darker aspects. Jorg Hiaider has often responded to serious criticisms 
by taking an issue to court, followed! by accusations of ‘defamation’ and the like. 
Consequently, the most likely cost of eany serious accusation -  both in terms of time 
and, every so often, eventual fines -  has led many journalists, politicians, and 
academics to think twice before voiciing any criticism against Jorg Haider and his 
party. A famous court case resulted from a comment made by the Innsbruck political 
historian Anton Pelinka on Italian television in May 1999. In the interview Pelinka 
stated: ‘In his career, Haider has repeatedly made statements which amount to 
trivialising National Socialism. Once he described death camps as penal camps. On 
the whole, Haider is responsible for rmaking certain National Socialist positions and 
certain National Socialist remarks rmore politically acceptable.’ In May 2000 the 
Criminal Court of Vienna found Pelimka guilty of ‘defaming the character’ of Jorg 
Haider. As a consequence, Pelinka was fined the equivalent of about $4500 (Bischof 
etal. 2000). Pelinka was later acquitted at the provincial High Court in Vienna.
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As far as the internal notion of charisma is concerned, it was no secret that Haider’s 
personal political power within the party was virtually unparalleled in contemporary 
Western Europe. According to Roger Eatwell (2003, p. 66), Haider’s control of his 
party between 1986 and 2000 offers a good example of internal charisma. However, 
in internal party matters Haider’s charisma was often tainted by a more dictatorial 
attitude. The disrespectful manner in which he treated the liberals in the early 1990’s 
bears the imprint of dictatorial behaviour. His dismissive attitude towards his fellow 
party members is displayed, as noted by Christa Zochling, in the rituals of submission 
and strangely self-humiliating excuses by his party colleagues, such as, ‘We have 
acted childishly’, following Haider’s announcement that, ‘Occasionally, I feel as if I 
were a governor of a large kindergarten’ (Cited in Zochling 2000, p. 191). Haider has 
also, in a quite condescending manner, assigned ‘homework’ to his party colleagues. 
Equally reminiscent of anti-democratic principles, the unusual authority of Haider 
enabled him to dismiss no fewer than 700 elected political functionaries in 1997 and 
1998 (Scharsach and Kuch 2000, p. 293; Mair et al. 2004, p. 161). Haider’s power 
indicates, according to the Handbuch des Osterreichischen Rechtsextremismus, an 
unparalleled ‘inner-party totalitarianism’ (1993, p. 352). Even though the 
consequences of these measures were negative for the expelled party members, it is 
clear that the party as a whole benefited from Haider’s internal charismatic qualities. 
Moreover, these qualities are closely linked to his decisiveness and his crude and 
independent ability for action, qualities that, within the context of Austria, are likely to 
have been highly appealing to certain segments of the electorate who felt that the 
authorities needed to be shaken up or put in their place by impulsive, popular ‘action’.
The above section has dealt with two fundamental explanations for the electoral 
appeal of the Freedom Party during Jorg Haider’s leadership, namely right-wing 
extremism and populism. The explanation based on the appeal of right-wing 
extremism relies on the acceptance of certain views, including the position that in 
1986, the party was swiftly radicalised towards a more right-wing extremist agenda; 
that the electorate was moving in a right-wing extremist direction, while Jorg Haider 
was described as a right-wing extremist; and that behind a veil of ‘codified’ liberal 
jargon, the party’s successful rhetoric was extremist, or possibly fascist.
Others, however, have questioned the weight of these conclusions. It was hard to 
overlook the fact that the Freedom Party had always adhered to the democratic rules
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of the game. Instead, populism was suggested as an alternative explanation. The 
system of the Austrian elite had struggled with immense problems of democratic 
legitimacy, which had been exploited very successfully by Jorg Haider and the 
Freedom Party. The key to the party’s electoral success was not related to historical 
fascism but to a distinctly modern social phenomenon. Of course, these views were 
not left undisputed, which, again, led back to the issue of apparent versus real 
motives. Behind clever vote-catching tactics, Jorg Haider was never interested in 
increasing democracy, some argue, but in replacing an open, democratic system 
(that had minor imperfections) with authoritarian rule.
The literature review has brought to attention one of the more problematic and 
controversial fields within modern social/political debate. What is the main motivating 
factor behind the recent rise of European parties on the rightist fringes? The debate 
has largely been dominated by focusing on the appeal of the ideology of the parties, 
but increasingly this view is being complemented by assessing the importance of 
populism. The above discussion has presented some of the key arguments for these 
two fundamental views. These views and arguments will be analysed in greater detail 
in the following chapters, focusing on the development of the Austrian Freedom 
Party.
Even though there is a plethora of material on the rise and on the electoral appeal of 
the Freedom Party -  in particular from 1986 onwards -  explicit comparisons between 
the explanatory strength of right-wing extremism and populism are rare. The present 
thesis will conduct a comparison between the two, based on a rich variety of 
Freedom Party sources; party material, interviews, speeches, and books. Moreover, 
the EU-sanctions against Austria will be brought into the picture. Considerable 
emphasis will be placed on statistical material and exit polls. This quantitative 
material represents the foundation of the main argument of this thesis, namely, that 
the rise in support of the FPO can best be explained by the party’s unflinching 
criticism of the Austrian elite rule of the SPO and the OVP.
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Chapter 3 
Methodology
As the literature review has shown, there is an abundance of written material about 
the Austrian Freedom Party, particularly from 1986 onwards. The party’s political 
programme, its history and its electoral successes have received significant attention, 
with a particular focus on fascism, xenophobia, immigration and related issues. This 
thesis seeks to assess the reasons for the electoral success of the Freedom Party. 
This requires a careful assessment of the data and the methods that will be used to 
analyse the data. In order to understand the reasons behind the Freedom Party’s 
success, two areas of interest will be highlighted: the debate concerning the Freedom 
Party and right-wing extremism, and the debate concerning the Freedom Party and 
populism.
Over the last few decades, the Austrian Freedom Party has been one of the most 
written-about political parties in Europe. Given Austria’s modest size, the amount of 
attention devoted to the Freedom Party is all the more surprising. Despite this, 
however, the number of thorough investigations dedicated to the Freedom Party’s 
own material has been fairly small. Often, second-hand sources, occasionally with a 
strong normative agenda, have been regarded as sufficient to support the analysis of 
the Party. Yet it is impossible to analyse any political movement without assigning 
due attention to its own documents and publications. This thesis therefore draws to a 
considerable extent upon primary sources; party programmes, internal documents, 
Jorg Haider’s own publications and books, political declarations and speeches, and 
statements by prominent party members. Whenever the party’s rhetoric is being 
analysed, attempts have been made to present the wider picture in order to avoid 
arriving at simplified assumptions and conclusions. When dealing with a party with 
indisputable populist tendencies, it is of vital importance to maintain academic 
impartiality, and not to yield to stereotypical images.
This thesis pays considerable attention to the statements and publications of Jorg 
Haider, the party chairman throughout the period of investigation. As the literature 
review has shown, during this time the party was dominated by Jorg Haider. While
47
much of this analysis has to be, by its nature, qualitative, an assessment will also be 
made of the relative weight given by the party to certain key issues in its yearbooks.
Election data and survey results constitute other important sources of data to support 
the research findings. Exit polls of the Austrian electorate, conducted by reputable 
research institutes, provide motives and stated motives for supporting the Freedom 
Party. Survey results will present correlations between social background and voting 
behavior.
Secondary literature, reports and analyses of various explanations for the recent rise 
of the party offer a third source of data. This includes a discussion of the EU- 
documents referring to the sanctions against Austria in 2000, as well as the ‘EU 
report’ ending the sanctions (Ahtisaari, Frowein and Oreja 2000). While part of this 
literature is based on scientific analysis, other parts are journalistic or polemical texts 
debating the party’s policies, activities and ideology, or the party leader Jorg Haider 
himself.
Jorg Haider’s Writings
Haider’s own work is an integral part of the analysis. Haider authored six books 
(1993a; 1994; 1996; 1997a; 1997b; 2003) and co-authored several more. Two of his 
books are crucially important for understanding the Austrian Freedom Party’s 
evolution and the development of its ideology and policies as well as Haider’s own 
view of Austrian society and politics: Die Freiheit, die ich meine. Das Ende des 
Proporzstaates. Pladoyer fur die Dritte Republik (1993a) (The Freedom I mean. The 
end of the proportional state. A pledge for the Third Republic); and Befreite Zukunft 
jenseits von links und rechts -  Menschliche Alternative fur eine Brucke ins neue 
Jahrtausend (1997b) (Liberated future beyond left and right -  Human alternatives for 
a bridge into the New Millennium).4
4 Even though here Die Freiheit, die ich meine and Befreite Zukunft m\\ be treated as the works of 
Jorg Haider personally, their true origins remain uncertain. According to Lothar Hobelt, Professor in 
History at the University in Vienna and former leader of Freiheitliches Bildungswerk, they were not 
written by Jorg Haider but by ghostwriters; Die Freiheit, die ich meine by Andreas Molzer, prominent 
spokesperson of the Freedom Party’s radical wing, especially during the early 1990s, and Befreite 
Zukunft by Peter Sichrowsky, former General Secretary of the Freedom Party, of Jewish origin, party
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The focus on Haider’s books and speeches raises an important question: how can 
assigning such an extensive role to Jorg Haider’s books and speeches be justified in 
analysing the rise of the Austrian Freedom Party? Is there a danger that such an 
approach will lead to a focus on the political views and opinions of one particular 
person among many, instead of the general political views and opinions of an entire 
political party? As was discussed in the literature review, Jorg Haider had a very 
prominent position within the party; the party and its rise were therefore shaped to a 
great extent by him during the period of investigation. ‘Until 2000’, as noted by Muller, 
Plasser and Ulram (2004, p. 161), Haider ‘de facto made all important strategic and 
personnel decisions. Party bodies only ratified what had very often already been 
publicly announced.’ This view is echoed by Duncan Morrow and Kurt Richard 
Luther, both British experts on the Austrian far right. The FPO’, Morrow claims, ‘is a 
strongly authoritarian party devoted to Haider’s leadership’ (Morrow 2000, p. 60). 
‘The loyalty of the FPO party elite’, Luther argues, ‘is oriented less to the party as 
such than to Haider himself (1999, p. 141). The views he expresses in these books, 
along with a number of selected speeches and interviews, are therefore essential to 
the analysis.
Die Freiheit, die ich meine offers insight into the political rhetoric of Jorg Haider 
during the early 1990s, a period of indisputable success for the party at both national 
and sub-national levels. In 1994, the Freedom Party had 4.5 times more votes than in 
the 1983 elections, increasing from 12 to 42 seats in parliament. In Haider’s home 
region of Carinthia, the party won 33 percent of votes at the local elections in 1994 
(See charts and tables with results in national and local elections in Chapter 8, Chart 
1, p. 164; Table 5, p.166, and Table 6, p. 167). Furthermore, 1993 represented, in 
the eyes of many observers, a turning point for the party. After 1986 a gradual 
radicalisation of the party’s rhetoric occurred, culminating in the exit from the Liberal 
International in 1993, accompanied by the resignation of key members of the party’s 
more ‘leftist’ wing, most importantly Heide Schmidt and Friedhelm Frischenschlager. 
Die Freiheit, die ich meine provides Haider’s view of the core discussions of the party 
during one of the most important episodes in its history. In several chapters, Haider 
criticises the Austrian political establishment, presenting a cultural critique of leftist 
hegemony and artistic decadence, a political critique of liberal market ideas and the
representative at the European Union, and formerly a prominent advocate of market-oriented views 
within the Freedom Party. (Hobelt, personal communication).
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Austrian elite in general, and an economic critique of the country’s economic 
mismanagement and economic modernisation. Assessing Haider’s critiques as 
expressed in this book help us understand the importance of anti-elite critique, 
whether this is well-founded or largely a voter-catching tactic, to the party’s electoral 
success.
Befreite Zukunft was first published in 1997 at a time when the party had established 
itself as a forceful political party on the right fringes of the Austrian political spectrum. 
The increasing impact of globalisation, neo-liberalism and the country’s EU 
membership (Austria joined the EU in 1995) had started to affect the entire political 
spectrum, including the Freedom Party, and increasingly influenced the party’s 
rhetoric and programme. Befreite Zukunft provides a crucial document in evaluating 
the evolution of the political rhetoric of the party during this period of changing 
international circumstances. Similarly to Die Freiheit, die ich meine, Befreite Zukunft 
attacks the Austrian elite from a wide variety of angles. Even though on the 
international scene, at around this time the general trend turned against traditional 
right-wing populism and towards market views and commercialism, the party did not 
lose its popularity. On the contrary, its electoral support continued to increase 
throughout the final years of the 1990s.
Both books gained public attention, and were for some time part of debates in the 
media, contributing to the popularity of the Freedom Party. More important, however, 
is the fact that both were highly influential in shaping the party programmes. Further, 
numerous discussions and themes featured in the two books later recurred 
prominently in the election campaigns, as Chapter 9 will show. According to Lothar 
Hobelt (2003, p. 160), Die Freiheit, die ich meine, ‘was obviously designed’ to replace 
Andreas Molzer’s 1990 Jorg! -  Der Eisbrecher, (Jorg! The icebreaker) as ‘a party 
campaign (auto)biography.’
Surprisingly, few political analysts have used these two books for an in-depth 
analysis of the Austrian Freedom Party. Many commentators seem to rely heavily on 
sensationalist media reports and statements, or speculative, excessively critical 
assumptions when commenting on the party’s programme and ideology, rather than 
conducting thorough and objective analyses of the main party literature (See, for 
example, Cheles 1995; Dahlstedt 1999; Golsan 1998; Gremliza 2000; Harris 1990).
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With a thorough qualitative analysis of these two books as well as other documents, 
we can focus on hitherto overlooked issues in developing an understanding of the 
Freedom Party’s dynamics and evolution and thereby fill an important lacuna in the 
debate about the party. The analysis of the two books is complemented by looking at 
several key speeches and interviews of Haider and other prominent party members.
As shown in the literature review, Haider’s writings and speeches have been the 
subject of numerous critiques and controversies. The analysis will also draw upon 
how his books and the speeches have been interpreted. The Archive for the 
Documentation of the Austrian Resistance, for instance, has gathered a considerable 
amount of material about the party. In 2000, as a consequence of the government 
coalition between the Freedom Party and the People’s Party, a substantial 
investigation by the EU was made not only of the Freedom Party, but of Austria as a 
whole. The EU sanctions against Austria were a result of concerns amongst EU 
member states about the racist and fascist undertones of the party and the fear of 
there being a right-wing radical party in the middle of Europe, but also covered wider 
issues around asylum policies, the level of tolerance and other democratic 
credentials of the Austrian state. The ensuing EU report is also particularly important 
because of the uniqueness of the EU’s reaction: never before had the EU so swiftly 
reached consensus. Therefore, the EU-sanctions and the associated report are vital 
for understanding to what extent right-wing views have shaped the party’s 
development and the reaction of its electorate and the wider Austrian society.
Freiheit und Verantwortung -  The Party’s Yearbooks
The second main source of primary data about the party’s internal ideological 
debates is its annual yearbooks -  Freiheit und Verantwortung. The Yearbooks were 
published between 1993 and 2001 by the Freiheitiiches Bildungswerk (the Academic 
Section within the Freedom Party), based in Vienna.5 They comprise articles and 
reports about historical, intellectual and social issues written mostly by Freedom 
Party members, and sympathisers in other countries. However, they also feature 
articles written by individuals that may not be seen as party sympathisers, such as
5 Due to restructuring and internal party strife, the yearbooks were terminated in 2001.
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the late former co-editor of the German Weekly Die Zeit, Marion Grafin Donhoff. The 
yearbooks provide a good reflection of the range of views prevalent within the party 
and among its supporters. A quantitative analysis of the content of all available 
yearbooks between 1993 and 2001 will be conducted, looking at the weight given to 
specific topics, giving an indication of the importance of certain issues such as 
criticism of the elite or right-wing extremist ideas such as those found in nationalist 
and racist discourse.
The Party Programmes
To complement the above sources, the present thesis also relies on the 
Parteiprogramm 1985 and Parteiprogramm 1997, and also takes into account the 
Osterreicherklarung zur Nationalratswahl of 1994 (Declaration of Austria at the 1994 
National Election). These three publications will support the observations and 
conclusions derived from the analysis of Jorg Haider’s two books and the Yearbooks. 
Also, they will offer a more hands-on source of information, describing not only the 
discourse and what was being discussed within the party, but also describing the 
party’s policies.
Election Data and Polls
To test the hypothesis that anti-elitist themes, such as corruption and scandals, were 
the core reasons for the Freedom Party’s electoral success since 1986, the thesis will 
draw on data from the elections and available polls. Four exit polls conducted by the 
German market research institute Fessel GfK -  1986,1990, 1994 and 1999 -  will be 
used for this purpose. Its Austrian branch, GfK Austria, is the leading market 
research institute in Austria, and its political research section is led by Dr. Peter 
Ulram, prominent expert in the field of opinion polls, quantitative analysis and 
Austrian politics. In analysing these election and survey data, we will focus on the 
following questions: What was the role of the right-wing extremist themes in these 
statistical investigations? What was the role of populist themes? The answer to these
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questions will provide valuable information as to the core hypothesis in the present 
thesis.
Populism and the Austrian Elite
An important part of this thesis shall deal with the Freedom Party’s critical discussion 
of the Austrian political elite. While Jorg Haider and the Freedom Party stated that 
they were merely describing what was going on, the members of the elite claimed 
that their allegations were unjustified. Therefore, it was decided that both the 
theoretical chapter on populism, and the background chapter on the Austrian elite 
rule, would be presented from two angles representing these two general 
perspectives.
The Political Context
Many studies of the Freedom Party have focused exclusively on the party itself, 
ignoring its place in the Austrian political spectrum (See Golsan 1998,1-18; Gremliza 
2000; Hainsworth 2008; Kestel and Godmer 2004; Oswalt 1989; Zochling 2000). 
The rest of the political spectrum in Austria, which to a large extent shaped and 
continues to shape the political agenda of the Freedom Party, is thereby left out of 
the picture or has its importance undervalued. This omission is particularly important 
in dealing with Austria, where issues such as national guilt and the legacy of the 
Second World War affect every party. Therefore, the present thesis will not only 
discuss the Freedom Party as an isolated phenomenon but will also discuss other 
political players. Similarly, although the rise of the Freedom Party occurred in Austria, 
the repercussions have at times been dramatically felt throughout Europe. Therefore, 
occasionally, the thesis will broaden the picture and discuss the rise of the Freedom 
Party from a wider European perspective. The EU-sanctions as a consequence of 
the government coalition between the People’s Party and the Freedom Party in early 
2000 prove a good example of this.
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The Freedom Party displays, from many perspectives, right-wing populist features. 
The party expresses a remarkable capacity for sudden shifts in views and opinions, 
more, arguably, than either outright Fascist parties confined by their extremist 
ideology, or mainstream parties restricted by a fairly consistent political agenda. 
Shifting views and opinions, as Chapter 4 will show, are often typical characteristics 
of populist parties. These shifts, nevertheless, pose a problem for any scholar 
searching for the party’s views behind what could be considered vote-catching tactics 
or empty rhetoric. To the extent possible, this apparent problem of reliability has been 
taken into consideration when analysing the ideological material of the Freedom 
Party. Yet the purpose of the thesis is to investigate the reasons behind the 
spectacular rise in popularity of the Freedom Party. The thesis will not venture into 
determining the party’s ‘true nature’ or speculating whether party rhetoric was merely 
to catch and manipulate the voters.
While the current literature on the Freedom Party and Jorg Haider is rich, very few 
studies have explicitly compared right-wing extremism and populism as two different 
key explanations for the party’s rise between 1986 and 2000. This thesis seeks to 
rectify this omission. In doing so, it has analysed a wealth of primary material of 
different types from the Freedom Party. This will hopefully make it easier to avoid 
taking on stereotypical views of the party, whether positive of negative. This is the 
purpose of the present thesis. This is also the reason why this thesis is important.
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Chapter 4 
Populism
Seen in this light, we are populists because we put ourselves in the 
place of ordinary men and women and fight for their minds.
Jorg Haider; Declaration of Vienna
(1993b, p.1)
The purpose of this thesis is to explain why the Austrian Freedom Party gained such 
popularity between 1986 and 2000. Two alternative explanations will be tested: (1) 
the party gained votes due to its right-wing (nationalist, xenophobic) extremism, and 
(2) its success was due to its anti-elitist, anti-centralist appeal in standing up for 
ordinary people against policies imposed from above. Both these explanations are 
linked to the concept of populism, in so far as the first sees the party as attempting to 
create a mob for its own purposes -  which are inherent in populism -  and the second 
seeks to liberate the people -  which is also an inherent aim of populism. Populism 
encompasses, in other words, a very wide range of ideas; from manipulation to 
motivation, and from attacking democracy to fostering participation and democracy. 
As this thesis will show, the Freedom Party displays both these tendencies. Populism 
therefore offers an appropriate theoretical framework for the present thesis.
Debates about the character of populism seem to revolve around whether one or the 
other definition marks the political formation: i.e. whether the political group in 
question appeals to voters largely on the basis of nationalism and extremism or on 
the basis of its anti-elitist (anti-bureaucratic) stance. A common understanding of 
populism, as articulated by Jorg Haider and the Freedom Party, is that it involves 
acting on behalf of ordinary people, seeing the world through the eyes of the 
common people and, as Haider expressed above in the Declaration of Vienna, 
‘fight[ing] for their minds’. According to critics of the Freedom Party, however, this 
rhetoric of fighting for the common people should not be taken at face value. It 
masks, they say, a hidden authoritarian and right-wing extremist agenda. The debate 
entails that suggestion that the Freedom Party is either not populist at all, or at best,
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that its populism is regressive or dangerous, a mere tactic for pursuing a right-wing 
extremist agenda.
This chapter will discuss the concept of populism, stressing issues that will be of use 
in the later analysis of the electoral appeal of the Freedom Party. First, the origins of 
the concept of populism will be presented. Then it will be argued that, despite its 
evasive character, populism still has some distinct features. These common features 
will then be used to analyse the continuing tension between two opposing notions of 
populism.
How are these two opposing forms of populism to be defined? The Swedish political 
scientist Thomas Knoll (2001) simply suggests the prefixes ‘bad’ versus ‘good’. 
While the former ranges from right-wing populism to fascism, populism is, according 
to the latter, essentially democratic. The problem with this definition is that no one 
would support ‘bad populism'. Along similar lines, Yves Meny has made use of 
‘negative’ versus ‘positive’ populism (1998, p. 9). In this thesis, however, ‘right-wing 
populism’ will be compared with 'egalitarian populism’. The immediate benefit of 
using the concept of right-wing populism derives from the fact that it is an 
established concept with very clear connotations -  such as preference for 
authoritarian leadership, a clear division between friend and foe, excessive social 
pessimism and an essentially fictitious political agenda. A possible downside would 
be that it may be seen as distinctly less extreme than racism, fascism or Nazism. 
However, this is not necessarily the case, as right-wing populism, as we shall see 
below, may easily be a cover-up for more extreme ideas. This link between populism 
and right-wing extremism is furthermore important, because expressions of populism 
can range from viewing the placing of power in the hands of the people as a primary 
objective, to displaying right-wing extremist tendencies, as the present thesis will 
show.
It would have been natural to contrast right-wing populism with ‘left-wing populism’. 
Even though this dichotomy partly makes sense -  not the least due to the chasm 
between equality and inequality -  it still raises problems. In cases where right-wing 
populism carries negative connotations, ‘left-wing’ populism would be associated 
with benevolent qualities, and this is not inherently accurate. Also, this distinction
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would make it impossible for any right-wing party to stand out other than as deeply 
problematic, simply by virtue of the fact that it is not left-wing.
The other side of this suggested dichotomy -  egalitarian populism -  can be traced 
back to an article by Margaret Canovan: Trust the People! Populism and the Two 
Faces of Democracy’. Recent populist movements, Canovan argues, ‘are usually 
treated as pathological symptoms requiring sociological explanation’ (Canovan 
1999, p. 2). In other words, they are unanimously seen as democratically 
problematic right-wing phenomena. To suppose, however, that populists are simply 
right wing is to ignore the egalitarian impulse’ and mobilisation of ‘’’ordinary people” 
against the privileged, highly educated, cosmopolitan elite’ (Canovan 1999, p. 5). In 
line with Canovan’s analysis, right-wing populism will here be contrasted with the 
concept of ‘egalitarian populism’, expressing an interest in emancipating the 
common electorate and ‘the people’ from the shackles of big government and elitist 
oppression.
The Origins of ‘Populism’
The etymological origin of populism is the Latin ‘populus’ meaning ‘the people’, either 
embodying the whole Roman state or else the people as distinct from the Senate. 
One might notice that one of the initial definitions of the concept assigns special 
attention to those outside the sphere of political power. Apart from these merely 
descriptive Latin meanings of populus, one may also find other interpretations, such 
as ‘the populace’ and the ‘masses’ that may be seen as somewhat pejorative. In 
some languages, such as German and Swedish, the related Pdbel would roughly 
translate as ‘mob’; implying a herd of aggressive and ignorant individuals, easily 
manipulated by the subtle strategy of the populist leader (See Knoll 2001, p. 267). 
Populism thus focused on those in society who lack access to political power. 
Furthermore, activities based on populism are regularly viewed as negative, or even 
hazardous to the political system.
As political doctrine, populism seems to be fraught with contradictions. On the one 
hand, exclusivist in its highlighting of ‘our folk’ against others; on the other hand,
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seeking to be empowering and inclusivist in its highlighting of the ordinary masses 
against an oppressive cultural or political elite. Peter Worsley offers a critique of 
populism as being full of ‘inconsistency, ambiguity, incoherence, contradiction, to 
enable the reader to read what he wants into those doctrines in the light of his social 
and psychological predispositions’ (1969, p. 214); MacRae, however, considers 
Worsley’s critique to be unproductive: ‘People who criticise those who take ideology 
seriously often object that any given ideology is not unitary, not logically consistent, 
not clearly defined, and is plastic in its interpretation or ambiguous in the guidance to 
give action. Of course: what else’ (MacRae 1969, p. 154)? Inherent conceptual 
ambiguities do not render any doctrine useless. On the contrary -  any concept in the 
social sciences that would not allow for a range of fruitful interpretations would be 
futile, if it were intelligible at all.6 From this perspective, where contradictions and 
ambiguities are seen as vital, populism is no less fractured or contradictory than any 
other political doctrine, be it socialism or social democracy.
Common Features of Populism
The question of whether the variants of populism should be considered as aspects of 
a single unified doctrine has been addressed by Isaiah Berlin. For Berlin, it is a 
question of matching a theoretical doctrine with political practice. This clash of fitting 
theory to national practice leads to a ‘Cinderella complex’. While we have populism -  
the theoretical shoe -  in our hands, this shoe simply does not quite fit, as we try it on 
real existing feet, i.e. on any factual social setting (Taggart 2000, p. 2). In other words, 
any down-to-earth, nation-specific variant of populism is in conflict with one or another 
of its universal features. Similarly, Ernesto Laclau points out that populism is an 
amorphous subject and preferably studied at a distance. Once we focus upon it more 
closely, however, we find that the various forms of populism differ to such a degree 
that we might feel tempted to drop the concept altogether (Laclau 1977, p. 145). I will 
argue that dropping the concept is neither necessary, nor productive. Despite vital 
differences among its various forms, a joint common denominator of populism shall be 
suggested.
6 Displaying a common feature among purists in the social sciences, Peter Worsley (1969, p. 214) only 
allows for two positions: complete consistency or uselessness.
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Populism is generally regarded as originating from below, from those excluded from 
the sphere of economic and political power. The short-lived American People’s Party 
of the late 19th century was, to take one example, a proper mass movement, having 
‘truly bottom up’ features, and the Swedish Ny Demokrati (New Democracy) of the 
early 1990s headed by a Count by the name of Ian Wachtmeister, and Bert Karlsson, 
a successful music producer and self-made man, was also to a great extent the 
product of a thrust from below (Taggart 2000, p. 26). In contrast, the Russian populism 
of the 19th century was a top-down project. It emanated from the intellectuals from 
abroad, upon whom the exhortation by the tsarist critic Alexander Herzen had the 
impact of a clarion call: ‘to the people, to the people, there is your place, you exiles 
from seats of learning’. However, their progressive mission failed because the rural 
population in Russia turned out to be conservative by nature and faithful to the Tsar 
(Ulam 1981, p. 102). Normally, populist parties are led by charismatic leaders, such as 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jorg Haider, Umberto Bossi, Silvio Berlusconi, Juan Peron in 
Argentina, the Dutch Pirn Fortuyn, and perhaps, Pia Kjaersgaard of the Danish Dansk 
Folkeparti7 Still, the above mentioned American People’s Party was not tied to any 
single leading figure (Taggart 2000, p. 36). Populism has also been regarded as an 
essentially rural, anti-urban, movement (lonescu and Gellner 1969). Today, Bolivia 
offers a good example of this rural form of populism. However, as a consequence of 
the shrinking social and political importance of rural society, this characterisation of 
populism has gradually been replaced by a definition which emphasises the social 
frustrations of disaffected masses, both urban and rural. The Italian parties, Lega Nord 
and Alleanza Nazionale, and the Austrian Freedom Party are examples of urban forms 
of populism;
Many theories about the origin of populist movements stress the harmful effects of 
modernisation, and more specifically the tension between the effect of modernisation 
and dislocation on traditional regions and social groups. Paul Taggart has sought to 
come to terms with this problem by distinguishing between ‘traditional populism’ and 
‘new populism’ (Taggart 2000, p. 73). The vagueness of the concept of populism 
would, then, be reduced. All these apparently opposing figures and characteristics 
may thus be associated with the concept of populist ideology: the down-trodden
7 Weber (2005, pp. 182-188), in what he refers to as the Veralltaglichung (routinisation) of Charisma, 
optimistically argues that Charismatic leaders gradually will be replaced by anomymous and reliable 
bureaucrats.
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peasant and the privileged intellectual; the traditionalist critic of modernisation and the 
progressive moderniser; the rural anti-urbanist and the disaffected city-dweller; the 
charismatic single leader and the leaderless collective movement. Given these varying 
associations and opposing views, is it valuable to talk of ‘populism’ as a general idea?
Before ending with this general and universal core of populism, we can.summarise by 
noting that populism is invariably of a reformist nature, incapable of offering 
fundamental ‘root and branch’ reform (Taggart 2000, p. 1). This is an important 
distinction between populism and fascism. The prospects for a successful populist 
movement are generally poorer under conditions of social stability, for instance within 
an authoritarian state. Hence, populist movements are likely to flourish during periods 
of transition, such as the current social transformation in Scandinavia from a secure 
welfare state towards neo-liberal deregulation. It could be argued that both the rise of 
the populist Swedish Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Democrats) and the no less 
populist Danish Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party) can be explained by an 
increasing social insecurity, resulting in calls for fierce critics who will stand for law and 
order and side with the people. Notably, populism is invariably against big business 
and globalisation, and in favour of nationalism, and hence of exclusion and inclusion.
Following the work of Edward Shils, Paul Taggart and others, it will be argued here 
that the general and universal core of populism lies elsewhere. As mentioned above, 
populism has to do with populus -  ‘the people’. Within populist movements, the people 
-  here understood as the common people who are the objects of elite projects -  are 
seen as essentially virtuous and authentic. Whether the populist movement originates 
from below or from the intellectuals, whether it is led by a charismatic leader or not, 
whether it is mainly of a rural or of a predominantly urban character, and regardless of 
whether it is anti-modernist or modernist, its key objective is constituted by the fight for 
the rights of the ‘oppressed people’. From the populist perspective, in all its aspects, 
the elite constitutes the complete adversary of the people: it is deceitful, manipulative, 
hypocritical, superficial, snobbish and accumulates illegitimate power and monetary 
fortunes behind the backs of hardworking people.
In a populist scheme, the people as well as the elite are often depicted as 
homogeneous entities. For Paul Taggart the very notion of ‘the people’ implies ‘an
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undifferentiated mass’, whereby conflicts and differing views within these two 
respective fields are systematically denigrated (2000, p. 96). Hence the essential 
populist conflict involves two organisms each attempting to exert its authority over the 
other. This fundamental ontology of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’ is supported by a 
number of scholars in the field. According to William Kornhauser, and in particular his 
theory of mass society (1960), this dichotomy -  an unresolvable conflict -  between a 
homogeneous people and a homogeneous elite is seen as one of the more generally 
applicable features of populism. Yves Meny (1998, p. 19). argues that ‘anti-elitism 
constitutes a key feature of populism’. According to Edward Shils, the key to 
understanding populism lies in the relationship between elites and masses (1956, pp. 
100-1). Finally Margaret Canovan finds no other common themes than ‘appeals to the 
people and a distrust of elites’ (Canovan, 1981, p. 264). In brief, the core of populism 
is constituted by the defence of a homogenous people and the critique of an 
illegitimate or seditious elite.
Two Different Forms of Populism -  Right wing and Egalitarian Populism
Now, this common denominator -  the defence of the people and the critique of the 
elite -  will be used in order to present two diametrically opposite forms of populism -  
right-wing populism and egalitarian populism. The underlying questions are: What is 
the nature of the people? Are they seen as acting subjects or merely as objects for 
ulterior motives? What is the nature of the elite? Is it manipulative or democratic?
The following chapter (Chapter 5) will focus in greater detail on the Austrian elite and 
Austrian corporatism. The remainder of this chapter will first emphasise the 
weaknesses of the Austian elite system, before providing a more comprehensive 
discussion of its social and economic benefits. This and the following chapter will 
stress the tensions between the Austrian Freedom Party under Jorg Haider and the 
Austrian elite.
Elaborating on right-wing populism as one particular form of populism may seem 
strange. In fact, the definition of populism is in most cases closely tied to ‘right-wing’; 
indeed so closely that ‘right-wing’ almost feels implicit in populism as a political
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concept. Why is this? It is because populism has very often constituted a tool for 
politically extremist purposes. Since the elite are always small in number and the 
people are large in number, any attempt to overthrow a regime must seek support 
among the people. The speeches of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were, for 
instance, rich with populist rhetoric. This leads onto an observation of critical 
importance for the present thesis. Populism should not always exclude right-wing 
extremism. The presence of populist themes does not, as noted by Brigitte Bailer- 
Galanda and Wolfgang Neugebauer, researchers at the Viennese Archive for the 
Austrian Resistance, rule out right-wing extremism. Rather, the populist approach is a 
convenient manner in which to present a right-wing extremist or fascist content. 
Moreover, today right-wing populism constitutes a perfect mask for right-wing 
extremists. Therefore, populism is always suspect (Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 
1997, p. 51).
A critical interpretation of populism may start with the centre of the populist party -  the 
party leader. He -  it is generally a ‘he’ -  often possesses charismatic qualities. 
Whereas anonymous rational/legal authority in Max Weber’s analysis is seen as 
trustworthy and accountable, charismatic leadership is irrational, invariably unstable, 
setting itself up as omnipotent and above the law. Partly influenced by Weber’s 
distinctions, personal charisma is associated with an autocratic form of leadership. In 
Europe charismatic politicians such as Silvio Berlusconi and Jean Marie Le Pen have 
contributed to an almost automatic association of populist parties with flamboyant, 
even eccentric, unstable, egotistical leaders. Instead, critics regard the faceless and 
anonymous bureaucrat as a role model. Politics is not about flamboyant performance, 
but about daily problems and routines.
In his daily political endeavours, a populist politician is socially very active, often seen 
on the street with the people talking and shaking hands. This is seen as problematic, 
not only because socializing exhibits the very essence of populism, in that such a 
figure appears to be trying to win the vote of everyone he meets, but also because 
spending so much time meeting the people takes his attention away from more urgent 
political matters. In fact, he is more distant from the audience than politicians who do 
not take this populist approach. Shaking hands is hence seen as detrimental to the
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people, and an excuse for an all-encompassing, and unpersuasive political 
programme where ideological differences have been ‘overcome’.
This tendency towards show rather than content leads on to another vital component 
of populist rhetoric -  namely a conspiratorial view of politics. Accusing the elite of a 
conspiracy to subordinate or control the people lies at the heart of much populist 
rhetoric. The populist leader is there to expose this conspiracy. Evidence which 
contradicts this conspiracy is viewed as part of an even more devious conspiracy. 
According to conspiracy theory, the elite is never to be trusted. This is why it suits 
populist rhetoric so well.
Above it was claimed that the populist politician often socializes with the electorate. He 
also shares their general distrust of politics. Therefore, populist politicians project 
themselves as not craving power, presenting themselves instead as on a mission to 
save the people from the devious, unscrupulous elite. Populist leaders always project 
themselves as reluctant politicians. However, once in power they may dominate the 
vocabulary of political debate (Taggart 2000, p. 112). This is because they make use 
of a simplified political rhetoric. Of course, certain parties, such as Jean Marie Le 
Pen’s Front National, have to some extent managed to define the topics of official 
political debate without gaining political power. In a sense, criticising and influencing 
the political agenda without ever taking responsibility has become something of a 
raison d ’etre for numerous European populist parties.
Furthermore, this reluctance to hold political office is often part of a romantic, 
sentimental self-perception (Taggart 2000, p. 61). ‘Ross Perot claimed that he did not 
want to run but felt obliged to do it’ (Taggart 2000, p. 42). This image of moralistic 
sacrifice -  ‘there’s a job out there and someone’s got to do it’ -  can be seen as a thin 
layer disguising egotistic or even dictatorial inclinations once the quest for political 
power has been accomplished. The people are manipulated for the benefit of a 
populist elite without scruples.
One reason why populist politicians -  once in power -  may determine the content of 
the political discourse is because they fail to recognise political complexities and 
instead make use of appealing -  and ‘populist’ -  stereotypes. However, this is often 
only a short-term phenomenon, because the inconsistency of its overambitious, all- 
encompassing, and ultimately unrealistic political programme soon becomes evident.
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Hence, a populist movement may fail to mobilise the population not because the 
programme is unrealistic -  as many such programmes are -  but because there is a 
gap between its promises and practical, economic realities. The major factor of 
electoral success is, rather, an unflinching critique of the elite. When a populist party 
becomes part of the political establishment, it is confronted with a dilemma: in order to 
remain anti-elitist it must renounce power and remain in opposition; alternatively, if it 
tries to remain in power, its entire anti-elitist rhetoric must cease. In such cases, it 
becomes evident that the remaining political programme is very similar to that of other, 
more established parties. As a consequence, a populist party that is successful at the 
ballots is, paradoxically, threatened by disintegration. These two options -  retreat or 
consternation -  make many populist movements unstable.
The common denominator of populism is its homogeneous view of the people, who 
are generally framed by the borders of the nation. Yves Meny notes that populist 
parties are often seen as xenophobic, racist, and nationalist (1998, p. 9). Alien forces, 
be they globalisation or immigrants from third world countries, are under constant 
attack in populist discourses. Populism is therefore regarded as intimately linked to 
racism; indeed populism is almost unthinkable without a racist agenda and hatred 
towards foreigners and immigrants. Moreover, as argued by Armin Pfahl-Traughber, 
populism evokes the image of brutal whispers at ‘the table of regular customers’ [der 
Stammtisch] and the idea of the ignorant and deeply conservative ‘common sense’ of 
the ordinary person (1994, p. 18). Along similar lines, Wolfgang Kowalsky asks 
whether the people always can be trusted to adequately assess their attitudes toward 
ethnic minorities and other marginalised groups (1992, p. 34).
This homogeneous people is tied to an organic conception of the nation. In this 
metaphor, the people constitute the body, while the populist leader constitutes the 
head -  having the capacity for reflection and guidance, and being willing to give a 
voice to the downtrodden common person who no longer is able to speak for 
him/herself. The downtrodden and abused common people are also occasionally, 
however, seen as full of insight and depth of feeling. Whether portrayed as 
downtrodden and inarticulate, or as commonsensical and authentic, ‘the people’ are 
depicted in terms of one or another simplified theoretical image. The people are 
‘unable to cope’ with globalisation, migration and cultural diversity. Hence, these
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‘deeper’ implications of populism not only lead to racism and virulent nationalism: they 
are also invariably linked to an elitist and pejorative perception of the people.
Finally, the common denominator of populism -  a defence of the people and a critique 
of the elite -  means, according to its advocates, that a populist agenda seeks to 
reduce the power of representative democracy for the benefit of direct democracy, 
through, for example, increasing the use of public referenda and other ways of giving 
a voice to the common electorate. The populist critique is a critique of the elected 
representatives, contending that they have ‘betrayed’ their constituents. The critics of 
these populist views, however, fail to take this at face value. Instead, it is seen as a 
standard technique from the repertoire of populist tactics, namely a means of pitting 
the people in its entirety against the elite. For these critics, wherever such populist 
tactics succeed, they produce anti-democratic effects. Rather than broadening the 
scope for public influence in politics, such tactics (when successful) cause the 
electorate to turn away from the established elite to a considerably smaller, protest- 
based elite, often viewed as irrational, where most of the power remains in the hands 
of the charismatic leader.
The democratic critique of populism suggests that populism as such breeds political 
extremism. Instead of being liberated or emancipated from the elite, the people are 
subject to abuse, manipulation and exploitation by an unscrupulous, egotistical leader 
who may change his tune once he gets his hands on state power.
With this general understanding of populist doctrine and mobilisation, let us come 
back to the central question of this study: explaining the sudden rise of the Freedom 
Party between 1986 and 2000. Here we will concentrate on the nature of the populist 
electorate. While populism thrives in situations of fear and insecurity, for example 
where there is a widely perceived ‘threat’ of foreigners (who are regarded as either 
‘cheap workers undercutting wages’ or ‘parasitic recipients of welfare benefits’), it has 
also been shown to be strong during periods of tranquility and prosperous social and 
economic conditions. The Swiss People’s Party under Christoph Blocher, peaking at 
almost 30 percent of the electorate in the lower house in the 2007 parliamentary 
election, is a good example of this. Here Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of social class may 
be relevant, whereby class is determined not only by means of economic situation, but 
also as a consequence of cultural values, norms, habits, etc (See Bourdieu 1987).
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Regarding the correlation between a penchant to vote for populist parties and social 
class, however, investigations often suggest a weak correlation. Populism can appeal 
to people who are educated as well as members of the working class, to those who 
are wealthy as well as those of modest income. Alternatively, some analysts have 
sought to capture the essence of the populist voter by portraying them as ‘losers in the 
process of modernisation’, implying that the electoral support of these parties is mainly 
constituted by those disenfranchised members of the populace at the bottom of the 
social ladder: the unemployed, immigrants and other marginalised groups. The 1995 
figures for the Austrian Freedom Party show, for instance, a tendency along these 
lines (See Table 1).
Table 1
Support of So-called ‘Modernisation Losers’ 
in Comparison 1995
-  FPO (Austrian Freedom Party)
FPO Other Parties
Low income small business owners (a) 59% 19% (OVP)
Unemployed women 55% 21% (SPO)
Skilled workers performing unskilled labor 49% 27% (SPO)
Unemployed men under 30 years 46% 25% (SPO)
Low income employers (b) 42% 19% (SPO)
Notes: (a) net income of less than Austrian Schillings 12,000 per month (about USD 1,100); (b) incomes less 
than Austrian Schillings 10,000 (about USD 900)
Source: IFES 1995 in Profit 13 Nov 1995, p. 30, cited in Heinisch (2002, p. 129)
IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems) is a non-profit organisation seeking to foster a 
democratic societv. See also IFES -  Election auide. www.electionauide.ora/about.DhD
FPO (Austrian Freedom Party)
OVP (Austrian People’s Party)
SPO  (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
What such people have in common is their support for populism’s nationalist and 
racist inclinations. Populist supporters can come from the ranks of citizens who 
cherish their own nation and national heritage in a stereotypical manner. Populism 
appeals to those with a pessimistic view of society, who, as a consequence, demand 
‘law and order’. The populist voter is invariably critical of the passivity of the current
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parliament and seeks salvation in ‘the strong leader’. Such attitudes can be found in 
both educated/well-off groups and less educated/socially marginal groups.
In this section, a number of salient populist qualities have supported the close link 
between populism and right-wing populism. The idea of charisma has been seen to 
be associated with a sense of omnipotence and right-wing extremist ideas. 
Socializing with the common electorate -  a typical populist activity -  was deemed to 
be an attempt to persuade by means of emotions instead of a political programme. 
This picture of an emotive and irrational approach to politics was strengthened by the 
idea of an ongoing conspiracy. Another key populist quality is seen in the tactical 
expression of a lack of interest in political power, further supporting the impression of 
being on the side of the common electorate. Finally, populism is determined by a 
defence of the people and a critical stance against the elite, with each of these 
conflicting entities seen as a homogeneous and undivided whole.
The section ended with commentary on the question: who (which social or 
demographic groups) is likely to vote for populist parties? It was argued that populism 
thrives in times of social turmoil, but also under more peaceful conditions. It can 
appeal to those of higher income and also to those of modest earnings; to those with 
higher levels of education but also to members of the working class. Similarly, while 
the suggested correlation between populist voters and the apparent losers in the 
process of modernisation has an explanatory value, the populist vote also appears to 
be determined by other parameters, such as nationalism, social pessimism, and 
racist tendencies (See chapter 2 for a more elaborate study of structural and 
individual explanations for reasons for voting for right-wing extremist parties.).
In the previous discussion, populism was presented in a critical light. It was seen as 
authoritarian, manipulative, elitist, racist and invariably unstable. However, populism 
can also take other forms and be interpreted along quite different lines, according to 
which the people are empowered and achieve some kind of autonomy, 
independence and control over their lives. From this perspective, the purpose of 
populism is not to strengthen hierarchical tendencies, but to achieve a more 
egalitarian society. Seeking to encapsulate this chasm between a problematic and a 
more democratic and egalitarian notion of populism, Yves Meny regards the concept
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in the same way as the Italian novelist Italo Calvino speaks of his Barone dimezzato. 
‘Like the baron split in two during a fight, populism has two faces: one positive and 
one negative’ (Meny 1998, p. 9).8
This more favourable interpretation of populism will be discussed by re-evaluating the 
features of populism discussed above. As will be shown, this will offer material for a 
partial reinterpretation of the features of the Freedom Party and for explaining its rise 
between 1986 and 2000.
One criticism of populism has been that it is based on the leader’s charisma rather 
than a substantial party platform. Yet charisma can be found across the political 
spectrum. The Swedish Social Democrat Olof Palme and his Austrian counterpart 
Bruno Kreisky were highly charismatic, and at the same time on the whole 
considered trustworthy players in the democratic arena. Trustworthy politicians are 
not necessarily anonymous. Populist behaviour, such as shaking hands with citizens, 
is not always a bad sign. These issues have been very important in Austria, with its 
tradition of anonymous politicians, and of agreements made behind closed doors, as 
the following Chapter on corporatism will elucidate in greater detail.
Real and existing flaws within any one political elite may lead us to reconsider 
another aspect of populist ideology, namely the predilection for conspiracy theories of 
overarching political control by secretive elites. The existence of conspiracy theories 
does not, of course, affect the status of critical theories based upon empirical 
observations. In fact, sound and reasoned allegations against an elite agenda may 
be justified. Lack of evidence might indicate a hollow conspiracy theory, but it may 
also point towards a more profound social malaise, namely the existence of a deeply 
embedded conspiracy within the political elite. If social pessimism and ultimately any 
form of social critique are simply dismissed as being populist conspiratorial thinking, 
the result is not only elitism, but also a society where social change is no longer 
possible. Social change requires dissatisfaction. The roots of social pessimism as 
such should be examined and not dismissed out of hand as some kind of paranoid 
delusion.
8 For an illuminating distinction between ‘good’ vs ’bad’ populism, see Knoll (2000, p. 268).
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A similar problem arises when we consider the idea that the so-called populists are 
reluctant politicians, and that this is a sign of shrewd political hypocrisy. Bruno 
Kreisky offers a good example of a democratic leader for whom obtaining political 
office was never a major concern. It would be strange if an anti-populist orthodoxy 
meant that no other politician could be trusted than those who openly pronounce their 
greed for power. The current, critical approach towards populism can easily be 
exploited by political cynics. When the Czech president and dramatist Vaclav Havel 
(1991) claimed that politics is a ‘job for modest people’ with no particular desire for 
worldly power, he was simply articulating this latter, brighter version of populism, 
hoping to increase the political impact of solidarity and egalitarianism. At this point, 
the comments in the previous section, regarding the fact that the governmental 
power of the reluctant populist politician may be short-lived due to his incongruent 
and ill-thought through programme, must be reconsidered. In brief, this outcome 
would occur only if his programme were haphazard and contradictory. If not, there is 
no reason why a populist-led government could not govern as long as any other 
party.
Populism generally relies on a homogeneous notion of the people. The framework for 
this unity is often constituted by the nation, and the nation is often seen as linked to 
exclusion, racism and reactionary attitudes. A homogeneous view of the people 
within a national setting may also run counter to the idea of individual freedom. 
However, this need not be the case. A populist platform ‘provides legitimacy to the 
democratic system’, ‘the government of the people, by the people, for the people’ 
(Meny 1998, p. 9). Populism ‘articulates the surprise at the fact that “populus”, “das 
VolK', “the people” enters into the official sphere’ (Dubiel, 1986) (See also Gress 
1994 p. 189). In this sense populism suddenly embodies a people hitherto excluded 
from power. It is egalitarian and empowering. The condemnatory critique of populism 
by elites can be just as harmful to the political system as simplified, irrational 
populism.
The elite is no less in need of misdirected idealisation than any people. History is 
replete with episodes in which a deeply compromised elite actually exploits the 
people in its entirety. Timothy Garton Ash’s (1990) vivid description of the fall of the 
communist regimes in the late 1980’s bears the title We the People: The Revolution
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of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague. But rather than 
constituting an illusion which mobilised these massive ‘populist’ movements, the 
authoritarianism and oppression in Eastern Europe were actual features of these 
regimes (Ash 1990). Popular disgust with the communist elite was real and certainly 
justified. It would be mistaken to describe this particular relationship between the 
people and the elite purely as the product of a stereotypical, right-wing populist mind. 
Hence, the dichotomy between the elite and the people may under certain conditions 
be described as one between two fairly homogeneous units, oppressor and 
oppressed, without -  notably -  being marked by a problematic perception of the 
people. ‘Many political science theories suggest both that elites rule and that there is 
a consistent pattern to the ways in which different sections of the elite participate in 
this system of rule.’ Also, ‘these positions characterise democratic elitist theorists 
(e.g. Mills 1956), as well as Marxist and class-based theories’ (Miliband 1969). While 
recognising that right-wing populism constitutes one form of critique of the elite, it is 
still only one among many. A bland, comfortable -  and somewhat populist -  view of 
the idea of populism does not acknowledge this, and suffers therefore from a 
troublesome attitude towards one of the fundamental democratic principles, the 
principle of the majority.
After a long period when populism, through the writings of Seymour Martin Upset and 
Richard Hofstadter, was equated with ‘manipulation’, populism can now be viewed as 
a ‘critique of liberalism’; marshalled against elitist implications of political 
representation and for the benefit of a heightened social awareness and sense of 
solidarity. Whereas the general perception of populism, beneath a veneer of justified 
moral indignation, saw it as seeking to transform the people into the puppets of a 
nationalist, anti-egalitarian concentration of power, the empowering and egalitarian 
type of populism is precisely the opposite. According to this view, its aim is rather to 
enhance political awareness and influence among citizens by means of, for instance, 
an increasing number of public referenda: ’let the people decide!’. Also, once its 
‘malicious branches of racism and anti-intellectualism’ have fallen off, the democratic 
features of a ‘political protest movement’ come into view (Gress 1994, p. 189). Even 
though this alternative interpretation of populism has not gained the attention it rightly 
deserves, it has its academic strongholds. For instance, it was thematised during 
‘Populism vs. the New Class’ - The Second Elizabethtown Telos Conference of 1991
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(5-7 April). Lawrence Goodwyn claims that populism ‘offers the best hope for a 
critique of, and alternative to, the hegemony of liberalism’, and suggests that local 
politics should be reinvigorated, ‘thus seeing populism as a potentially liberating 
political project’ (Goodwyn 1991, p. 38, cited in Gress 1994, p. 189). Links between 
populism, community, Gemeinschaft and racism, which are seen by certain anti­
fascist intellectuals and activists as inherently tied to populism, are seen by Paul 
Taggart as being no more than a ‘potential’ danger (2000, p. 21 ).9 The term ‘radical 
populism’ has been suggested as a label for this more egalitarian style of populism, 
in order to distinguish it from the more exclusionary type (Husbands 2003).
Populism therefore should not be automatically assumed to be of the exclusionist, 
extremist or xenophobic variety. The fact that Jean Marie Le Pen, Ross Perot, 
Umberto Bossi, Silvio Berlusconi and others may speak on behalf of the people does 
not mean that populism cannot also be empowering and even emancipating for 
oppressed citizens. Populism belongs also to democrats and egalitarians, 
represented by people as diverse as the German, republican political thinker Hannah 
Arendt, Huey Long, leader of the American populist Union Party with its strong 
socialist tendencies, the Czech former dissident and former president Vaclav Havel, 
and also, in a sense, Karl Marx himself.10 The Austrian Liste Dr Hans-Peter Martin is 
a good example of an empowering and egalitarian populist force within the EU. 
Martin is a determined EU-skeptic who seeks to counter anti-democratic tendencies 
within the EU, and who sees globalization as an attack against the welfare state and 
democratic ideals. When representatives of the Swedish ‘June List’ (Junilistan) in the 
European Parliament cast their votes, their left-wing liberal anti-Brussels stance often 
results in their voting together with the British National Party (BNP). Both are critical 
of Brussels as a bureaucratic power which disempowers citizens. Yet, while the 
British National Party is a right-wing, even right-wing extremist, populist party, the 
June List seeks to increase the scope for public influence in politics and to 
democratise the European Union. This difference does not prevent established
9 For a discussion of ‘the politics of protest’, see Goodwyn (1991). See also Westlind (1996, p. 99). 
However, something needs to be added. To anyone whose preoccupation is political issues a 
persistent focus on linguistics might seem odd. What ‘populism’ really means is apparently hard to tell, 
but we should agree upon the fact that there is indeed a political phenomenon out there, consisting of 
a people being manipulated by an elite. Franz Gress’ literal and benevolent interpretation of ‘populism’ 
as ‘populus’ meaning “the people” is surely appealing, but leaves an unfortunate conceptual void. 
Manipulation of the people still goes on, and we still need a word for it.
10 For a balanced account of Huey Long, see Harry Williams’ Huey Long (1970).
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politicians, such as Goran Persson -  the then Swedish Prime Minister and Social 
Democrat -  from insinuating that the June List followers are somehow anti­
democratic because they advocate against giving more power to Brussels, which for 
him must imply that the two parties share certain extremist views. Persson, like so 
many critics of populism, refuses to recognise the important difference between the 
two types of populist party, between the exclusionary, nationalist populism of the 
BNP (and of its sister parties in various countries such as the French Front National 
(National Front) and the Belgian Vlaams Belang (Flemish interest)) and the 
empowering, left-wing liberal movements such as the June List. Leaving politics, one 
discovers numerous individuals within the populist tradition: Charlie Chaplin, the 
social critics Michael Moore and Morgan Spurlock (Super Size me!)u , Woodie 
Guthrie, Walt Whitman, Bruce Springsteen, and Naomi Klein -  to name but a few. 
They reflect a kind of cultural populism which sees virtue and authenticity in the 
common folk, and hypocrisy and opportunism among the elite. On the international 
scene, anti-globalisation movements, such as Attac, and indigeneous movements 
such as the one championed by the French farmer Jose Bove, leading protests 
against McDonalds, are all critics of the elite within this empowering and egalitarian 
tradition of populism.
Unless these two forms of populism -  right-wing populism and egalitarian populism -  
are carefully distinguished, one is likely to present a hopelessly confused analysis. It 
is therefore important to distinguish between an ideological, doctrinaire anti­
egalitarian critique of the elite and a critique of the elite that is based on empirical 
analysis. Analytically confusing the two types prevents us from understanding key 
issues in political development. This is especially true in Austria in relation to the 
roots of the Austrian Freedom Party’s support. Mixing right-wing populism and 
egalitarian populism will in practice constitute a water-tight argument in the hands of 
any self-righteous elite, including, it is worth adding, a self-righteous elite with 
indisputably right-wing populist tendencies. This is the real, practical danger inherent 
in an excessive and stereotypical anti-populism.
Who would vote for a party with these kinds of populist qualities? Such a party would 
attract those who have a political interest, and who see a politically active electorate
11 Super Size Me (2004) is a documentary in which the filmmaker and protagonist -  Spurlock -  eats 
only from McDonald’s only over a period of a month.
as important. These voters have a.strong belief in public referenda as a means of 
reaching political decisions* and as a means of egalitarian persuasion. Hence, in 
contrast to populists of the radical nationalist type, they are against hierarchies. An 
important segment of this persuasion is composed of the Euro-skeptics who contest 
the power of Brussels to decide national issues as diverse as the use of food 
additives or asylum law. These people are critics of international capitalism, the 
privatisation of the public sector (what they call ‘neo-liberalism’) and of globalisation. 
They place their faith in the nation-state and dismiss its links with the history of 
Fascism and Nazism. Instead, they see national sovereignty as a precondition for 
democracy, the rule of law, equality and other marks of modernity. Finally, they are 
against the agenda of multiculturalism; partly because they believe in the notion of 
solidarity across borders, be it across a ‘multitude’ of cultures, or transgressing 
ethnic, class-based, gender-based, and religious demarcation lines; and partly 
because multiculturalists generally criticise political charisma, the nation-state and 
other concepts that have historically been associated with right-wing extremism.
From this brief overview of some salient features of populist voters, it could be 
argued that such voters are neither traditionalists nor conservatives in the sense of 
wanting to protect some established hierarchies. These voters are modern and 
egalitarian. They are not conspicuously oriented towards unregulated market 
capitalism, because this system is hierarchical and fosters the existence of elites. 
They may not be liberals, as classic liberalism (of the European variety) relies on 
parliamentary democracy and political representatives. Instead, they are likely to be 
trade union socialists and social democrats for whom the nation state is associated 
with secure working conditions and social peace, and for whom solidarity and 
equality are crucial (while difference and inequality are not). These socialists and 
social democrats are opposed to multiculturalism, because it is inherently linked not 
only to difference, but also to inequality, to representation based on myth (that of a 
mutual ancestry) rather than political views, and ultimately to a hierarchical society. 
The voters for this form of populism are always anti-elitists and at times republicans.
As we have seen in this chapter, populism is notoriously hard to pin down. It can be 
seen as everything from emancipating to dictatorial. While some say it relies on a 
hidden, right-wing extremist agenda, others claim that populists often mean what
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they say. Debates thrive over whether populist movements primarily attack the elite, 
or chiefly criticise immigrants and foreigners. Are populists underdogs or elitists? 
Furthermore, the accessible, hand-shaking nature of populist politicians raises the 
question: is it inherently beneficial to be anonymous? These issues are all closely 
linked to the Austrian Freedom Party. Scholars argue about whether the rise of the 
party was caused by its right-wing extremism or by its egalitarian populism and anti­
elitism. Therefore, populism offers a suitable theoretical background to the thesis. 
Next, chapter 5 will give an outline of the elite dual rule between the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria and the Austrian People’s Party. This discussion is rather 
thorough, as this dual elite rule was the target of intense critique from the Freedom 
Party and Jorg Haider.
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Chapter 5
Austrian Corporatism -  An Overview
The post-war shared rule between the Social Democratic Party of Austria and the 
conservative Austrian People’s Party has above been referred to as the ‘elite’. This 
kind of dual elite rule, practised in Austria, Sweden and other countries appears in 
many guises. ‘Consociationalism’ -  emphasising the dual arrangements between the 
parties -  is a well-established concept in the academic literature. Among more 
imaginative descriptions, ‘sleaze democracy’ -  Filzdemokratie -  highlights the 
Kafkaesque experience of the operation of secret rules in Austrian society, while 
‘sham democracy’ and ‘authoritarian’12 are but two epithets of democratic critics. 
However, following the terminology used by Peter Gerlich and Anton Pelinka (and 
also noted in the introduction), the system will here be referred to using the more 
value-neutral term ‘Austrian corporatism’.
Etymologically, ‘corporatism’ is derived from corpus, the Latin word for body. In the 
early stages, the concept did not have any specific political correspondence. Instead, 
it reflected ‘holistic’ medieval European ideas of an entire social community in which 
each of the various components fulfilled a function, in a manner similar to the role of 
the constituent elements in a living organism. A clear-cut notion of corporatism 
cannot, however, be constructed from this ‘bottom line’ of corporatism. Like populism, 
corporatism is an essentially fractured social concept, ‘a handy label that will stick to 
almost any surface’ (Williamson 1985, p. 3). As noted by some critics, ‘the first thing 
that strikes one as one reads through the recent literature on modern corporatism is 
the profound lack of agreement on what the concept actually refers to’ (Panitch 1980, 
p. 159).
Despite the vague aspects of the definition of corporatism, we can identify certain 
general characteristics. Essentially, corporatism is a system of formalised relations 
between three institutions: the unions, the employers, and the government. These 
three ‘corporations’ or ‘bodies’ have obtained a monopoly on bargaining on behalf of 
their respective interest groups. Hence, as opposed to individual action or complete
12 As early as 1957 the Austrian political system was described as ‘authoritarian’, ‘though retaining the 
trappings of democracy’. See Preston (1957, p. 346).
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state control, corporatism is the institutionalisation of the middle person. Corporatism 
rests on a specific kind of associative action, namely the class organisation of both 
labour and capital (Pekkarinen et al. 1992, p. 2). Instead of class war, however, the 
agents of the corporatist institutions engage in orderly negotiations for mutual benefit. 
The fact that corporatism does not allow for individual negotiations on the labour 
market leads to one of the key components of corporatism: centralised wage 
bargaining, which is ostensibly associated with low unemployment and 
egalitarianism. The general set-up of the corporatist structures means that the state 
is involved, either formally or informally, in setting wages and working conditions.
The existence of corporatism, however, does not only depend upon the unions, 
employers and government as the three pillars of corporatist action. These bodies 
must also exhibit a number of features in their structure and interaction.13 Unions and 
employers are both characterised by the following internal traits:
1. Concentration of power; i.e. a high level of influence exercised by a peak 
council on the action of its affiliates. Widely acknowledged union membership 
fees as well as the collective organisation of employers are both examples of 
this.
2. Organisational unity; i.e. where the class of employers or the class of workers 
is characterised by internal concord as opposed to discord. A rough estimate 
of the degree of concord can be read by the number and size of 
confederations and subgroups that jointly constitute labour and capital -  the 
class of workers and the class of employers. In Sweden, for example, the 
Swedish Trade and Industry [Svenskt Naringsliv\t formerly Swedish 
association of employers [SAF -  Svenska Arbetsgivarfdreningen] and the 
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) -  Landsorganisationen], are both good 
examples of a high level of organisational unity on the part of capital and 
labour.
3. High membership density. A high rate of union membership is vital for 
corporatist possibilities where labour is involved, as the alternative to a 
systematic formation of labour often lies in a complete disintegration to the 
level of separate individuals.
13 For a more elaborate discussion about these internal and in-between features that foster the rise of 
corporatism, see Archer (1998, p. 72).
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The vague nature of corporatism has meant that, historically, it has been associated 
with a great variety of ideologies. Throughout the first four decades of the 20th 
century, corporatism was by and large a vehicle for Roman Catholic and fascist 
ideas, either separately or together. The end of the Second World War, however, 
brought about changes in the history of corporatism. The papal interest in 
corporatism faded, while the conservative or fascist version of corporatism had been 
brought into disrepute. This meant that the fundamental features of corporatism -  
political concord, centralised negotiations and collectivist bargaining -  could now be 
tied to a different ideological discourse. Instead of being exploited by the rightist 
fringes who would draw on it in emphasising social harmony and cooperation 
between the classes, corporatist ideology could now serve the interests of the 
moderate left because, among other things, it not only accepted the collectivist 
organisation of labour, but endorsed it. As a result of this continuity in corporatist 
thinking, scholars have been at pains to differentiate between the pre-1945 and the 
post-1945 versions of corporatism. Gerhard Lehmbruch (1979, p. 54) refers to 
‘authoritarian’ and ‘liberal’ corporatism, Philippe Schmitter (1979, p. 20) talks about 
‘state’ and ‘societal’ corporatism, and Colin Crouch (1979, p. 188) questions the 
possibility of a general concept of corporatism by differentiating between ‘pure’ and 
‘bargained’ corporatism. Claus Offe (1981, p. 140) captures the distinction between 
fascist enforcement and liberation by contrasting corporatism based on ‘restraint’ with 
a corporatism based on ‘delegation’.
The particular features of Austrian corporatism suggest that it constitutes a good 
example of this post-war, moderate leftist version of corporatism. In the eyes of Peter 
Gerlich, (1992a, p. 132) Austrian expert on these political arrangements, Austrian 
corporatism must not be interpreted as being of the Italian fascist style but should be 
understood ‘in the broadest possible sense’, as implying ‘co-operative policy styles in 
various arenas of the political system’. As opposed to Italy, Spain, and Portugal, 
where ‘corporatism’ in the fascist tradition was set up to replace class war by class 
co-operation through the dictates of authoritarian rule, Anton Pelinka (1998a, p. 133) 
sees ‘social partnership [as] the friendly Austrian version of this skeleton in the 
closet.’
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‘Social partnership’ (Sozialpartnerschaff) is often defined as (the core of) the Austrian 
version of corporatism. The widespread popularity of social partnership goes back to 
the fact that many players on the political arena could find benefits with the system. 
For industrialists, social partnership prevented social tensions because unions were 
invited. For the unionists and Social Democrats, it contributed in democratising 
capitalism, while conservatives and Christian Democrats saw social partnership as a 
tempting middle way between collectivist and secular socialism, and consumerist and 
decadent capitalism (Pelinka 1998a, p. 91). In his classic definition, Gerhard 
Lehmbruch describes social partnership by means of four main aspects. First: Key 
interest groups are organised into ‘Chambers’. Second: The institutionalisation of 
interest group cooperation by systematic agreements between labour and capital. 
Third: An Advisory Council for Economic and Social Problems (solely composed by 
experts from different groups according to paritary quotas. Forth: Free and voluntary 
cooperation of various interest groups (Lehmbruch 1979, pp. 53-61).
The two central actors in Social Partnership are the Federal Chamber of Commerce 
and the Austrian Trade Union Federation. Membership of the Federal Chamber of 
Commerce is compulsory, whereas the Austrian Trade Union Federation, enjoying a 
monopoly, covered about 60 percent of the labour force in the early 1990s. Only 
Sweden seems to have had higher membership levels (See Lauber 1992, p. 148). 
Since 1957, discussions between the Federal Chamber of Commerce and the 
Austrian Trade Union Federation have taken place within the Joint Commission for 
Wages and Prices (Die Paritatische Kommission fur Lohn -  und Preisfragen), an 
institution frequently considered as constituting the core of post-war Austrian 
corporatism. Furthermore, the Executive Committee of the Joint Commission was 
regarded as the so-called ‘Big Brain’ of Austrian corporatism (See Marin 1982, p. 
306).14
The second core element of Austrian corporatism is consociationalism -  i.e. manifest 
in the political co-operation between the Social Democratic Party and the
conservative Austrian Peoples Party. Peter Gerlich simply labels it “Party
cooperation” (Gerlich 1992, p. 132). Alike Social Partnership above,
consociationalism can also be summed up in four key components: A coalition
14 For an interesting discussion of the intricate relations between the different elements of the Austrian 
system of corporatism, see Knoll and Mayer (1976).
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between major parties, the principle of mutual veto, political representation 
determined by proportionality, and finally autonomy for each group of the political 
system (Pelinka 1998a, p. 21; see also Luther 1998, p. 110).
Under what circumstances do consociationalism come about and parties cooperate? 
When societies are characterized by ‘vertically encapsulated and mutually hostile 
political subcultures’. Under these conditions, consociational solutions -  fostering 
cooperation instead of competition -  may lead to a ‘metaphorical bridge’ stretching 
over the gulf separating various political subcultures or ‘pillars’ and thus political 
stability can be acquired (Luther 1999, p. 3). This leads to one of the paradoxical key 
feature of consociationalism; namely a co-existence of deeply fragmented political 
cultures and elitist unanimity and concord among political leaders. Gerhard 
Lehmbruch refers to consociational options -  or Concord democracy -  as ‘the 
response of political elites in certain countries to the challenge of strong sub-cultural 
segmentation* (Lehmbruch 1974, p. 1; See also Lehmbruch 1967, Lijphart 1968, and 
McRae 1974). Furthermore, this co-operative policy can be executed in two ways; 
either through engaging in negotiations and reaching agreements on every single 
issue, or by means of a ‘simultaneous junction of different actions’ (Junktim), 
whereby the power and responsibility for resolving key issues is equally divided 
between the two parties or coalitions. That is, while certain issues are decided 
according to the wishes of the Social Democrats, other issues are settled in favour of 
the Austrian People’s Party.15 After these preliminary observations about corporatism 
in general and about Austrian corporatism, it is now time to undertake a critical 
investigation of this elite system.
15 For a discussion clarifying of Junktim see Lehmbruch (1967, p. 45).
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Austrian Corporatism -  Elitist Oppression?
It is common knowledge in Austria that you do not have influence 
because you are a member of parliament, but you are a member of 
parliament because you have influence (Pelinka 1985, p. 19).
Situated in the midst of the liberal Western political ambience, the Austrian political 
system appears something of an oddity. Emerging from war-time and post-war 
occupation and then, from 1955, an apparently solid democracy it has enjoyed free 
elections, and politicians whose terms of office have depended on the will of the 
people. Shrinking voter turnouts and declining party membership, which have long 
haunted the West, have not been a phenomenon of Austrian politics. In the mid- 
1990s 17 percent of the Austrian population were members of a political party, more 
than three times the European average (See Sperl 1993, p. 70). Voter turnout has 
been consistently high, averaging 92.7 percent between 1953 and 1990 (Luther and 
Muller 1992, p. 29). During the period of this investigation 1986 to 2000 turnout was 
84.4 percent, slightly lower but still high for Western Europe (Khol et al. 2001, p. 
731ff).16 There are a great number of widely read newspapers, although the political 
party press faces a constantly diminishing readership. Strikes are virtually unknown 
(See Klose 1987, p. 118).
Even so, these facts do not present the whole picture. In fact, whether Austria is a 
liberal society or not is a matter of some dispute. Ever since the collapse of the Nazi 
regime, Austria has been characterised by rather questionable features, such as a 
weak parliament and secret negotiations among political actors. Austrian corporatist 
arrangements between the Social Democrats and the conservative People’s Party, 
the first period of which lasted from 1945 to 1966 and the second from 1986 to 1999, 
suffered from corruption and a considerable amount of scandal, which allegedly 
affected Austria’s economic performance. As the following discussion will show, 
these democratic defects and the way the Freedom Party has exploited them in their 
rhetoric are the most important explanation for why Jorg Haider and the Freedom
16 In later national elections, voter turnout was 83.0 percent (2002); 78.5 percent (2006) and 78.8 
percent (2008). (www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/nationalrat/NRW_History.aspx)
80
Party have achieved such an impressive increase in popular support since 1986.17 
Accusations of ‘lack of democracy’, ‘secluded guilds’, ‘elite rule’ of ‘old dinosaurs’, to 
name but a few of the allegations, struck a chord among the Austrian public, 
delivering for the Freedom Party a great increase in electoral support. Haider himself 
often declared that he would not be where he was were it not for the ‘political 
grannies’ on the park bench (Haider 1993a, p. 190).
Austrian corporatism is a highly complex phenomenon, and as such open to various 
forms of scholarly critique. For the sake of clarity we will divide such critique 
according to four main features, which may be represented by the headings: 
‘corruption in the political system’; ‘political participation and opposition’; ‘the scientific 
rationality of Austrian corporatism’; and finally ‘Ideology strikes back’.
Corruption in the Political System
It is hard to imagine a political society where party membership reflects ideological 
conviction alone. Pressure from relatives and colleagues at work inevitably affect 
voter preferences in addition to party membership -  possibly even more so. 
Furthermore, the recent change whereby people tend to vote for a particular ‘issue’ 
rather than a political idea is a frequently observed phenomenon. Personal and 
economic circumstances also play a part, as for example when someone joins an up- 
and-coming fringe party as a means of pursuing a political career. However, pursuing 
such objectives this way have drawbacks -  it involves hard work, the competition is 
severe, and, importantly, such career opportunities are confined to the field of party 
politics. Therefore, becoming a party member for tactical reasons is, under these 
circumstances, likely to be uncommon.
Since the end of the Second World War the situation in Austria has been quite 
different. Situated within a state whose authority had been permanently called into 
question, the Austrian Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s Party had 
divided between them vast domains of the country’s administrative system -  ranging 
from organisations with political objectives to associations for car owners, botanists,
17 For an overview of the Freedom Party, see Luther (1991, p. 247).
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and dog and cat owners. Therefore, post-war party influence in Austria ranged over a 
much wider area of public life than is usual with European political parties. Especially 
important for this study are those areas where private interest was at stake, such as 
obtaining a job, being promoted or the allocation of publicly owned housing. 
According to a 1980 Austrian survey asking people their motives for becoming a 
party member, nearly eighty percent replied ‘work-related advantages’ (Deiser and 
Winkler 1980, p. 143).18 Without a Social Democrat or People’s Party card it was for 
decades almost impossible to obtain any prominent position in Austria -  in the media, 
in industry and in organisations, in politics and education.19 Party power was no less 
impressive within the housing sector. As a significant proportion of the Austrian 
housing stock was under the influence of one or other of the two major parties, it is 
not surprising that 71 percent when asked about their reasons for joining a party 
responded ‘to receive a flat’ (Deiser and Winkler 1980, p. 143). Nor were these 
implicit agreements restricted to obtaining apartments. An equivalent division along 
party lines was often present among construction companies (Kofler 1985, p. 43). 
This created a situation where the personal lives of citizens were almost entirely 
dependent on the goodwill of the party (Plasser, Ulram and Grausgruber 1992, p. 
18).
Inevitably, these arrangements bred nepotism and corruption on a large scale. 
Anyone with contacts in the political sphere had an undisputed advantage under the 
shared rules of intimacy and anonymity. For those holding political office 
opportunities for personal gain were significantly more diverse and on a different 
level. For our purposes, it will suffice to remark that the ‘list of politicians [...] accused 
of crimes, actually found guilty of serious offences by the courts -  including for 
example tax evasion [...] -  reads like an extract from the ‘W ho’s Who of Austrian 
politics’” (IMAS-report 1991, p. 119).
18 The exact figure is 78.1 percent. This study is also quoted in Luther and Pulzer (1998, p. 129). 
Luther and Pulzer refer to 79 percent for work enhancement and 72 percent for housing respectively. 
These high figures are now shrinking, even though recent events, such as the fact that the Liberate 
Forum failed to gain any seats in Parliament in the 1999 National election, questions the assumption 
that those illiberal corporatist structures will eventually disappear.
19 Already in 1957 when provisonal arrangements were set up in order to stabilise the Austrian 
economy, which soon became established as the Joint Commission for Wages and Prices (Die 
paritatische Kommission fur Lohn und Preisfragen), this criticism was widespread. It was almost 
impossible to achieve a post within prominent areas of the Austrian system except through party 
influence. (Preston 1957, p. 346) - •
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Also, as opposed to the ordinary citizen, the public official had the power to benefit 
not only himself or herself but also to personally favour certain segments or groups in 
Austrian industry. This difference is important, since nepotism and undercover 
negotiations between, for instance, firms and companies arguably affected the 
efficiency of the Austrian economy. According to an investigation made by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Austrian legal 
protection against ‘unfair competition’ -  as it was conveniently framed -  quite 
successfully promoted financial agreements between powerful interest groups, 
excluding non-organised and possibly more financially sound companies and 
tenders. As a consequence of the duration and extensive use of these corporatist 
arrangements, about half of Austria’s GDP, by the end of the 1980s, was produced in 
sectors sheltered from competition (OECD Economic Surveys 1989/90, cited in 
Lauber 1992, p. 162).20
These protectionist tendencies were seen as a structural weakness of the Austrian 
economy which, arguably, hampered Austria’s responsiveness to changing 
international conditions (Lauber 1992, p. 160). The early 1980s, characterised by a 
weak economy, heavy financial losses and numerous scandals such as unsuccessful 
oil speculation within the Austrian nationalised steel industry, saw critics increasingly 
point towards the connection between corruption and poor economic results (Gerlich 
1989, p. 214).
Political Participation and Opposition
At first sight, political representation within Austrian corporatism does not differ from 
ordinary pluralistic representation. In both cases, political decisions are influenced by 
interest groups, all of which try to affect the decision-making process according to 
their specific objectives. But whereas pluralistic representation generally takes place 
from a position outside the sphere of power, corporatist representation usually takes 
place within powerful institutions. No interest group pressure can be exerted outside 
official channels or expressed without a formal position. These arrangements 
considerably limit the number of contending pressure groups and render their
20 This OECD investigation would support a liberal and pluralist critique, arguing that the economy 
does not benefit from the orderly surveillance and ‘transparency’ of corporatist arrangements.
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activities more institutionalised than those within pluralistic representation. 
Consequently, increased knowledge and horizontal intimacy between interest group 
members is obtained only at the price of the exclusion of any pressure group that, for 
whatever reason, is situated outside the sphere of power (Marin 1982, p. 43).
This leads to an important feature of the system -  that due to a combination of secret 
negotiations and a rubber-stamp parliament, the vast majority of political decisions 
are made out of sight of the people. Ostensibly for the sake of mutual benefit, 
newspapers were rarely informed before decisions were taken. This contributed 
strongly to the fact that, during the two decades between 1966 and 1986, about 80 
percent of all legislation was passed unanimously by the Austrian National 
Assembly.21 This corporatist process of political decision-making meant that 
meetings and negotiations between member of the Joint Commission for Wages and 
Prices (Die Paritatische Kommission fur Lohn- und Preisfragen) -  frequently 
regarded as the very core of Austrian corporatism -  took on the air of gentlemen’s 
agreements.22 Secluded, informal discussions created an informal atmosphere and a 
sense of mutual responsibility, where a spoken promise was trusted (Gerlich 1992, p. 
136f).
Corresponding to these corporatist characteristics of horizontal intimacy, the system 
executed a faceless power. Politicians could not be confronted as members of the 
Joint Commission for Wages and Prices (Marin 1982, p. 16) for there were no formal 
lists of members, routines for membership, official offices, agendas, or procedures for 
exit (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 136). The impression of amorphousness was further 
strengthened by the fact that no firm duties existed; consequently, neither did 
expectations, surprises, or, ultimately, responsibilities (Marin 1982, p. 16). In short, 
these intimate negotiations were being executed from a position aloof from society, 
beyond the reach of the citizen and the law.
21 Despite recent changes in direction towards a less co-operative parliament, the latter is still 
predominantly regarded as the place where negotiations between government and opposition take 
place. (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 104)
I am referring to negotiations made within the aforementioned Joint Commission for Wages and 
Prices, (Die Paritatische Kommission fur Lohn -  und Preisfragen) frequently regarded as the very core 
of Austrian corporatism. See Marin (1985, p. 74) and Klose (1987, p. 90).
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Just as hidden negotiations behind a rubber-stamp parliament of pre-fabricated 
consensus can be seen as the core feature of political behaviour under Austrian 
corporatism, so the behaviour of the citizen may be traced back to one -  
psychologically significant -  element, and, indeed, one which appears to gainsay a 
fundamental correlation in political behaviour.
Generally, voting is regarded as an act of political conviction stemming from either 
‘party identification’ -  where voting constitutes an act of loyalty, or from the theory of 
‘rational choice’ whereby one acts in pursuit of one’s personal interests. In contrast, 
anyone who does not vote is assumed to be showing a lack of political engagement. 
Decreasing voting participation within Western nations has therefore been a cause 
for concern.
According to the definition of Barnes and Kaase (1979, p. 38), participation is defined 
as ‘interaction between authorities and non-authorities’ [author’s translation]. This 
definition of participation, which emphasises free interaction within a given hierarchy, 
can be regarded as one variation between two extreme definitions, the one aiming for 
self-government, the other aiming for the preservation of the balance of a political 
system (Zimpel 1970, p. 72). Whereas the self-government perspective puts forward 
a rather narrow definition, and emphasises the citizen’s knowledge and ability to 
improve his or her personal situation, the ‘balance-seeking’ approach is mainly 
concerned with the preservation and functioning of a given social system. The citizen 
should be engaged, but within limits; a subservient and enthusiastic supporter of 
decisions taken elsewhere (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 490).
The latter form of political action lacks what is required in order to achieve self- 
government, namely the aptitude for change through personal judgement. Therefore, 
as opposed to ‘political participation’, political acclamation might be a more 
appropriate label for the Austrian system. More specifically this suggested label 
illustrates one seemingly contradictory element in Austrian politics: the Austrian 
combination of high voting figures and political apathy (See Luther and Muller 1982, 
p. 60).23 In elections from 1953 to 1990 figures show that average turnout was 92.7
23 In any investigation concerning voting or membership of a political organisation, the case of Austria 
has for decades been noted for exhibiting strikingly high voting figures. However, the Kafkaesque, 
anonymous nature of Austrian political participation is revealed when we turn to face-to-face
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percent (Luther and Muller 1982, p. 29). Taken at face value the Austrian figure is a 
cause for some envy. In reality, however, it comes with a widely held ‘non-ideological 
conception of politics’, shared by 81 percent of Austrians.24 This acclamatory 
tendency can also be shown by research showing that whereas Austria has been a 
rather average European country in the category of ‘conventional political 
participation’ -  ranging from political campaigning to political inactivity -  it 
nevertheless displayed remarkably low figures in the positive category ‘protest 
potential’ -  covering activities from the hesitant signing of petitions to illegal strikes 
(Barnes and Kaase 1979, p. 80).
What the system of Austrian corporatism requires is citizen support and legitimacy. 
What it does not need is active participation (Pelinka 1987, p. 72). It is all for the 
people, but nothing by the people. Judging from the Austrian experience, one might 
conclude that the greatest degree of political apathy is expressed by a citizen who is 
unable to refrain from voting.25
The Scientific Rationality of Austrian Corporatism
Is politics as such an irrational and therefore politically dubious endeavour? The 
question might seem provocative, but since the end of the Second World War it has 
been quite central to the Austrian political scene.
In order to illustrate the Austrian corporatist view of politics, one should first, by way 
of comparison, briefly consider some features that have traditionally defined
encounters with local politicians; the unparalleled Austrian figures suddenly collapse to less than half 
the figure in the Netherlands, barely outnumbering India. (Verba 1978, p. 61).
24 This figure is from the year 1979, which showed a turnout of 92.2 percent, fairly close to the average 
of the period under investigation. (Barnes and Kaase 1979, p. 224)
25 To be fair, lack of active participation is not exclusively confined to corporatist societies. See, for 
instance, Butler and Stokes (1969) and Converse (1964) Converse argued that the level of political 
knowledge among the general American public was rather low. Central to his argument was the 
concept of ‘constraint’, meaning the degree to which a particular belief is predictive of another belief. 
While the American elites do display constraint, i.e. consciously seek to construct a cogent and 
consistent body of ideological thought, the majority of Americans rather tend to choose randomly, 
resulting in an inconsistent political view. According to Converse, Americans who defend the welfare 
state are also most likely to defend lower taxes; as if they, on a quite rudimentary level, select policies 
that 'are good for us’. The author believes these two ideas are mutually exclusive, and therefore 
demonstrate a lack of constraint. Hence, while corporatism may lower political participation among the 
electorate, political apathy is a problem throughout the Western community.
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European democratic political action.26 First and foremost, it is characterised by an 
explicit range of alternatives, defined by a trade-off between different sets of values.27 
Apart from basic issues, such as the common benefit of not declaring war, solutions 
presented generally favour certain groups and not others. Politically opposed views 
regarding, for instance, the tax system are natural and cannot, by means of their very 
nature, be overcome. These contesting alternatives imply, furthermore, that the 
citizen is compelled to choose.
The underlying theoretical assumptions behind Austrian corporatism are different, the 
reason for which is connected to the concept of ‘objectification’ (The Austrian original 
term is Versachligung, literally ‘turning to the thing itself’, or ‘turning to the heart of the 
matter’).28 In a benevolent, relativistic interpretation that makes the concept true, if 
somewhat obvious, this would arguably suggest no more than the need for any 
contending party to steer away from irrelevant issues. In an Austrian setting, 
however, the meaning of ‘objectification’ is quite different. It entails the avoidance of 
ideological conflict.
In contrast to a pluralistic system, ideologically founded disputes were, in Austrian 
political culture, not recognised as core elements for negotiation, but as a sign of 
immature debate.29 They did not, as it were, belong to the ‘object’ of any political 
issue. On the contrary, ideological differences should be ‘played down’, (Pelinka 
1998a, p. 147) ‘dismantled’, (Klose 1970, p. 68) peeled off by the expertise of the 
corporatist politician.
26 The difference between Austrian post-war politics and that of other European countries is not one of 
kind, but one of degree. A redefinition of politics towards ‘the mutual interest’ is an international 
phenomenon. Even so, it can be argued that in Austria this process is gaining ground not only 
because of the lack of a political defence, but actively, through the structure of the system itself.
27 For an argument that political distinctions can be analysed in terms of equality versus inequality, see 
Bobbio. (1996, p. 99) For a discussion of the terms liberty and equality in terms of left and right, see 
Bobbio. (1996, p. 76)
28 As early as in the 1950’s, the Austrian politial theorist Alfred Klose used ‘Objectification’ to describe 
the policy of Austrian corporatism. (Pelinka 1998, p. 147) It must not be confused with ‘objectification’
( Vergegenstandlichung) in the Marxian sense, in which the worker in the era of capitalism becomes 
assimilated to the object he produces. (Giddens 1971, p. 11)
29 Again, it is easy to overstate the differences. In a well-functioning democratic system opposing 
views must also be overcome. The one, but still significant difference concerns ‘when’, and under what 
circumstances these opposing views are finally moulded together, i.e. if these originally conflicting 
views are to be regarded as real or illusory in the first place.
87
Naturally, in Austria during the period we are examining, this grand ‘objectification’ 
had immediate repercussions, both for the scope of possible social alternatives and 
also for the definition of a rational decision. Once the illusions of political interest 
were overcome, the range of possible solutions narrowed considerably (Pelinka 
1998a, p. 147). In fact, what ultimately remained was not even one option among 
many but one which ‘eventually should be regarded as an unquestionable order of 
political rationality’, the only alternative to which consisted in ‘a complete politicisation 
of the economy, and degeneration into the inter-war atmosphere of class struggle.’ 
Wirtschaftspolitische Blatter 20 (Vol. 6.1973, cited in Marin 1982, p. 309).
Only Austrian corporatism was rational, scientific, responsible, all else was 
unrealistic, dangerous, and utopian (Marin 1982, p. 75). A political point of view was 
no longer significant. In the words of the Austrian political historian Anton Pelinka, 
well-known dividing lines were replaced by new ones, the vacuity of which was 
revealed by their seemingly incontestable nature: ‘The gap between socialism and 
capitalism, between interventionism and the free market, was seen as secondary 
compared with the difference between ‘good’ (consistent) and ‘bad’ (inconsistent) 
solutions’ (Pelinka 1998a, p. 147). Politics had indeed ended up being an irrational 
and almost politically dubious endeavour.
Ideology Strikes Back
If the one crucial difference between ideological programmes is their amount of 
explicit honesty in relation to their equally subjective and partial endeavours then 
indeed Austrian corporatism has been a failure. It might seem tempting to cling to 
‘scientific solutions that go beyond interest’, and jump on the bandwagon of ‘good’ 
and ‘consistent’ solutions (Pelinka 1998a, p. 147). But the question lingers: ‘To 
whom?’ To whom are those solutions favourable? Where do they take us? At what 
specific position on the scale of left and right are these proposed changes ‘free from 
illusions’, ‘objective’, ‘non-political’? These questions have all been absent from the 
ideological debate within Austrian corporatism.
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As the unspoken rule of Austrian corporatism is one of constant negotiation (and not 
constant strikes), it has often been argued that the system has a structural bias in 
favour of the employers. Historically, this more favourable attitude towards the 
employer might be explained by the fact that they favoured the system precisely 
because the system was non-transparent and secretive. The employees, on the 
contrary, approved of the system in spite of those very same corporatist features. 
The system of Austrian corporatism is a system more favourable to conservatives 
and moderate reformists than to revolutionaries or, indeed, reactionaries (Pelinka 
1987, p. 68). A further explanation for this conservative impression is suggested by 
Arend Lijphart: broad agreements can be perceived as more democratic than 
majority rule; but practically, these agreements might, by means of the principle of 
veto, end up being a conservative rule by any minority (Lijphart 1977, p. 27).
The main explanation for Austrian corporatism’s quite subjective nature can, 
however, be sought within various programmatic statements, where these seemingly 
objective concepts are further explained. ‘Rational’, for example, was everything 
which ‘serves the objectives of the economic policy’, such as economic growth 
(Kienzl, cited in Marin 1982, p. 307). ‘Rationality’ as manifest in economic growth, 
should have ‘an educating and edifying impact’ (Bischof 1966, p. 13). This clearly 
shows how ideological conflicts were ‘played down’ as a mere educational issue, 
assisting in overcoming political obstacles ‘by means of spreading economic 
knowledge among the population [...]’ (Schmitz 1973, p. 307). Conflicts were caused 
by confusion and were therefore ideological by nature. Knowledge was economic by 
nature and led to co-operation.30
Under the veil of the common good, Austrian corporatist ‘objectification’ was the 
rationality of production, trade, and economic progress; an ideology of the times 
labelled as the ‘end of ideologies’, run by the technocratic elite: managers, experts, 
strategists, public-relations people (Marin 1982, p. 301). In denying their partial 
stance, they mystified the world. Furthermore, the adherents’ innocence made this 
technocratic ideology yet more ‘plausible and non-transparent, authentic and 
therefore more seductive than all other ideologies, past and present, because it alone
30 Jorg Haider and the Freedom Party argue that Austrian corporatism is a predominantly socialist 
project. In light of the conservative or downright neo-liberal connections above, this might seem 
surprising.
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aspired to express the conscience of post-ideological modernity’ (Marin 1982, p. 
301).
Austrian Corporatism -  a Success Story
The elite system of Austrian corporatism was plagued by a wide range of problems 
as the previous discussion has shown. Whether or not the system was democratic 
was questioned. The system exhibited indisputable traits of corruption. The 
electorate had, so it seemed, entered into a psychological frame of thought where 
voting procedures no longer had any meaning. The very existence of social conflicts 
was programmatically denied. Instead, the view of any dissenting voice was declared 
to be false, while the view of the Austrian elite was seen as the truth. Under the 
surface of such proclamations, a subjective agenda in favour of progress and 
rationality was hidden.
However, this discussion of Austrian corporatism is still incomplete. A fuller picture 
will now be presented, stressing the system’s historical background and the reasons 
why it initially came about. The economic development will be underscored.
Austrian Corporatism -  Historical Legacy
Ever since 1618, when rebellious Czechs, in what could be regarded as the very 
epitome of a separatist outrage, hurled three Habsburg partisans out of the Hradcany 
Royal Palace window, the empire was threatened by factionist tendencies.31 
Comprising vast areas of wilderness, the empire was characterised by a multitude of 
cultures, languages, religions, all of which contributed to a pronounced feature of 
Habsburg -  namely that it was a fledging empire combining diverse and increasingly 
nationalistic regions. Not only did this seriously affect the sense of unity among the 
population but also, eventually, became an insurmountable difficulty for the 
government. The constitution of 1867 allowed for the development of a parliament 
and party competition. Initial hopes for debates according to ideological convictions
31 Since 1800 no other European country has shifted identity as many times as Austria. (See Pelinka 
1998a, p. 9)
were soon dashed, resulting in a party system completely fragmented by ethno- 
linguistic differences (Pelinka 1998a, p. 10).
In addition to language barriers and rising ‘inner’ nationalism, the empire was 
fractured by religion and age. As opposed to the ‘young Czechs’, favouring a 
nationalism of a more popular nature, the ‘old Czechs’ were ‘tactically allied with the 
feudalists’ (Steiner 1972, p. 29). During one period of severe tension between 1879 
and 1893, Prince Charles Schwarzenberg, an old Czech’ moderate, responded to 
calls for sovereignty: ‘If you and yours hate this state -  and it is unfortunately a fact 
that hatred of Austria is spreading in Bohemia through your teachings -  what will you 
do with your country, which is too small to stand alone? Will you give it to Germany 
or to Russia, for you have no other choice if you abandon the Austrian union’ (May 
1951, p. 199). As a whole, Habsburg failed to excite the patriotism and enthusiasm 
that normally characterise state formations. All in all these features contributed to the 
drift of power from the state to political parties.
In the early 1900’s central European societies were influenced by three distinct 
perspectives. An emphasis upon ‘class’ created the socialist camp, stress upon 
‘religion’ formed the basis for political Catholicism, and ‘ethnicity’ found its political 
expression in various forms of radical nationalism, most importantly Pan-Germanism 
(Pelinka 1998a, p. 74; see also Steiner 1972, p. ix). For want of a pacifying sense of 
national belonging, citizens consequently fled into one or other of these competing 
camps -  conservatism, socialist internationalism or anti-democratic ultra-nationalism. 
Further signs of the strength of these political camps -  and the frailty of the Habsburg 
state -  can be seen in their repeated attempts to forge links with like-minded foreign 
organisations (Luther and Muller 1993, p. 4). Any prospect of constructing a separate 
Austrian state was hampered by the fact that all its inhabitants from 1918 onwards 
spoke German (Pelinka 1998a, p. 12). Just as language had played a part in the lack 
of support for the Habsburg regime, so linguistic factors prevented emotional 
affiliation to the subsequent Austrian state; this time, however, it was not because 
there were too many languages, but because there was only one -  German. In 
addition, hopes for Austrian separatism were, at least in parliament, shattered, as
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most major parties advocated Anschluss; nationalists hoping for a shift rightwards, 
socialists expecting a revival of the German revolution (Steiner 1972, p. 16).32
After the turmoil of the First World War, Austria -  der Rumpfstaat -  now a mere 
fraction of its former size, found itself equipped with an over-sized bureaucracy.33 
The inevitable dismissal in large numbers of those very civil servants upon whose 
shoulders state legitimacy normally rests seriously affected the self-esteem of the 
young nation (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 5). Worse still was the fact that the idea of 
an Austrian nation had been non-existent during the monarchy (Macartney 1926, p. 
8). For the conservatives, the First Republic was the product of old Austria’s defeat: 
for the left, it was just a temporary arrangement until unity with the Weimar Republic 
could be implemented; finally, for the extreme right, it was a nightmare phase 
between reality and the myth of a Greater German Empire. It was the state no one 
wanted (Pelinka 1998a, p. 11).
In the shaping of modern Austrian corporatism, the historical defeat of liberalism 
played a significant part. The bourgeois revolutions of 1848 failed to incite lasting 
changes within the Austrian state. In 1848, at the demand of reformists, the Vienna 
government made liberal reforms to the press, including allowing the printing of 
certain radical papers and publishing a constitution; only, however, to make a 
reactionary U-turn soon after and declare all liberal reforms null and void (May 1951, 
p. 25). Eventually, after considerable hesitation, modest liberal reforms were 
introduced in 1860, and in 1867, the same year as the progressive ‘December 
Constitution’, Austria started applying liberal principles more widely. However, the 
initial excitement turned sour with the major crash on the Vienna Stock Exchange in 
1873 which partly explains the failure of the laissez-faire measures taken during in
32 In early August 1914, the editorial of the Austrian Arbeiter-Zeitung bore the title: ‘Der Tag der 
deutschen Nation’ (The day of the German nation), which indicates that the Austrian Social 
Democracy was dominated by the idea of Anschluss. (Kreisky, 1986, p. 151) Still, support for 
Anschluss was possibly stronger among leading socialists than among its rank-and-file. Otto Bauer 
wrote in Die osterreichische Revolution in 1923 that the workers were ‘somewhat cool' towards the 
Anschluss idea. (Cited in Steiner 1972, p. 16.) As noted by Bruno Kreisky (1986, pp. 181-2), 
Anschluss-fanaticism was by and large absent among the Austrian Sozialistische Jugend in the early 
1930’s. Indeed, Kreisky is amazed by the fact that younger socialists at the time did not express a 
clearer critique of the party’s official enthusiasm for the idea.
33 In 1918 Austria encompassed roughly one-sixth of the previous Habsburg territory, and the 
population had shrunk from fifty-two million to seven million inhabitants. (Steiner 1972, p. 3)
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the inter-war period as well as the peripheral position of Austrian liberalism ever 
since (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 1 ).34
These historical circumstances in the period leading up to 1918 -  a lack of national 
support and permanent centrifugal tendencies, the failure of liberalism and a lost war 
-  might all help to explain the emergence of the strong corporatist state. 
Economically, 1918 brought heavy war reparations, weighing heavily on a former 
empire which had suddenly lost most of its industrial structure. As a consequence 
Austria was the only European state with a negative inter-war GDP. In contrast to 
other countries, Austria never, after the Europe-wide state regulation of industry, 
regained a deregulated industrial structure, but plunged into a prolonged era of 
turmoil (Lehmbruch 1989, p. 60). Ideologically, what Anton Pelinka refers to as 
‘centrifugal democracy’ subsequently led to political polarisation, civil war, Austrian 
fascism and eventually, in 1938, Anschluss and Nazi rule (1987, p. 71 ).35 In 1945, 
owing to a shattered economy, a lost war and a lack of political consensus, the nation 
therefore again suffered an urgent crisis of legitimacy. Hence, the initial organisation 
of Austrian corporatism in the late 1950s was not born out of political optimism; 
rather, it evolved as a defensive reaction to potential disintegration and social 
upheaval.
Not long after Austria had been declared a sovereign state, it was put under an 
ostensibly democracy-fostering occupation by France, the United Kingdom, the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Even though Austrian politicians repeatedly 
made reassuring remarks concerning the political reliability of their country, the 
occupation was to last for those first ten years of Austria’s post-Second World War 
existence, a period during which, generally, a national self-consciousness normally 
appears. This international arrangement further hampered the credibility of the 
nation, including national leaders, in the eyes of the Austrians. Instead, different party 
leaders and party elites started exercising unusually large levels of influence upon
34 Even though these authors by no means overstate the consequences of the failure of pre-1939 
Austrian liberalism for the Austrian political climate ever since, something should be added. Germany, 
for instance, also suffered from economic crises in the late 19th century and was equally hit by the Wall 
Street crisis. However, Germany eventually regained a firm belief in liberal principles.
35 It is also worth noticing that far from the Anschluss being an act of aggression against a nation of 
‘victims’, Hitler actually had the support of a considerable number of Austrians. However, the fact that 
a public referendum shortly before Anschluss showed that more than 99.72 per cent were in favour of 
it does not necessarily mean that they all supported Hitler. Austrians had many reasons to favour 
unification with Germany, and the Nazi ideology was only one of them.
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the masses, at least within the context of modern Western Europe. As a 
consequence, the relative power of the political parties -  most prominently that of the 
Social Democrats and the conservative People’s Party, started to increase in 
proportion. Seen in this context, it is probably unjust to characterise the political 
parties’ influence over Austria as determined only by greed for power and money.
An important consequence of this uncertain boundary between the Austrian state and 
its two major parties was that any state property was owned in practice by the 
Socialists and the Conservatives.36 Therefore, the fact that in 1946, shortly after the 
war, the Austrian government agreed to create a law of state ownership of private 
corporations as a protective measure against Russian mass confiscation in Vienna 
and surrounding areas also, arguably, increased the power and influence of what 
was soon to evolve into Austrian corporatism (Gutkas 1985, p. 38).37
Healing the Wounds and Bridging the Past
We have now reached the end of the international occupation in 1955, and move on 
to the peak period of Austrian corporatism. As indicated above and exemplified in the 
episode of the Russian expropriations, we now find that, in contrast to the general 
perception of ‘corporatist measures’, the cause for the initial establishment of 
Austrian corporatism was not as a means for great achievements but, on the 
contrary, intended as an explicit act of healing and protection against precisely those 
‘great achievements’ which had recently dominated Europe.38 Anton Pelinka 
observes that ‘The parties had to fulfil functions which under normal circumstances 
would belong to the state’ (1998a, p. 3), and refers to quite justifiable ‘corporatist 
techniques for healing the wounds, and bridging the past’ (1998a, p. 15). ‘At the 
time’, as noted by Hella Pick the ‘country was deemed too fragile to sustain the 
rough-and-tumble of authentic parliamentary democracy’ (2000a, p. 233). According 
to Bruno Kreisky, the reason why early tenant associations were unofficially Social
36 As has previously been discussed, this is also exemplified by the fact that access to any state- 
owned apartment could only be achieved by membership in one of the two dominant political parties.
37 According to Peter Gerlich (1989, p. 213), this precautionary strategy in the area under 
Russian occupation was unsuccessful.
38 After the experience of the war, the Social Democrats and the People’s Party agreed that any 
democratic measures would be allowed that could contribute to the prevention of another tragic 
political polarisation of the country.
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Democratic was that ‘it was felt that the Social Democratic Party could offer the best 
protection for the interests of the tenants’ (1986, p. 20). The Austrian state was, 
Kreisky adds, ‘conspicuously weak and were of little avail to the Austrian citizen’ 
(1986, p. 20). The key word was, according to the Austrian political scientist Bernd 
Marin, modernisation, and the message was social peace and progress through an 
expanding economy and a dismantling of ideological tensions’ [author’s translation] 
(1982, p. 301). Kurt Richard Luther sees the ‘main objectives of corporatism [as 
being] to avoid the crisis of the First Republic’ (1992, p. 64). It was ‘elite behaviour 
designed to stabilise a political system, the viability of which would otherwise be 
under threat’ (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 205). In the eyes of Ronald Preston, 
commenting in 1956, Austrian corporatism maintained social peace in Austria and 
made possible an orderly social transformation of the country’ (1956 p. 344f).39 
Indeed, negative descriptions of Austrian corporatism during this period are hard to 
find.
More generally, these various historical explanations depict Austrian corporatism as 
a benevolent political system arising out of an emergency created by the civil war of 
1934 and the following fascist rule. None of those quoted above seeks to hide the 
fact that the corporatist measures had certain democratic flaws. Instead, they attempt 
to explain these measures by emphasising the critical historical situation of Austria in 
the late 1950s, as well as the democratic intentions of these measures.
From the corporatist arrangements the evolution of a mutual confidence would, later, 
enable a competitive market economy to function (1992b, p. 144). Thus, taking these 
historical features into consideration -  a lost empire and a state without support, a 
persistent financial crisis and the weakness of liberal values, political polarisation, 
civil war, Anschluss, Nazi rule, followed by a ten-year denial of self-sufficiency -  
consociational theory ‘may constitute something like a “missing link” between 
dictatorship and democracy, a stepping-stone on the way from a traditional to a 
modern form of politics and social life’ (Gerlich 1992).
39 In order to avoid being too critical of the ‘elite rule’ and taking on the 'lack of transparency’ of 
Austrian corporatism -  both stemming from the wisdom of hindsight -  it is important not to 
overlook contemporaneous comments.
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The fact that Austrian corporatism was intended as an explicit remedy for political 
and social disorder tempted the various interest groups to accept modest changes, 
which, under more favourable circumstances, might have been regarded as 
insufficient. The system was, for example, open to multiple political interpretations: 
for the socialists, corporatist measures made it possible to democratise capitalism. In 
the eyes of the capitalists the same measures prevented class warfare, whereas the 
unionists of Austrian corporatism saw a sudden opportunity to take part in decisions 
from which they had previously been excluded (Pelinka 1998a, p. 91).
Corporatism and the Austrian National Character
Before reconsidering the lack of transparency and ‘objectification’ of Austrian 
corporatism, which, as discussed above, revealed a somewhat questionable 
technocratic ideology of production and trade, Austrian national character will be 
discussed. In so doing, this consideration of the Austria’s political development after 
1945 will shift its focus away from specific measures of corporatist politics towards 
the underlying features of a people. Of course, in research on parties prone to ethnic 
simplifications it is of the utmost importance to avoid national stereotypes. But 
national characteristics and prejudiced stereotypes are two different things. Cafe 
discussions in Prague are generally quiet, and queues in the supermarket occur in 
Florence, but not in Munchen 40
In the earlier section on differences and similarities between academic and Freedom 
Party criticisms of Austrian corporatism, the observation was made that the system 
as such was not confined to the ‘elite’, but was an attribute of Austria as a whole; 
even, possibly, constituting a kind of national character. From an empirical point of 
view, Freedom Party criticisms were regarded not as distinct, but as merely a tactical 
selection within the wider area of academic criticism, with the aim of creating a
40 Naturally, in the continual debate about structures and psychological characteristics, it is impossible 
to separate cause and effect. In order to find out if the effects of Austrian corporatism were alleviated 
by inherent national characteristics of the Austrian population, one would need to go back to the 
period prior to the late 1950’s, i.e. the founding years of the system. The historical existence of 
national characteristics would, by including the entire Austrian population, also constitute an additional 
argument against the Freedom Party’s populist presentation of a chasm between an exploitative elite 
and an exploited people. These historical discussions are, however, outside the scope of this thesis.
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breach between a homogeneous and blameworthy ‘elite’, and an innocent and 
exploited ‘people’.
Leaving aside direct participation in corporatism by the Austrian public, its citizens 
can be said to carry certain general features without which, one might argue, 
Austrian corporatism would not have been so successful. Austrians are industrious, 
cautious, and likely to keep private problems to themselves. ‘Historically, Austrians 
dislike conflict and are even willing to suffer personal losses, as long as 
compensation can be expected at some later date’ (Gerlich 1989, p. 219). They avoid 
risks, which creates a rather conservative society where political and social changes 
do not easily occur (Gerlich et a l 1988, p. 215). A telling example is the alleged 
existence of legal sanctions in the minds of the Austrians. They will ask themselves 
whether or not they are allowed to go on strike -  and they are likely to answer this 
question in the negative (Gerlich etal. 1988, p. 217). The particular Austrian mind-set 
can also be illustrated by the degree of public satisfaction and private melancholia, 
as strikes have always been unusual in Austria at the same time as the nation 
historically has been plagued by high suicide rates.41
Returning to the previous discussion on acclamatory participation and the reluctance 
to engage in any kind of non-parliamentary action, the question needs to be raised 
whether, as was argued above, these features are mainly an outcome of the 
psychologically suffocating system of corporatism, or whether they rest upon deeper, 
historically founded elements within the Austrian population.
It has been argued that Austrians participated in the system of corporatism, and also 
displayed certain psychological features that fostered the scope and complexity of 
the structure. But what was their openly expressed opinion of it? Moreover, did this 
opinion change at any stage? In the early years and up until the 1980s, voter support 
for the two established parties indicates that the corporatist system rested on firm
41 In 1985, at the onset of this investigation, the suicide rate in Austria was, according to the WHO, 
27.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. Among the 25 independent European states at the time, this was only 
surpassed by Hungary (44.4) and Denmark (27.9). The figure for the Czech Republic in 1986 is 20.9 
and may be taken as a close approximation of the figure for Czechoslovakia in 1985. The figure for 
Germany in 1990 is 17.8.
(http://www.who.int/mental health/prevention/suicide/countrv reports/en/index.html)
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public support (Kofler 1985, p. 92).42 Its popularity reached a peak in the 1970s 
(Pelinka 1998b, p. 112), and as late as the mid 1980s, there was hardly anyone who 
wished to reduce the influence of Austrian corporatism (Pelinka 1985, p. 195).
Austrian Corporatism -  Ideological and yet Progressive
In the political arena, it is hard to avoid having a partial stance. To pose as an 
unbiased, unprejudiced observer reveals, at best, a lack of honesty. The one 
admissible distinction in this respect lies not between ‘the critic and the neutral 
observer’, but between those who do, and those who do not admit their political point 
of view. According to Max Weber, to ‘cloak [...] value assertions in the field of politics 
with a spurious scientific neutrality is as illegitimate as to openly preach a partisan 
position within a university’ (Cited in Giddens 1971, p. 144). The Austrian corporatist 
concept of ‘objectification’ allegedly implying a policy beyond political conflict also 
‘cloaks value assertions’, which, as previously discussed, immediately raises 
concerns about the democratic validity of the system. However, if the important 
observation about the partial stance is allowed to mark the end of any political 
discussion one is bound to reach comfortable but simplistic conclusions, where any 
political proposal or programme is seen as an essentially interchangeable ‘ideology’.
In his attempt to prevent ‘ideology’ from ending up as cheap, relativistic jargon, Kurt 
Lenk (1994, pp. 32-3), German expert on political philosophy, presents a typology in 
which he distinguishes between four main categories: Ideology of justification 
includes traditional ‘High Ideologies’, most prominently economic liberalism; 
Complementary ideology covers metaphysics, religion and nationalism; Ideology of 
veiling refers to anti-Semitism, racism and various elite ideologies; and Ideology of 
expression incorporates imperialism and National Socialism. Using this 
categorisation, we shall try to determine where the ideology of corporatist 
‘objectification’ belongs.
42 Research carried out by Strourzh and Ulram (1988) found that, when asked about their feelings 
about Austrian corporatism, 63% of the Austrian population identified themselves as ‘proud’ and 28% 
identified as ‘not proud’. In contrast, when asked about their attitude to Austria’s ‘Overcoming 
economic problems’, only 23% said they were proud, while 69% identified as ‘not proud’. (Cited in 
Luther and Pulzer, 1998, p. 99, Table 5.12)
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Behind the general interest of objectification, Bernd Marin found nothing but 
technocrats and the rationality of production -  and the ‘end of ideologies’ was instead 
the end of sincerity (Marin 1982, p. 301). But Marin also notably emphasises that: 
Their interpretation is, on the other hand, closer to practical realities than most other 
ideologies. The technocratic ideology has access to all the knowledge and rationality 
of its time. Most importantly, however, it does not fight other ideologies in the name 
of another, better or more human ideology, but in the name of the end and 
abandoning of ideologies as such by means of a pure scientific rationality’ [Author’s 
translation] (Marin 1982, p. 301 ).43
The underlying reason for the ideology of ‘objectification’ was by no means unbiased, 
but at least there were no new pretentious clouds of ‘ideology’, no promises of ‘great 
achievements’. In their demand for change, Austrians were not yet again asked to 
wait, not expected to succumb in bliss.44 Austrian corporatism would inevitably have 
been a system of failure if the one crucial difference between ideological 
programmes is their level of explicit honesty in relation to their equally subjective and 
partial endeavours. On the other hand, if honesty in politics is not crucial, then 
Austrian corporatism was perhaps not a failure. The most important basis on which to 
judge it is its practical consequences, and the overall impression of Austrian 
corporatism may be milder when its turbulent history is taken into account. Calls for 
honesty and having all one’s cards on the table are meagre excuses for political 
miscarriage 45
In returning to Kurt Lenk’s typology above, it seems that the ideology of Austrian 
corporatism, notwithstanding its uneasy relationship to liberalism, should belong to 
the Ideology of justification. Among its constituent features are ‘a relatively high 
degree of rationality in respect to the depiction of social relations’, and market 
competition as a regulating principle (Lenk 1994, p. 33). Furthermore, the core 
elements of Austrian corporatism cannot easily be reconciled either with an 
empirically thin Complementary ideology, or with a potentially violent Ideology of
43 One might also argue that the very fact that their policy was ‘non-ideological’ and purely 
economic/scientific prevented it from developing utopian tendencies, as utopias are often political in 
nature, and rarely -  if ever -  rest upon an economic foundation.
44 It was, in a Popperian sense, an ideology of ‘piecemeal social engineering’.
45 In Robert Dahl’s (1998, pp. 124-127) discussion of various constitutional elements that foster a 
democratic development, Transparency (and comprehensibility)’ constitutes one factor out of eleven.
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veiling, even less with the irrational and dichotomous Ideology of expression. An 
ideology always lies behind any scientific approach in politics, Austrian corporatist 
‘objectification’ included. But behind the ideology lies the distinction between rational, 
realistic ideologies, such as Austrian corporatism, and irrational, utopian ideologies, 
such as National Socialism. We have argued above that Austrian corporatism was 
not, at heart, simply a tool for the exploitation of the general population in the hands 
of the elite. Instead, based on the opinions and empirical analysis of experts in 
various fields, it was largely beneficial for the whole community.
Corporatism and Democratic Flaws
As with the argument about ‘ideology’, which proves to be an imprecise tool for 
analysing Austrian corporatism, concerns about ‘secret negotiations’ and ‘lack of 
democracy’ also easily overlook the complexities involved. It is of course true that, all 
other things being equal, a fully transparent system is better than a non-transparent 
one. But beyond the calm waters of abstraction, the question is, again: What is the 
practical outcome? How was Austria affected by these activities behind the scenes?
First we will consider the fact that eighty percent of all legislation, in what was 
referred to as ‘pre-fabricated consensus’, was passed unanimously by the Austrian 
National Assembly (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 104). The image of a complete and 
obscure consensus among the ‘elite’, and most importantly between the members of 
the Joint Commission for Wages and Prices, gives the impression that there is a 
division between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’, similar to the one drawn in populist 
rhetoric. In reality, however, this horizontal division was a red herring. The fact that 
legislation was passed ‘unanimously’ by the National Assembly only meant that there 
was agreement at that stage. Any populist insinuation that there were no negotiations 
at all is unfounded. The defaming ‘pre-fabricated consensus’ meant in effect 
precisely that -  negotiations had already taken place elsewhere, and the parliament 
was therefore inevitably transformed into a ‘rubber stamp’. Behind what appeared to 
be an undivided power elite, Austrian political and economic rule was, as in any 
fundamentally democratic system, characterised by vertical divisions between
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bargaining interest groups.46 This shows a certain romanticism on the part of critics of 
Austrian corporatism. Of course, constantly aiming for peaceful negotiations might be 
a sign of deceitful actions on the part of the ‘elite’. But it can also, simply, reveal a 
wish to solve an issue in a civilised and rational manner out of the reach of 
sensationalist populist media asking for an instant fix. The fact that newspapers, 
allegedly for the sake of mutual benefit, were normally informed only once decisions 
had already been taken need not always be problematic. Extra-parliamentary 
methods are not necessarily created by external circumstances. History is full of 
unfortunate examples, where promising economic and political conditions were 
ruined by ecstatic minds. A question that is being dealt with by means of sober 
negotiations need not be a less dramatic and fierce process than one where the 
result is a parliament on fire.
Finally, the question must be raised: Who precisely were the members of these 
interest groups? What were their positions? The argument that these groups 
belonged to an irresponsible ‘elite’ is not only made by the Freedom Party (Kofler 
1985, p. 92). More widespread, however, is the opinion that these informal groups 
consisted of a diverse range of professionals and specialists, who had more 
responsibility and expertise than ordinary politicians: '[...] the majority of those who 
received prominent posts were, in reality, experts in their field’ (Gutkas 1985, p. 88). 
Therefore ‘until the seventies, one of the essential conditions for the predominant 
influence of interest groups on the policies of their respective parties was, to some 
extent, the fact that the former had, via their teams of experts, the economic know­
how which the latter lacked’ (Gerlich etal. 1988, p. 219).
Post-war Economic Realities
A brief comparative discussion of Austria’s economic performance under Austrian 
corporatism will be included. As there is widespread agreement about the country’s 
economic progress until 1966, i.e. the year classic post-war corporatist arrangements
46 The evolution of Austrian politics since 1945 proves that the ‘populist’ critique of a horizontal division 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is incorrect, and should be exchanged for a pluralist, ‘vertical’ division. Anton 
Kofler, a former member of the Joint Commission for Wages and Prices, argues that ‘the manner in 
which parties and organisations were interwoven have strongly contributed to a dynamic democracy, 
and increased possibilities for participation.’ (Kofler 1985, p. 174)
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between the OVP and the SPO came to an end, we will focus on the development 
from the late 1960s onwards (Luther and Muller 1992, p. 206). In relation to other 
European countries, the economic development of Austria during the 1970’s was ‘a 
success story’, creating ‘numerous admirers’ (Gerlich et al. 1988, p. 21; Arndt 1982; 
Katzenstein 1984). Even during the late 1970s, Austria showed record rates of 
economic growth -  in fact the highest in OECD Europe. What is more, contrary to the 
common negative correlation at the time, Austria had low inflation and exceptionally 
low levels of unemployment (Lauber 1992, p. 147). In the period between 1977 and 
1986 the rate of inflation was less than half the OECD average, unemployment was 
not even 40% of the OECD average, and Austrian economic performance was about 
20% higher than the OECD average (Pelinka 1987, p. 65).47
Admittedly, Austria’s economic performance was less outstanding in the 1990s, yet in 
the new millennium the economy remained strong with an estimated GDP per capita 
ratio of 20 percent above the EU25 average, only surpassed by Luxembourg and 
Ireland.48
Ever since the late 1950s, these figures have enabled Austria to provide a highly 
developed welfare system, possibly unparalleled in non-Scandinavian mainland 
Europe. ‘Social peace, defined as social stability, is the outcome of the Austrian 
model’ (Pelinka 1987, p. 68). A similar conclusion is reached by Kurt Richard Luther, 
who observes that the system ‘for over 50 years, has been predominantly 
characterised by domestic peace and levels of economic prosperity that compare 
very favourably not only with its own inter-war experience, but also with the post-war 
experience within most Western states’ (Luther 1998, p. 121). Thus, it is evident that 
the economic outcome of Austrian corporatism has been a success. This has 
frustrated its neo-liberal critics, who have assumed that the corporatist policy would 
fail the economy.
Before closing this discussion of Austrian corporatism, a general comment must be 
made. It deals with the model of, on the one hand, a ‘liberal’ division along vertical 
lines between openly contending elites and between groups within the ‘people’, and,
47 Notably, in 1980 the level of unemployment of 2 percent contrasted sharply with a European 
average of 7 percent. (Lauber 1992, p. 153)
48 (http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/48/4/33727936.pdf)
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on the other hand, a right-wing populist division along horizontal lines, where a 
homogeneous ‘elite’ is confronted with an equally ‘homogeneous’ people. Many 
nations can be said to display horizontal divisions in the manner described by the 
Freedom Party, where all power remains in the hands of a corrupt self-righteous elite, 
leaving the country in tatters. But Austria after the Second World War does not fit this 
schema. If empirical evidence about economic and political development is the 
measure according to which ‘corruption’, ‘manipulation’, and ‘lack of democracy’ are 
to be assessed, then Austria is a poor example. In fact, Austrian economic and 
political performance since the war suggests that the allegations above are 
exaggerated. The features of Austrian corporatism as highlighted in the rhetoric of 
the Freedom Party were partly only surface phenomena. Beyond the appearance of 
democratic flaws, tendencies towards nepotism, scandals, some undercover affairs 
and a weak parliament, the political system referred to as Austrian corporatism must 
be regarded as one of the most successful in Europe.
In the second part of this chapter, the broader picture of the system of Austrian 
corporatism was presented. It started with a historical background, where the frailty 
of the post-war Austrian state was highlighted. The creation of the Social Democratic 
and Conservative ‘party state’ was described as an act of defence and protection, 
and not as one of aggression or elitism. The features of Austrian corporatism were 
partly explained by means of a particularly submissive and passive Austrian mind­
set. Even though the system was geared by a partial ideology, this ideology was by 
and large seen to be democratic, productive and progressive. Conclusively, 
widespread corruption and mismanagement result in poor economic figures and 
industrial stagnation. This scheme does not seem to fit Austria, because its post-war 
economic development was very strong.
Following on from the literature review and these two historical background chapters 
on populism and the system of Austrian corporatism, we will now present a historical 
account of the evolution of the Austrian Freedom Party prior to Jorg Haider’s 
assumption of leadership. This will give an idea of the ideological tensions within the 
party -  between German Nationalism and Austrian patriotism, between elitism and 
anti-elitism, between right-wing extremism or outright fascism and attempts at 
liberalism or even neo-liberalism. In the coming analysis, it will be shown that these
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tensions continued to affect the rhetoric and ideology of the FPO during Jorg Haider’s 
leadership, even if anti-elitism or populism stood out as a core feature of the party, 
both in terms of ideology and of vote-catching tactics.
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Chapter 6 
A Short History of the FPO from 1949 to 1986
Although the Austrian Freedom Party was only founded in 1956, and its predecessor, 
the Verband der Unabhangigen (VdU) only in 1949, it can be argued that the roots of 
the party stretch back at least to the mid-19th century and the wave of European 
Revolutions in 1848 (Livonius 2002, p. 17). At the time this so-called Third Camp 
(aside from the Catholic/Conservative Camp and the Socialist Camp) comprised a 
wide array of political convictions, ranging from bourgeois-liberal to German- 
nationalist views. In post-war Austria, German nationalism expressed a longing for a 
unity with Germany and the extermination of Austria as a sovereign state. Even 
though these ideas could be held by socialists, they were particularly strong among 
conservatives and right-wing extremists.
These inner ideological tensions continued to characterise the movement and later 
the VdU and the Freedom Party. In 1882, the most radical of these groupings 
coalesced under the banner of ‘Alldeutschen Partei’, led by the virulent anti-Semite 
Georg Ritter von Schonerer (Livonius 2002, p. 18; Krah 1996, p. 71). After the end of 
the First World War seventeen different factions within the Third Camp united to form 
the Grossdeutschen Volkspartei (1920) and the Landbund (1922) (Livonius 2002, p. 
18). They found common ground in German nationalism, even though their electoral 
bases differed; the former had strong support among the bourgeoisie, and the latter 
attracted mainly farmers and peasants.
In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, rightist ideas had been severely 
discredited, and the Allies launched a massive programme of democratic ‘education’ 
for those who had supported the Nazi regime. After the war, around a quarter of the 
Austrian population were still linked to the NSDAP and its paramilitary organisations 
(Luther 1988, p. 20). In 1946 and 1947 a policy of ‘denazification’ was pursued to 
eliminate ex-Nazis from the bureaucracies and the economy. Also, those Austrians 
who had collaborated with the Nazis lost their right to vote. These ‘small fish Nazis’ 
constituted an important interest group, and as such started to put pressure on the 
Socialists and the Conservatives It was eventually agreed to offer a ‘general
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amnesty’, whereby almost 500,000 ‘small fish Nazis’ -  i.e. all but a handful -  
regained their full electoral rights (Pelinka 1985, p. 18; Ignazi 2003, p. 110).
A large number of former Nazis were allowed to enter the bureaucracy of the two 
parties, and many achieved prominent positions in the party organisations 
(Riedlsperger 1978, pp. 47-9). Until the present day, this legacy of fascism and 
Nazism runs as a troublesome undercurrent throughout the party’s ideological 
development. What has been their role in post-war political life? What has been their 
impact on legislation? Most importantly, to what extent is the Freedom Party a 
continuation of the wartime League of Independents? While the ‘continuity’ view is 
promoted by the critics of the Freedom Party, described as a late-comer of fascist or 
Nazi ideas, others argue that the rise of the Freedom Party since 1986 should be 
seen as a reaction to modern political circumstances in Austria, particularly the rule 
of the Austrian elite and increased immigration.
Verband der Unabhangigen -  the Failed Integration of FPO’s Predecessor
The liberal journalists Herbert Kraus and Viktor Reimann, both active in the 
resistance during the war, created a new party, the League of Independents in order 
to seek to incorporate former National Socialists into the democratic process (Ignazi 
2003, p. 110). The VdU was formally registered on 25 February 1949, and had an 
impressive start (Krah 1996, p. 74). At the national elections in 1949, the party 
reached 11.7 percent, and 10.9 percent in the following national election in 1953. 
However, the inner tensions of the party between those with national-liberal views 
and those favouring more radical rightist strands of thought could no longer be 
suppressed. Eventually, the liberal wing, headed by Reimann and Kraus, was forced 
to step down. By 1954 the party spoke with a German nationalist or even National 
Socialist voice (Livonius 2002, p. 21). The VdU, as noted by Piero Ignazi, acted as ‘a 
haven for the nostalgics’ (Ignazi 2003, p. 109). While it was thought that the radical 
takeover would stop the downward slide in popularity of the party, the VdU started to 
disintegrate into rivaling factions.
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The Early Years -  Fledging Attempts at Liberalism
In early 1955 Anton Reinthaler, former General in the SS and member of the German 
Reichstag until 1945, launched the Freiheitspartei as a rival to VdU. Later the same 
year Freiheitspartei and the severely damaged VdU joined forces under the banner 
of Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs -  The Austrian Freedom Party (Krah 1996, p. 79). 
The party was formally established in April 1956 and Reinthaler was elected party 
leader. The fact that he received 117 out of 124 votes cast at this founding 
convention, whereas his opponent Herbert Kraus received 3 only votes, amply 
illustrates the weakness of the liberal camp within the party. ‘In contrast to the party 
Kraus sought to establish, the young Freedom Party was in its early stages’, notes 
Max Riedlsperger, ‘a grouping oriented towards the past [...]’ (Riedlsperger 1991, p. 
87). Hence, the leading individuals behind the creation of the Freedom Party had, as 
opposed to the forces behind the establishment of the VdU, distinctly German 
Nationalist, or even National Socialist views. At the time, Kraus wrote in 
disappointment: ‘It was never my intention to establish a successor of the NSDAP’ 
(Kraus cited in Krah, p. 81 ).49
The optimism following the clear election of Reinthaler was not to last. German 
Nationalism had little attraction for Austrians and the number of ‘old comrades’ from 
the Nazi epoch dwindled for natural reasons. The party was faced with two 
alternatives: ‘ghettoization’ or systematic moderation (Sully 1990, p. 63). As can be 
seen in Richtlinien freiheitlicher Politik (Policies of the Freedom Party) of 1957, the 
leadership under Reinthaler took further steps in the direction of German Nationalism 
(Livonius 2002, p. 23). Reinthaler died in 1958 and was succeeded by Friedrich 
Peter. Alike Reinthaler, Peter was an old SS soldier, and so it was believed that he 
would continue in the German Nationalist tradition of his predecessor. But it soon 
became obvious that Peter sought to take the Freedom Party out of the political 
‘ghetto’ towards the political mainstream and a position from which it would not 
instantly be ruled out as a potential coalition partner (Krah 1996, p. 94). ‘Nationals 
and Liberals should both’, Peter explicitly stated, ‘feel at home within the Freedom 
Party’ (cited in Krah 1996, p. 84). In 1959, the party received 7.7 percent of the vote, 
slightly above the 6.5 percent in the previous election in 1956. Then once again, it
49 Wiener Zeitung, April 13, 1956, cited in Krah, 81.
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appeared as if the party’s liberal wing almost had been wiped out (Livonius 2002, p. 
23).
The Salzburg Programme, Bruno Kreisky and Attersee Circle -  Between 
Mainstream and Oblivion
Throughout the 1960s, the Freedom Party managed to build a more acceptable party 
image. The 1964 Salzburg Party Programme adapted a more liberal image. It took 
as its motto ‘freedom and progress’, and paid respect to the century-old (or longer) 
tradition of national-liberals fighting for freedom (Sully 1990, p. 66). But the move 
toward liberalism was also due to external factors, such as the end of the Great 
Coalition in 1966 and Bruno Kreisky’s conciliatory tone towards the German 
Nationalists in the Third Camp (Livonius, 2002, p. 28). Moreover, the party’s 
somewhat more respectable reputation was also linked to the fact that its rightist 
fringes left in 1966 and formed the Nationaldemokratische Partei, claiming to be the 
Austrian equivalent of the German Nationaldemokratische Partei (Krah 1996, p. 85). 
The political impact of this party was very small, partly as a consequence of left-wing 
tendencies in the late 1960s. The end of the 1960s saw increasing rhetoric in favour 
of free market views and economic liberalism (Ignazi 2003, p. 111). Despite these 
measures and the rhetoric, the radical war generation was still dominant among 
politicians and members, who were entrenched in a German Nationalist world-view 
(Livonius 2002, p. 63).
After the 1970 national election, Friedrich Peter tacitly supported Bruno Kreisky’s 
minority government, in return for electoral reform. As a result, Peter and the 
Freedom Party achieved more representation in the national assembly, even though 
their share of the vote remained constant at around 5.5 per cent (Sully 1990, p. 63). 
Another important force trying to gear the party towards the political mainstream was 
a group of young students, who in early 1971 founded the Atterseekreis (the Attersee 
circle). Originating from outside the Freedom Party, they quickly managed to gain a 
prominent position within the party (Krah 1996, p. 87). As a response, Laxenburger 
Kreis (the circle of Laxenburg), another rightist splinter group was created, attacking 
the Freedom Party for selling out to Marxism, because both liberalism and Marxism 
rest on ‘the unnatural idea of equality’ (Krah 1996, pp. 87-8).
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However, as with the events of 1966, when the party’s radical wing left and formed 
Nationaldemokratische Partei, a large section of German Nationalists active in so- 
called Burschenschaften (‘fencing societies’) refused to accept these liberal views, 
and turned their back on the party. Despite the fact that the Freedom Party under 
Friedrich Peter had managed to gain a degree of respect among its competitors, 
support amongst the electorate remained weak. Throughout Peter’s 20-year 
leadership, the party had staggered on the brink of extinction, generally hovering 
between 5 and 6 percent of the vote. A more plausible explanation is, however, that 
the party’s constant weakness at the polls did not occur despite its moderate tones, 
but because of them. Why vote for a radical party that is no longer radical, but merely 
a badly organised copy of other mainstream parties?
Table 2
NATIONAL ELECTIONS -  RESULTS FOR FPO
YEAR FPO YEAR FPO
percentage seats percentage Seats
1945 - - 1975 5.4 10
1949 11.7 (VdU) 16 1979 6.1 11
1953 10.9 (VdU) 14 1983 5.0 12
1956 6.5 6 1986 9.7 18
1959 7.7 8 1990 16.6 33
1962 7.0 8 1994 22.5 42
1966 5.4 6 1995 21.9 40
1970 5.6 6 1999 26.9 52
1971 5.4 10 2002 10.0 19
Source: www.bmi.gv.at
The struggle between the German Nationalist camp and the National-liberal camp 
continued to characterise the Freedom Party throughout the 1970s. The party 
leadership sought to establish good relations with the Social Democratic Party and 
liberal students strengthened their position. For example, the 1973 Freiheitliche 
Manifest gave voice to liberal or even libertarian sentiments, and the chasm between 
freedom and security (or modernisers and traditionalists) was once again revealed. 
During the final years of the decade, however, the political tide turned once again in
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favour of more radical views, Eventually, in 1978, Friedrich Peter was pushed aside 
by the party’s ‘old forces’, and he decided not to run in the next election.
The Bad Ischl Programme and the Libertarian Promise
Peter was succeeded by Alexander Gotz, popular mayor of Graz, who never made a 
secret of his conservative views. Moreover, Gotz quickly established better relations 
with the Austrian People’s Party, a move that damaged the Freedom Party’s previous 
good connections with Kreisky’s socialists (Livonius 2002, p. 30). In 1979, during 
Gotz’s leadership, the party became a member of Liberal International -  a worldwide 
organisation for the promotion of liberal views. In spite of Gotz’s initial popularity -  he 
was also supported by the circle of Attersee (Atterseekreis) -  he failed to live up to 
expectations. In the 1979 national election, the party had only a minor increase in its 
share of the vote: from 5.4 percent to a mediocre 6.1 percent, and hopes to form a 
coalition government with the People’s Party came to naught. As a result, Gotz, a 
successful local politician but an unpersuasive national figure, announced his 
resignation as party leader after only one year, in early December 1979 (Krah 1996, 
pp. 89-90).
Even though right-wing extremists remained powerful throughout the 1960s, the 
moderates had by and large a stronger position in the 1970s than in 1960s. The 
difficult task of appeasing both camps is illustrated in the party’s Bad Ischl 
Programme of 1968. As the party of the ‘nationalist-libertarian middle and of social 
equality’, the Freedom Party expressed, for the first time, a willingness to work with 
other parties. Along the lines of its libertarian efforts, it rejected compulsory 
membership in Austria’s chamber systems, and pledged a depoliticisation of public 
bureaucracy; i.e. that it would seek to reduce the bureaucratic power of Social 
Democracy. Moreover, it sought to present a more modernised image by defending 
the Austrian Republic in very clear wording; i.e. seeking to cut the ties to a politically 
compromised German nationalism. On the other hand, concessions to the deeply 
conservative notion of Volk, an organic perception of society and a pledge for the 
‘maintaining the genetic health of the populace’ (Erbgesundsheitspflege) evoked 
right-wing extremist tendencies (Sully 1990, p. 66). According to Melanie Sully, the 
party explicitly defended an elitist understanding of society, in which an ‘active’
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section comprised of Austrians endowed with superior qualities in terms of 
entrepreneurial capacities, motivation and skills was to take the lead. In an attempt to 
draw a line between them and the Social Democrats, and to attract both liberals in 
favour of freedom as well as German-nationals opposed to equality, equality was 
seen as an enemy of freedom (Sully 2002, p. 66).
Behind the scenes during Gotz’s brief leadership in the late 1970s, a small number of 
party members -  among them the liberal winger Norbert Steger, co-founder of 
Atterseekreis, Friedhelm Frischenschlager, who in 1993 was to leave the Freedom 
Party for Liberal Forum, and Jorg Haider -  were dividing key posts between them, in 
the event that they should gain power in the future (Krah 1996, p. 89). After Gotz’s 
early resignation, a new party leader had to be selected. The elections took place in 
March 1980, and developed into an open battle between Steger and the German- 
nationalist Harald Ofner. Eventually, Steger gained the upper hand. The new party 
leader had a good reputation and no links to the far right (Ignazi 2003, p. 112). Also, 
he enjoyed the support of the young Jorg Haider, partly because Steger aspired to 
enter into a government coalition in the event that the Social Democrats lost their 
absolute majority in the coming election in 1983 (Krah 1996, p. 90). Steger set out on 
a course of political pragmatism and managed to push the party somewhat in a 
liberal direction. At the same time, however, he had to appease those party members 
of a German-nationalist persuasion. His decision to visit Walter Reder, a National 
Socialist and war criminal who was serving a life sentence in Italy, may be seen as a 
gesture in this direction.
Steger’s pragmatism can also be explained from a different perspective. According to 
Erich Reiter (1982), the FPO of the early 1980s was still a party with an elaborate 
and coherent world-view. From then onwards, Kurt Richard Luther (2005, p. 16) 
claims, this ideological foundation was gradually marginalised in order to benefit from 
the evasive nature of a ’political protest’. Without denying the role of the ’National 
component’, this was still, Luther continues, only a minor ’part in an elaborate 
populist protest based on Haider in person’ (2005, p. 16). Put differently, there was a 
trade-off between the national aspect and populist protest, and the populist protest 
increasingly gained the upper hand.
I l l
The Fragile Coalition 1983-1986
In 1983 the Social Democrats lost their absolute majority, as Steger, 
Frischenschlager and Haider had predicted. Supported by only 47.6 percent of the 
Austrian electorate (as compared to 51 percent in 1979), they were forced to seek a 
coalition partner. The Freedom Party’s close relations with the Social Democrats and 
in particular with Bruno Kreisky, in combination with Steger’s pragmatism led to the 
formation of a new government coalition, in which the Freedom Party took part for the 
first time in history (Pelinka 1993, p. 27).
This was a time for modest optimism on the part of the Freedom Party leaders. In the 
late 1970s, the conservative and elitist Bad Ischl Programme was seen as outdated 
and had been replaced in the summer of 1985 by the Salzburg Party Programme, 
with the title ‘Political Renewal of Austria’. This programme stressed formally liberal 
views such as ‘freedom’ at the expense of traditional, German-nationalist themes. 
Concessions to the old voters, however, were still evident. The party programme 
rested on an ‘idealistic world view’, whereby the individual had to ‘fit into the 
community’, and their responsibilities for the well-being ‘the people, fatherland and 
state’ were emphasised {Salzburger Programm 1985, ch. 1 para. 1) (For an analysis 
of the Salzburg Programme, see Chapter 7).
Steger’s liberal wing was facing severe problems. The prospects for real political 
influence were very small, as support for the Freedom Party had reached an all-time 
low in the 1983 national election with only 5.3 percent of the votes (Krah 1996, p. 91). 
This matter of fact, along with the suspicion that the party was no more than a tool in 
the hands of the mighty socialists, sparked deep resentment within the German- 
nationalist camp, among whose members were Otto Scirnzi and Jorg Haider 
(Livonius 2002, p. 32). In addition to the declining credibility of the party in the eyes of 
its German-nationalist members, criticism was mounting against Steger’s leadership 
from the other side of the political spectrum due to tactical errors, where the benefits 
of appealing to the party’s rightist fringes were being outweighed by its costs. 
Particularly troublesome in this respect was the so-called ‘Reder-affair’ in early 1985, 
in which Friedhelm Frischenschlager, Minister of Defence and one of the party’s 
liberal wingers, met and shook hands with the war criminal Walter Reder, when he
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arrived at the airport in Graz after having been released from Italian prison (Krah 
1996, p. 94).
The Ascendancy of Jorg Haider
Born in 1950 in a family with pronounced National Socialist views, Haider joined Ring 
Freiheitlicher Jugend, the youth organisation of the Freedom Party, at the age of 
fifteen, and was elected Landesjugendfuhrer three years later. He finished his 
university studies in Vienna in 1973, and became University assistant in Staats- und 
Verwaltungsrecht. In 1979, Haider was elected a member of parliament (Nationalrat) 
and in 1983 he became editor-in-chief of the Karntner Nachrichten, the party 
newspaper for Carinthia.
In the new government coalition with the Social Democrats, Norbert Steger became 
Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Trade (Sully 1990, p. 64). Haider initially stood 
behind Steger, but Haider insisted on being assigned the post of Minister of Social 
Affairs, which Steger refused him. Then Steger offered Haider a post as State 
Secretary, which Haider declined. Instead, strengthened by increasing electoral 
support in his home region of Carinthia -  in 1984 Haider’s Freedom Party had 
obtained 16 percent of the vote and 5.5 percent above the local elections in the 
party’s second stronghold this year, Vorarlberg -  he distanced himself from the party 
leadership in Vienna and gradually started to form an internal opposition (Krah 1996, 
p. 93). A similar scenario was to be repeated in the spring of 2000, after Jorg Haider 
resigned as party leader (See Chapter 10, ‘Conclusion’).
From his position as regional governor, Haider’s critique of Steger’s leadership 
steadily grew stronger. As early as August 1983 Haider announced that Steger was 
an ‘incompetent, authoritarian player’, and repeated the same attack shortly 
thereafter (Krah 1996, p. 93). Numerous scandals within the coalition further 
undermined the FPO’s reputation among the electorate. The one clear exception to 
the rule was the region of Carinthia, where the Freedom Party was able to increase 
its support by almost 40 percent between 1979 and 1984. This was most certainly 
due to the fact that the Freedom Party in Carinthia, headed by Jorg Haider and the
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German-nationalists, was campaigning against, not in favour of Steger’s national 
leadership in Vienna (Krah 1996, p. 94). In other regions, the Haider effect did not 
surface until after September 1986. The two most badly hit regions were Lower 
Austria and Salzburg. In Lower Austria, support for the Freedom Party dwindled from 
3.2 percent in 1979 to 1.7 percent in 1983, whereas the FPO in Salzburg suffered a 
downturn from 13.3 percent in 1979 to 8.7 percent in 1984. Detailed election results 
from Carinthia can be found in Chapter 7.
Haider’s home region of Carinthia was often the base for successful inner-party 
opposition to the headquarters in Vienna. In 1986 the conflict between Carinthia and 
Vienna escalated even further. Haider threatened to cancel all co-operation with the 
national party leadership and began, despite persistent denials, to prepare his 
candidacy for the coming party leadership election. In Die Presse, one of Austria’s 
most renowned newspapers, Norbert Gugenbauer, another key spokesperson for the 
party’s radical wing and critic of Steger’s leadership, argued in favour of a 
‘redefinition of the relations in the leadership’ of the party (Krah 1996, p. 95). Judging 
from an inter-election poll during the summer of 1986, the Freedom Party under 
Steger was supported by no more than between 1 and 2 percent (Birk and Traar 
1986, p. 20).
At the party convention in Innsbruck in September 1986 Jorg Haider came storming 
in; fresh, young, vibrant, bold and radical. Steger was outmaneuvered by Haider and 
Gugenbauer, and finally, Jorg Haider was elected new national leader for the 
Austrian Freedom Party (Heinisch 2002, p. 53). Steger received 39.2 percent of the 
delegates’ votes, whereas Haider received 57.7 percent, mainly as a consequence of 
his popularity among the party’s grass roots (Sully 1990, p. 64; Morrow 2000, p. 47). 
Even though the figures did not represent a landslide, it was a clear win. Once again, 
the tide had turned in favour of the more right-wing nationalist wing.
The Early FPO -  Battle between Extremists and Liberals
This brief account of the Austrian Freedom Party’s evolution and its entry as an 
established player on the Austrian political scene has addressed a number of issues 
of key relevance for the present thesis. Until Haider’s take-over in 1986 the party was
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a weak and fairly insignificant force on the rightist fringes, having gone through some 
short episodes in which more liberal inclinations came to the fore. What does this tell 
us about the personal role of Jorg Haider? Would it be fair to say that the post-1986 
Freedom Party was a different party altogether? Or are the events after 1986 
determined by the previous period?
The role of the critique of the elite was noted above, even though this line of 
argument was not central during the period of this overview. This raises the question 
of the weight of populism in the pre-Haider era. Anti-communism and anti-socialism 
were always heavily criticised by the Freedom Party, but this does not necessarily 
amount to populism and anti-elitism. Rather, the early FPO appears to have voiced a 
radicalised form of elitist conservatism along with an explicit National Socialism, 
leaving little room for maneuver in terms of anti-elitism. It was noted that the 1968 
Bad Ischl Programme displayed clear elitist traits, and that the 1985 Salzburg 
Programme sought to move towards more liberal views. Did this pave the way for 
Jorg Haider’s populism, or was this instead an effect of Haider’s rhetoric?
Then again, we should not exaggerate Haider’s role. As was noted in the previous 
chapter, Austrian corporatism rested on rather firm support until the mid-1980s, and it 
would probably have been difficult to exploit it at that time. Rather, the rise of anti­
elitism and populism from 1986 onwards may be seen as a combination of the effects 
of a fierce critic and a system in decay.
The party has experienced a number of splits, both on the German-nationalist side 
and on the liberal side. This supports the view of a party torn, possibly more than 
mainstream parties, by inner conflicts. These tensions are also an argument against 
a too simplified notion of the party, be it overly critical or too lenient. The few years in 
governmental power during the mid 1980s highlight the problems facing a radical 
party seeking wider acclaim. Surprisingly, the party seemed to fare less well when in 
government than as an opposition party. These questions of ‘normality’ versus 
radicalism lead to the major observation in this overview. The history of the Freedom 
Party is to a great extent a struggle between traditionalists and reformers. While its 
founders were liberal, the early years were dominated by right-wing extremism. 
During the 1960s and 1970s more liberal views became stronger. In the early 1980s,
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the party entered governmental power led by the liberal candidate Norbert Steger, 
only to be followed by Jorg Haider from the German nationalist camp in 1986.
We have now presented the wider picture of the Freedom Party in the literature 
review, followed by a theoretical background of the concepts of populism and 
corporatism. Subsequently, an overview of the history of the Freedom Party was laid 
out. This lays the foundation and will provide the framework and context for the 
empirical analysis in the remaining chapters.
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Chapter 7 
Analysing the FPO’s Electoral Appeal -  Rhetoric, Party Programme 
and Reactions
It is often assumed by most journalists and academics in Austria and abroad that the 
Austria Freedom Party’s popularity is largely due to its appeal to right-wing extremist 
ideas, racism, xenophobia and fascist tendencies. This chapter starts with a general 
analysis of the extent to which right-wing extremist ideas such as those associated 
with racism, dictatorship and fascism have featured in Jorg Haider’s and the party’s 
rhetoric, followed by an analysis of Freiheit und Verantwortung, the FPO’s annual 
yearbooks, and an assessment of the FPO’s political programmes.50 It will also 
discuss the EU sanctions, imposed to curb the influence of what was perceived to be 
a right-wing extremist party.
Racism, Anti-Democratic Ideas and Fascism -  Rhetoric and Provocation
Ever since Jorg Haider’s seizing of power in 1986, the FPO has been blamed for 
overstepping the bounds of decency and democratic trustworthiness, trespassing into 
racism, fascism, anti-Semitism and even at times Nazism. These trespasses are 
seen as taking the forms of inappropriate comparisons, racist statements and a 
historically rooted racist ideology. Throughout his political career Haider made many 
controversial statements. Here we will first focus on four important speeches which 
illustrate Haider’s rhetoric during three important phases of his leadership: one in 
1985, during the final stages of the government coalition between Franz Vranitzky’s 
SPO and the FPO under Norbert Steger; two in 1991, when the party had 
skyrocketed from virtual non-existence to almost 17 percent of votes cast in four 
years; and one four years later in 1995, when the party had stabilised at a level 
above 20 percent of votes cast.
50 The yearbooks, as explained in Chapter 3, start in 1993.
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In late 1985, shortly before he took over as chairman of the FPO, Haider was 
interviewed by Profit, an Austrian weekly newspaper. The journalist brought up the 
atrocities during the Second World War:
Profit: Did I hear that properly: ‘Events’. What do you call events?
Haider: Well alright, it was activities and measures against ethnic groups, 
clearly violating the principles of human rights.
Profit: Do you find it difficult, to speak about the gas chambers and mass 
murder?
Haider: Well, it was mass murder, if you so wish.
(Profil', 8 (1985) cited in Schiedel and Neugebauer 2000, p. 19.)
The interview was characteristic for Jorg Haider’s style at the time. In describing the 
Second World War, he uses a ‘minimalist’ terminology. Even under pressure, he tries 
to portray the war’s atrocities in the least dramatic terms possible. The question is 
why he is doing this. One possibility is that he is concerned about retaining the right- 
wing extremist voters in the party. Another possibility is that he does it in an attempt 
to provoke his opponents, and later on gain votes as a result of an aggressive and 
polarized debate. Finally, it may be that he is simply expressing his personal views. If 
so, it is rather extreme to label probably the most systematic and biggest act of mass 
killing in history as mere ‘events’.
In a speech on 13 June 1991, as the head of the governing coalition at the Landtag 
in Carinthia, Haider favourably compared the employment policy of Nazi Germany 
with that of present Austria: ‘in the Third Reich there was a proper employment policy 
(ordentliche Beschaftigungspolitik), something your government in Vienna can’t even 
manage’ (Cited in Riedlsperger 1996a, p. 359).51 Not long thereafter the SPO asked 
for a vote of ‘no confidence’ against Haider, supported by a number of members of 
the People’s Party. From then on, Haider’s statement rapidly spread through the 
media, not only in Austria, but also abroad. Even though the effects on Haider and on 
the FPO were limited within Austria, it caused great harm to the party’s reputation 
abroad. For many observers this speech confirmed the direct ideological link
51 The full quotation is: "A/a, das hat’s im Dritten Reich nicht gegeben, weil im Dritten Reich haben sie 
ordentliche Beschaftigungspolitik gemacht, was nicht einmal Ihre Regierung in Wien zusammenbringt. 
Das muss man auch einmal sagen. " (Qouted in Czemin 2000, p. 31)
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between the NSDAP and the present-day Freedom Party (Riedlsperger 1996a, p. 
359-60).
However, to fully understand the implications of the statement it is important to 
contextualise Haider’s defence of the employment policy under National Socialism, 
as Max Riedlsperger, Professor Emeritus in History at California Polytechnic, has 
pointed out. The discussion leading up to Haider’s controversial statement had dealt 
with welfare policy issues. Jorg Haider, advocating welfare reform, had suggested 
that able citizens who were unwilling to work should be compelled to accept work or 
face a cut in their unemployment benefits. A member of the Social Democratic Party 
in Carinthia responded to this suggestion with That is forced labor [...]. We have 
already had what you are demanding -  in the Third Reich!’ Haider, in return, 
responded: ‘No, that wasn’t the case in the Third Reich, because in the Third Reich 
there was a decent employment policy (ordentliche Beschaftigungspolitik), which is 
more than can be said for what your government can manage in Vienna’ (Cited in 
Riedlsperger 1996a, p. 359).
Considering the context, Max Riedlsperger fails to see Haider’s suggestion as 
anything out of the ordinary. According to him, Haider proposed ‘that in the case of 
someone who is capable, but is unwilling to accept employment in a similar or related 
area, he should be brought to reconsider accepting work by a sanction that would 
appropriately reduce his unemployment money.’ Riedlsperger claims that Haider’s 
statement seems ‘less severe than the (social policy) proposal favoured by 91 
percent of Americans according to a Los Angeles poll in 1993’, and ‘significantly less 
drastic’ than a "workfare” programme put in practice in California by Republican 
Governor Pete Wilson, according to which “able-bodied welfare recipients either 
accept work assigned to them or be cut off from benefits’” (Riedlsperger 1995a, p. 
359).
Later, Haider expressed regret for the remark, and said that he did not mean to 
favour the employment policy of the Nazi regime over that of Austria in the 1990s. 
But the criticism kept growing stronger, not only among political opponents, but also 
internally. Heide Schmidt, future presidential candidate at the time, publically 
declared that she could not find anything ‘proper’ in the Nazi regime (Sperl 1993, p.
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85). Haider, it was argued, sought to relativize the Holocaust, trivialize the atrocities 
committed by Hitler and the SS-regime and ‘discuss good and bad aspects of 
National Socialism.’52 The Chancellor Franz Vranitzky threatened to take legal 
measures. As a consequence, Haider had to resign as Head of the Carinthian 
government shortly thereafter, on 21 June. Haider’s utterance has also, however, 
been criticised from another perspective, namely arguing that Hitler’s praised 
unemployment policy by and large is a myth. Already by 1936, as claimed by 
Albrecht Ritschl, the German economy had reached full recovery from the depression 
and was approaching full employment. Investments in autobahn, along with many 
other Keynesian projects, gained momentum only after 1936 (Albrecht Ritschl 2003).
Provocations seem to be part of Haider’s tactics. Hans-Georg Betz describes 
Haider’s strategies as ‘fairly banal, yet effective, above all because Austria's political 
elite has dutifully played its part and fallen into the various traps Haider set for them -  
to the amusement of Austria's public’ (2000, p. 268). According to Max Riedlsperger, 
it is ‘important not to yield to simplified allegations and ‘typical leftist hyperbole’, 
because a part of Haider’s intentions are precisely to provoke a moralistic over­
reaction from the opposite camp’ (1996a, p. 359). What happens is briefly this: the 
FPO finds moral values close to the heart of the general public which are initially 
presented to the public in a highly moralistic fashion aimed at splitting the audience. 
A certain appreciation arises. Then, as expected, the left responds with moral frenzy, 
signaling the start of the next phase. This consists of the second, triumphant speech 
to the Austrian audience, whereby they are told that they are seen as ‘fascists’, 
‘racists’ or ‘a disgrace’ by the high-and-mighty. Only now, Haider’s tactics will gain 
momentum by means of a second -  and decisive -  increase among votes cast. 
Indeed, as noted by Wolfgang Kowalsky, the far right often simply counts on this 
‘anti-fascist reflex’, whereby the leftist critics fight against illusory enemies of the past 
(1992, p. 32). Max Riedlsperger refers to this mechanism as ‘the back-fire effect of 
the charges of right-extremism’ (1996a, p. 360).
On 30 September 1995, Jorg Haider attended the Ulrichsberg celebrations, a yearly 
right-wing summit north of Krumpendorf in southern Carinthia. Present were, among 
others, Gudrun Burwitz, daughter of Heinrich Himmler and fervent apologist of Nazi
52 http://www.nationalsozialismus.at/Themen/Umaana/zitiert.htm
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Germany. Haider’s speech at Ulrichsberg contained the following passage which 
provoked strong reactions in Austria and abroad: That even on these rainy days, 
when there are still honest people, people of character, who even when the wind 
blows hard, stick by their faith and stay loyal up to this very day. And this is the 
foundation, my dear friends, which has also been passed on to us, the younger 
generation. And a nation, which does not respect its fathers, is anyway doomed to 
perish.’ (Anon. ‘Jorg Haider’s Antisemitism’ n.d. Vidal Sassoon International Center 
for the Study of Antisemitism)
While this statement resonates with typical conservative and populist themes and 
rhetoric, Haider’s call for a nation to respect its fathers was considered by many 
observers to contain an apologetic reference to the country’s Nazi past, particularly 
considering the audience (Scharsach 2000a, p. 188). However, some observers 
have argued that the Ulrichsberg meeting in 1995 was not an exclusive gathering of 
right-wing extremists, but a meeting attended by Austrians from many different 
parties. According to Herbert Schui, German politician and Professor Emeritus in 
Economics, the criticism of the Ulrichsberg gathering levied by the two major parties 
was ‘unconvincing’, because the meeting was also attended by a number of SPO 
and OVP politicians (1997, p. 236).
This conclusion can be subject to question because what is often perceived as one 
meeting was in fact two meetings. The general Ulrichsberg meeting was traditionally 
frequented by politicians from all Carinthian parties, but it also included church 
representatives and delegates from various voluntary associations. On the eve of the 
Ulrichsberg meeting in 1995, a different gathering -  often referred to as Krumpendorf 
meeting -  took place. This was arranged by Kameradschaften IV, a group of 
veterans from the German Waffen SS. Alfred Jammeregg -  spokesperson for 
Kameradschaft IV Karnten -  confirms that this was where Jorg Haider volunteered to 
give his speech (Interview in ZIB2 -  Zeit im Bild, Austrian TV Programme, 19 Dec. 
1995).
Who, then, attended this particular meeting? In their ‘Schnell-lnfd regarding the 
Waffen SS Discussion’, the FPO declared that around 40 percent of those attending 
were relatives of former Waffen SS soldiers, while the remaining 60 percent were 
relatives of soldiers who had served in other sections of the German Army (Schnell-
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Info. No. 5, 1995). As for party preferences, one should distinguish between the 
common electorate and official representatives. Walter Fanta, who has written 
extensively about Ulrichsberg and these political gatherings, claims that the 
Kameradschaft IV meetings ‘actually (hosted) SPO and OVP people, but not 
“politicians”.’53
Given the fact that the Ulrichsberg meeting contained two separate gatherings, it 
seems as if the FPO sought to blur the distinction between the two events in order to 
relieve the pressure on Jorg Haider. Former FPO politician Peter Westenthaler 
(currently BZO) declared, for instance, that the media report on the matter was 
‘completely false’.54 The above quoted Schnell-lnfo, however, does not hide the fact 
that Haider spoke at a meeting arranged by Kameradschaft IV.
On the day after the official Krumpendorf meeting, there was a celebration at the 
Concert Hall in Klagenfurt. Both the FPO and anti-racists declared that the entire 
political spectrum from the Ulrichsberg meeting -  including the member of the 
Kameradschaft IV -  were seen socializing with each other during this occasion. 
Commentators linked to the FPO naturally saw an opportunity to portray Haider’s 
speech as less problematic by bringing mainstream politicians into the picture. The 
same group of people whose presence had led to the vehement criticism of Haider 
were now, it was argued, seen in the Concert Hall, Klagenfurt, ‘celebrating’ with 
‘leading functionaries from the SPO and the OVP’ (Strutz: ‘Auch hohe SPO- und 
OVP-Funktionare feierten mit K IV’). The same passage was reprinted by 
Arbeitskreis gegen den karntner Konsens, an Austrian anti-racist group who 
frequently sought to disrupt meetings of right-wing extremist groups, such as 
Kameradschaft IV.55 The purpose of this leftist and anti-racist group, however, was 
not to defend Haider and his party, but to accuse the SPO and the OVP for being as 
extreme as the FPO. The fact that mainstream politicians appers to have socialised 
with individuals from the right-wing fringes somewhat weakens the allegations made 
by the two ‘big parties’ against Jorg Haider’s appearance at Krumpendorf. Either 
Haider’s speech is seen as extremist, which casts a shadow over those politicians 
from SPO and OVP present in the Concert Hall in this criticism; or in order to defend
53 (Personal correspondence with Walter Fanta, 22 July 2010).
54 ‘FPD: ARD Berichts vollig falsch’, 15 Dec. 1995, in personal correspondence with Michael Richter 
(BZO), 21 June 2010)
35 See http://u-berQ.lnxnt.ora/materialien/uberabroschuere2005.pdf (accessed 2 July 2010).
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these politicians, Haider’s speech must be described as within the bounds of the 
politically acceptable. Having said this, Haider’s voluntary speech at the 
Kameradschaft IV  gathering appears at best as an unabashed and truly right-wing 
populist attempt to retain the sympathizers and relatives of Waffen SS as voters for 
the FPO, and at worst, as a proclamation of what in fact were Haider’s true 
ideological views.
A statement that echoed the 1991 interview in Profil, where Haider referred to the 
atrocities of the Second World War as ‘events’, occurred in 1995, when he labeled 
the Concentration camps lStraf!agef (penal camps) in a speech delivered at the 
National council. As a result, the Jewish community in Austria and abroad reacted 
very powerfully against what they saw as a return of the acceptance of ideas of 
National Socialism.
Some observers strongly felt that these remarks were part of a plan to trivialise and 
thereby make gradually more acceptable views that had previously, even to those of 
a right-wing radical persuasion, been impossible to express publicly. On 1 May, 
1999, in an interview on RAI, Italian TV, Anton Pelinka maintained that ‘Haider has 
repeatedly made statements which amount to trivialising National Socialism. Once he 
described death camps as penal camps. On the whole, Haider is responsible for 
making certain National Socialist positions and certain National Socialist remarks 
more politically acceptable’ (Pelinka 1999; see also Abram etal. 2000).
Hans-Henning Scharsach (2000a) draws attention to the fact that Jorg Haider 
compared 140,000 unemployed Austrians with 180,000 Gastarbeiter. Haider thereby 
insinuates that there is a direct correlation between the number of foreigners and the 
number of unemployed Austrians, ignoring the real causes of unemployment in 
Austria. Scharsach brings up another, and far more problematic comparison, namely 
the codified link between 180,000 Gastarbeiter of the present day, and 400,000 Jews 
during the Second World War (Scharsach 2000a, p. 202). Alfred Worm (2000, p. 
185) highlights the manner in which the FPO, and Jorg Haider in particular, 
compares the suffering of the Sudeten Germans with the suffering of the Jews during 
the Holocaust. There is, in Haider’s view, something absolute about violations 
against human rights, and ‘you cannot treat identical matters as being different’
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(Cited in Worm 2000, p. 185; see also Haider 1998). It is easy to assume that Haider, 
who has generally been quite dismissive of the liberal/universalist notion of human 
rights, was merely exploiting the concept for the sake of relativising the suffering of 
the Jews.
Although Haider dominated the party, supposedly right-wing extremist statements 
were not exclusively made by him. Other prominent party members and leaders have 
also been accused of making extremist claims. We shall here mention three of these 
-  Andreas Molzer, John Gudenus, and Reinhard Gaugg. Molzer was a leading figure 
in the Freiheitliche Bildungswerk, the party’s cultural section, in the early 1990s. He 
was editor-in-chief of the right-wing Karntner Nachrichten from 1982 to 1990, a 
Member of Bundesrat from 1991 to 1994, and has served as FPO representative in 
the European Parliament since 2004. In 1991 he was nominated by Haider as 
advisor on ideological principles. He has published widely in right-wing extremist 
newspapers and journals, such as the German Junge Freiheit. Since 1997 he has 
also been editor-in-chief for Zur Zeit, a right-wing weekly closely associated with the 
rightist section of the FPO. Molzer held a critical journalist, Karl Pfeifer, responsible 
for the death of a conservative German professor who killed himself in May 2000. 
Evoking right-wing extremist echoes of the Nazi era, Molzer referred to Pfeifer as a 
‘jewish journalist’ (Klenk 2002). Molzer saw the European Union sanctions against 
Austria in 2000 as part of an ‘anti-Austrian conspiracy of a liberal-socialist- 
communist-internationalist clique.’ (Stephen Roth Institute ‘Austria 1999-2000’ n.d56 
Christa Zochling has highlighted Molzer’s distinction between ‘Wirtsvolker’ and 
‘rootless Jews’, and also pointed out that during his editorialship of Zur Zeit Molzer 
referred to the Holocaust as a ‘dogma’, and a ‘myth’, and named Hitler a ‘Social 
revolutionary’ (Zochling 2000, p. 222). In 2005, John Gudenus, long standing 
member of the party and former member of Austria’s upper house, publicly 
questioned the Holocaust: ‘Gas chambers? Ich halte mich da raus. Ich glaube alles, 
was dogmatisch vorgeschrieben ist’ (Schiedel n.d). As a result of this statement, 
Gudenus received a conditional prison sentence of one year. Reinhart Gaugg was a 
former prominent FPO politician both at the national level and in Carinthia. Like Jorg 
Haider, Gaugg had a problem with drinking and driving and as a consequence of 
repeated offences, he was forced to resign in 2002. In 1993, Gaugg was interviewed
56 http-yAwww.tau.ac.il/Anti-Senriitism/asw99-2000/austria.htm)
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and asked about the meaning of the word ‘Nazi’. - ‘Nazi?’ Gaugg replied. ‘Neu, 
attraktiv, zielstrebig and ideenreich’ (new, attractive, goal oriented and rich in ideas) 
(Karntner Tageszeitung, Sept. 11, 1993). Even though one might suspect that 
Gaugg’s utterance was meant to provoke, it is still beyond the bounds of propriety to 
turn Nazism into a simple joke. If this was a tactic to gain voters, the question is: 
‘Who would be persuaded by such as response?’
The Party Yearbooks -  The Party’s Ideological Spectrum
The party’s annual yearbooks Freiheit und Verantwortung (‘Freedom and 
responsibility’), published between 1993 and 2000, provided a platform for intellectual 
debate covering the ideological spectrum of various party factions and views as well 
as those of symphatisers and observers from other parties and countries. However, 
its audience never spread to the main electoral base and remained rather small. 
Initially an ambitious project, comprehensiveness and readership seemed to wane 
until the final edition was published in 2000.57
The first three editions (1993 to 1995) had an emphasis on conservative intellectual 
debate, history and philosophy. Even though these themes were also to be found in 
the editions from 1996 onwards, other themes gradually became more prominent, 
such as economic issues, applied science, and attempts to fuse a 
historical/defensive conservatism with a more enthusiastic and neo-liberal stance. 
The 1997 edition presents the American education system as a model for Austria, 
introducing views such as the idea that Universities could benefit from the application 
of market principles and the development of a highly competitive climate, which 
previously had been absent from the rhetoric of the party (Kanovsky-Wintermann 
FV97 1996).58 The 1998 edition contains an interview with the Director of the 
American Shooting Sports Council, introducing a somewhat more untroubled rhetoric
57 Whereas the 1993 edition had almost 600 pages and the 1994 edition 800 pages, editions between 
1996 and 1999 were about 300 to 500 pages long and the last edition in 2000 had only about 100 
pages.
This and subsequent references to the yearbooks in this chapter are given in the form (FVxx yyyy), 
where FV represents a yearbook (Freiheit und Verantwortung), xx gives the last two digits of the 
corresponding year as it appears in the yearbook’s title, and yyyy indicates the year of publication. 
Where the author of an article is identified, this information will be included in the usual manner.
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compared to the more academic tone used in previous yearbooks.59 Indications of a 
change in basic outlook can be found in the yearbook of 1998, where it is stated that 
of utmost ‘strategic importance’ is ‘the task to bring culture to the audience; that is 
questions of marketing’ (Gassner 1998, p. 208). The 1999 edition presents Alvin 
Rabuschka, and his suggestion to ‘starve the government’; in particular, his ideas 
about a ‘flat tax’ are the subject of a lengthy analysis (FV99 1998, p. 110).60 In the 
same volume, Jorg Haider refers to the US: ‘The Americans simply call it ‘leadership’. 
We are all leaders, executives of Carinthian business’ (FV99 1998, p. 15). He also 
declares that politics, ‘as we all know’, ‘does not create jobs’ (FV99 1998, p. 15). This 
statement shows a plausible link between right-wing populist critique of the Austrian 
elite, and a more general neo-liberal critique of state interference. In a similar vein, 
the foundations of New Public Management are laid out and presented in a very 
positive light in the 2000 edition of the yearbooks (Zischg FV00 1999).
This shift in focus can partly be explained by the fact that the first three editions were 
edited by Lothar Hobelt, Professor of History, the philosopher Brigitte Sob, and the 
radical Andreas Molzer, famous for the anti-Semitic remarks mentioned above; 
whereas the latter volumes were edited by Fritz Simhandl, lawyer and business 
consultant, and Johannes Berchtold, whose background was in the social sciences 
and psychology. The range of contributions in the journal was often wide. The 1995 
edition, for example, contained material from internationally renowned personalities 
such as the late Marion Grafin Donhoff, editor of the German Weekly Die Zeit, as well 
as publishers from the rightist fringes of the Freedom Party, such as Otto Scirnzi 
(See Pelinka 1998a, p. 196). In the 1997 edition, Kurt Waldheim contributes an 
article entitled ‘Austria in the world’ (FV97 1996). This yearbook was introduced by 
Thomas Klestil -  at the time President of Austria, and his short essay on ’40 years of 
the Freedom Party’ (FV97 1996).
Several articles in the yearbooks deal with typical right-wing themes of immigration 
and the nation, with the majority of contributors arguing in favour of stopping or 
limiting the influx of foreigners. In the 1993 edition, articles of this type with the
59 Cf. Berchtold and Simhandl (1998) -  article entitled ‘Jorg Haider is our friend because we share 
basic principles and basic ideas’.
60 At the time, Jorg Haider showed great interest in Rabuschka’s ‘flat tax’, and also asked Rabuschka 
to ’make a model for Austria’. (FV99 1998, p. 114).
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following titles may be found : ‘Territory, home and national identity -  ecological 
necessity and social realities’; ‘Identity and justice -  remarks on contemporary 
Europe’; ‘Rights of people and the protection of minorities in Europe’; ‘Rights of 
ethnic groups in the ’’new Europe’” ; ‘Minority problems in the Baltic states’ 
‘Expulsions from home, ethnic Germans and Old Austrians -  the situation of German 
minorities in central- and eastern Europe and Austria’s responsibility’; ‘The dialectic 
of the border -  human cultures cannot be imagined without borders’; ‘Considerations 
regarding the foreigner question’; and The problematic nature of foreigners in 
Vienna’ (FV93 1992).61
Articles dealing with similar themes in the 1994 yearbook include: ‘Vienna must 
therefore remain our hometown!’; ‘Multiculture -  concerning the idea and critique of a 
thought experiment’; ‘Patriots in all camps -  Unite!’; ‘Migration and political culture -  
concerning the power of media’; ‘The question of the east within European 
integration’; ‘The concept of minority against the background of problems of 
immigrations’; ‘Help to help yourself’; ‘School as a place of protection of cultural 
identity’; ‘Is human being ready for paradise?’; and ‘The “Barbarossa” enterprise -  a 
new version of Katyn’ (FV94 1993)?62
In the 1995 edition, finally, the following articles are also situated in a political grey 
zone between conservative views and right-wing extremism: ‘Notes on the 
compromise of asylum’; ‘Protection of the homeland as integrated cultural and 
environmental protection’; ‘Military service is a waste of time’; The concept of the 
nation, definition and current significance’; ‘Internationalism versus nationalism -  an 
eternal enmity’; The survival of Europe’s state system in a period of global change’;
61 The titles given here are the author’s translations. The respective original German titles as they 
appeared in the yearbook (FV93 1992) are as follows: ’’Revier -  Heimat -  nationale Identitat -  
Okologische Notwendigkeit und gesellschaftliche Realitaten”; ’’Identitat und Gerechtigkeit -  Notizen 
zur europaischen Gegenwart”; "Volksgruppen -  und Minderheitsschutz in Europa -  Die Situation der 
deutschen Minderheiten in Mittel- und Osteuropa und die Verantwortung Osterreichs”; 
’’Volksgruppenrechts im ’neuen Europa'”; ’’Minderheitsprobleme der baltischen Staaten”; 
’’Heimatvertriebungen”; "Die Dialektik der Grenze -  Menschliche Kulturen sind ohne Grenzen nicht 
vorstellbar”; "Uberlegungen zur Auslanderfrage”; ’’Auslanderproblematik in Wien”.
62 The titles given here are the author’s translations. The respective original German titles as they 
appeared in the yearbook (FV94 1993) are as follows: ’’Damit uns Wien Heimatstadt bleiben”; 
"Multikultur -  Zur Idee und Kritik eines Gedankenexperiments”; ’’Patrioten aller Lager vereinigt euchl”; 
"Umerziehung und politische Kultur -  Zur Macht der Medien”; ”Der Osten in der europaischen 
Integration”; ”Zum Begriff der Minderheit vor dem Hintergrund der Einwanderungsproblematik”; ’’Hilfe 
zur Selbsthilfe -  Das Beispiel Siebenburgen”; "Die Schule als Bewahrungsstatte kultureller identitat”; 
”lst der Mensch paradiesfahig?”; ”Das Unternehmen “Barbarossa” -  ein neuen Katyn?”. -
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‘National conflicts in a global neighbourhood’; ‘Protecting ethnic groups in Europe 
without violating national borders’; ‘Minority issues’; Minorities in present-day 
Slovenia’; ‘”Multa non multum” -  cultural critical notes regarding multicultural society’; 
and ‘Islam and Islamism in Europe’.63
While it is difficult to apply a quantitative analysis to the yearbooks, an analysis of the 
titles and main content of the individual articles gives an indication of the spectrum of 
views amongst the party’s leading intellectual sympathisers and the weight given to 
particular issues. In Table 3 (see below, p. 129), the articles have been classified 
according to the extent to which they promote typically right-wing and right-wing 
extremist ideas: articles containing strong and explicitly right-wing extremist views 
including racism, xenophobia and fascist reminiscences are categorised as ‘articles 
with explicit right-wing extremist views’. Articles alluding to or addressing the nation 
or nationalism, tradition and values are categorised as ‘articles with a right-wing 
tendency’. Articles debating sociobiology are defined as ‘extreme’. The depiction of 
animals (and in particular carnivores) as role models for human behaviour must be 
seen as not only politically ‘extreme’, but as a theoretical excuse for political violence. 
As an example, in the 1993 edition, the fate of a crab in an alien colony is 
metaphorically used to justify the inhuman treatment of people from other cultures 
(Kohl FV93 1992, p. 73). In the 1994 edition, the lack of biological evolution over the 
last 10,000 years is emphasized, while a considerable social evolution is wiped aside 
(Iraneus Eibl-Eibesfeldt FV94 1993, p. 215). Again, the purpose here is to introduce a 
harsher political agenda by means of a (pseudo)scientific justification.
On the other hand, conservative cultural critique does not necessarily qualify as right- 
wing extremist. An article called ‘Leftist culture mafia -  rightist art’ directs criticism 
against Austrian official culture supposedly out of touch with ordinary citizens 
(Marinovic FV94 1993). Hence, this article is populist in nature and not classified as 
right-wing extremist. ‘Avant-garde art and totalitarian rule’ debating among others
63 The titles given here are the author’s translations. The respective original German titles as they 
appeared in the yearbook (FV95 1994) are as follows: "Anmerkungen zur Asylkompromiss”; 
"Heimatschutz als integrierter Kultur- und Umweltschutz”; "Wehrpflicht ist Verschwendung”; "Der 
Begriff der Nation, Definition und aktuelle Bedeutung"; ” Nur im Nationalen liegt Hoffnung”; 
"Intemationalismus gegen Nationalismus -  Eine unendliche Todfeindschaft”; "Die Zukunft der 
Nationalstaaten -  Die Behauptung Europas Staatenwelt im globalen Wandel”; "Nationale Konflikte in 
einer globalen Nachbarschaft”; "Volksgruppenschutz in Europa ohne Antastung der Staatsgrenzen”; 
"Minderheitenfragen”; "Minderheiten im heutigen Slowenien”; "Multa non multum -  Kulturkritische 
Anmerkungen zur multikulturellen Gesellschaft"; "Islam und Islamismus”.
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Marinetti and the Italian futurist movement seeks to draw a link between avant-garde 
art and culture and large-scale political oppression. The article expresses a clearly 
conservative form of criticism against progressive art and culture. But it would be a 
mistake to consider this critique as right-wing extremist or ‘fascist’.
Table 3 
Party Yearbooks 1993 to 2000 -  Percentage of Right-wing Views
Year Total 
number 
of articles
Articles with a Right- 
Wing Tendency
Articles with Explicit Right- 
Wing Extremist Views
Number Percentage Number Percentage
1993 56 9 16 2 4
1994 76 9 12 1 1
1995 66 10 15 2 3
1996 29 2 7 1 3
1997 39 0 0 0 0
1998 29 0 0 0 0
1999 36 0 0 0 0
2000 7 0 0 0 0
Source: Freiheit und Verantwortung (Vienna: Freiheitliche Bildungswerk, Freiheitliche Partei 
Osterreichs, 1993-2000)
Table 3 shows that the amount of articles with a right-wing tendency varied between 
7 percent and 16 percent between 1993 and 1996; with the mean percentage of 
right-wing material amounting to 12.5 percent. To put this another way, the proportion 
of right-wing material was one out of eight articles during these four years. The last 
four editions of the annual journal contained no overtly right-wing material.
The Party Programmes of 1985 and 1997
While the yearbooks reflect mainly the internal intellectual debates amongst the party 
leadership or ideologues, it is important to identify more direct references to or 
indications of political and practical realities. We therefore now turn our attention to
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two particular party programmes, that of 1985, the so-called ‘Salzburger 
Programm’,64 and the 1997 party programme, the so-called ‘Linzer Programm.’65
The 1985 Salzburg Programme is important for many reasons. References to a 
German Volksgemeinschaft have faded, and ideas about cultural enrichment of ‘our 
common homeland’ are being defended. As noted by Kurt Richard Luther, while the 
‘national component’ was still there, liberalism was ‘clearly the dominant ideology’ at 
the time (Luther 2005, p. 18). The programme also shows to what extent the 
Freedom Party under the new leadership of Jorg Haider remained faithful to the 
party’s prevailing ideology during the mid-1980s, and to what extent he distanced 
himself from these views. The 1997 party programme is of interest because it 
describes the FPO’s programme at the height of Jorg Haider’s power and influence.
In this context two themes are of particular interest -  the party’s views on ‘liberalism’ 
and on ‘immigration’. As Chapter 6 has shown, throughout its history the party sought 
time and again to underline its liberal leanings, as also reflected also in its name. It 
was a member of the Liberal International until 1993 and also participated in 
government as a predominantly liberal party between 1983 and 1986. Examining the 
party programmes for clear references to liberalism also demonstrates the presence 
of mainstream views. The party’s views on immigration and its association with their 
negative consequences for Austria are, on the other hand, often associated with 
racism and right-wing radical views.
In the Salzburg Programme, liberalism is clearly endorsed. In total, 41 references to 
liberalism were found (Table 4). ‘Freedom on the part of the single individual’ is a 
supreme goal (SP, p. 1, para. 2). The aims of the FPO are declared to be to awaken 
the creative potential in society, and to use a liberal policy to foster ‘uniqueness’ (SP, 
p. 1, para. 13). An educational system based on a ‘liberal foundation’ is endorsed 
(SP, p. 10, para. 155), ‘liberal ideas’ enable us to help ourselves (SP, p. 8, para. 
123), ‘the capital market should be based on liberal principles’ (SP, p. 19, para. 279), 
and the idea of progress is linked to ‘the enlightenment and to liberalism’ (SP, p. 26
64 The Programm der Freiheitlichen Partei Osterreichs (1985) or ’Salzburger Programm’ will be 
abbreviated to SP in references in the remainder of this chapter.
65 FPO Die Freiheitlichen 1997 (Programme of the Austrian Freedom Party 1997) (1997) or the ‘Linzer 
Programme’ will be abbreviated to LP in references in the remainder of this chapter.
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para. 385). Still, this form of liberalism should not be mistaken for liberalism in the 
tradition of 1789, where the individual is the sole purpose and benefactor. In fact, 
despite the fact that this party programme appeared at a time when the FPO was 
portraying itself as distinctly mainstream and ‘liberal’, the liberal views expressed in 
the programme are in the tradition of 1848; in other words, this is a form of liberalism 
where the individual is situated firmly within a context in which the rights and 
freedoms of nations are of primary importance. The emphasis on the freedom of the 
individual above is limited by the context of a particular social order (SP, p. 1, para. 
2). When a liberal policy fosters uniqueness, this is not primarily aimed at fostering 
unique individuals, but, in accordance with classic conservative views, at producing 
distinctive ‘groups of people’ (SP, p. 1, para. 13). The national collective is never out 
of sight when liberal ideas are expressed in the Salzburg Programme. Therefore, in a 
‘liberal order’, ‘rights and obligations’ are of equal importance. Without a solid societal 
and political framework individual freedom is not possible (SP, p. 1, para. 4). This 
form of liberalism could be considered a smokescreen for more radical ideas. Either 
the individual is in focus, or the individual is being suppressed. Collective entities -  
whether conservative or Marxist -  surrounding and ‘protecting’ the individual are 
often seen as suspicious.
Table 4 
Salzburger Programm 1985 and Linzer Programm 1997 -  references to 
liberalism, immigration, and Right-wing populism
Salzburger Programm Linzer Programm
Absolute numbers Absolute numbers Equivalent
size
Liberalism 41 1 2
Immigration 3 9 18
Right-wing
populism
16 45 90
Source: Programm der Freiheitlichen Partei Ostereichs (Vienna: Freiheitliche Bildungswerk, 
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs, 1985; Program of the Austrian Freedom Party -  FPO, Die 
Freiheitlichen (Vienna: Freiheitliche Bildungswerk, Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs, 1997)
Table 4 compares the political tendency in the 1985 FPO party programme -  the 
Salzburg Programme -  with the tendency in the 1997 party programme -  the Linz
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Programme. In the Salzburg Programme, 41 paragraphs included positive references 
to liberalism, while the equivalent of two articles (see explanations in the following 
paragraph) referred to liberalism in the Linzer Programme. Put differently, by 1997, 
references to liberalism were only 5 per cent of the figures of 1985. In the Salzburg 
Programme, 3 paragraphs contained references to immigration, while (the equivalent 
of) 18 items referred to immigration in the 1997 Linz Programme. The weight of 
themes referring to immigration had increased six-fold. Finally, the Salzburg 
Programme contained 16 paragraphs relating to right-wing populism, whereas the 
Linz Programme exhibited (the equivalent of) 90 references to right-wing populism. 
Hence, right-wing populism was also six times more common in 1997 as compared 
to in 1985. Although immigration and right-wing populism both increased by the same 
factor, their relative importance changed. Compared to immigration, right-wing 
populism rose to have major importance in the Linz Programme of 1997.
In comparing the two programmes, a few fundamental difficulties had to be taken into 
consideration in terms of classification and data coding. First, a word count showed 
that the Salzburg Programme had about 38,000 words, while the Linz Programme 
only had around 17,000. This means that a direct comparison with regards to the 
prevalence of various views (‘Absolute numbers’) would be misleading. The figures in 
the Linz Programme have therefore been doubled (‘Equivalent size’). Their different 
respective length is reflected in the style. The Salzburg Programme is more scientific, 
reasoned, and ‘dry’ in style, while Linz Programme has a more ‘populist’ tone. The 
only chapter in the Linz Programme that could qualify as scientific is chapter XVII -  
‘Science and its teaching are free: “The promotion of science and research has 
priority’” . Chapter 8 -  ‘Economics and tax issues’ and Chapter 9 -  'Sozialweseri are 
only two examples of chapters in the Salzburg Programme written in an academic, 
non-polemical tone.
In any classification of the prevalence of certain themes, the relative size of the 
theme had to be calculated. In comparing the Salzburg- and Linz Programmes -  one 
paragraph counted as one theme, and thus one ‘hit’, regardless of whether the 
paragraph or article was long, and the theme recurred many times.
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This classification must also take into consideration a number of borderline 
instances. This problem is particularly relevant concerning the prevalence of right- 
wing populist themes. An important question is: What is normal criticism against 
political opponents and what constitutes true right-wing populism? The Salzburg 
Programme states that ‘Monopolies... should if possible be avoided’ (SP, p. 17, para. 
247). The Linz Programme seeks to reduce ‘bureaucratic obstacles in conducting 
public questionnaires’ (LP, p. 16, art. 4). It is hard to tell whether these statements 
are aimed at monopoly and bureaucracy in general, or if they have a populist edge 
against the dual rule of the SPO and the OVP (and hence, should be included in 
table 4 above). The context of the former quotation, however, would lead us to 
conclude that it should rather not be included above. The general discussion 
advocates ‘liberal market principles’, and the critical discussion about monopolies 
does not fall within the boundaries of right-wing populist, hard-hitting rhetoric. 
Regarding the latter quotation, the wider picture -  seeking to increase the power of 
‘the public’ as opposed to parliamentary power -  suggests that the basic message is 
in fact a populist message criticizing the elite rule of ‘SPOVP’. This quotation, 
therefore, has been included in table 4.
While the Salzburg Programme defends ‘cultural pluralism, where all constituent 
groups’ can flourish (SP, p. 9, para. 141), the Linz Programme claims that ‘Nobody 
should be persecuted because of their convictions, views or ideas’ (LP, p. 5, art. 2). 
These statements could be interpreted as a mere quest for openness, but they can 
also easily target the supposed suppression of ideas by what is called the ‘Austrian 
elite’. The former citation, however, includes ethnic minority groups within the 
concept of ‘cultural pluralism’, and it is unlikely that the embracing of ethnic minorities 
would go together with right-wing populism. Therefore, it is left out of table 4. The 
latter passage, on the other hand, is further explained by the following statement: 
Respect ‘for the individual personality rules out ...oppression resulting from certain 
political values and attitudes.’ This seems to be an implicit critical reference to the 
Austrian elite rule, and the citation is therefore included in table 4. Should anti-EU 
rhetoric be regarded as distinct (and possibly left-wing), or as merely an extended 
version of domestic anti-elitist and right-wing populist sentiment? As discussed in 
Chapter 4, both alternatives are possible. The quotation in the Linz Programme, 
however -  where Austria’s entry into the EU is criticized for having led to a ‘massive’
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standardization of the country’s ‘intellectual and cultural substance’ -  is an indicator 
of strongly nationalist and patriotic language (LP, p. 6 art. 4). This context suggests 
that the anti-EU rhetoric above expresses right-wing populist views. Hence, it has 
been included in table 4.
The Linz Programme advocates ‘direct elections’ (LP, p. 16, art. 5). This can be seen 
as either an alternative to representative democracy in general, or as a right-wing 
populist alternative to those ‘anonymous functionaries’ within the Austrian ‘party 
state’ in particular. The quotation has been included in table 4, This is because the 
context of the quote offers an alternative to secretive ‘appointment(s)’ of political 
representatives and because calls for ‘direct elections’ and ‘direct democracy’ always 
appear in right-wing populist language.
The Linz Programme strongly supports ‘school autonomy’ (LP, p. 32, art. 2). Would 
this be a tactical concession to neo-liberalism, or rather an implicit attack against a 
perceived socialist control in education? Or both? While ‘independent schools’ and 
‘autonomy’ in the realm of education frequently overlap with right-wing populist 
rhetoric targeting the dual rule of SPO and OVP, this is not clearly indicated by the 
present passage. Therefore, it has not been included in table 4.
Finally, the Salzburg Programme contains the following passage regarding social 
care: ‘Voluntary assistance within the circle of friends and family constitutes, in our 
eyes, a great opportunity for the future’ (SP, p. 22; para. 315). Is this an expression 
of conservative (and possibly right-wing populist) language against the inhumane 
nature of modernist, social democratic social policy, or is it plain neo-liberal rhetoric 
about deregulation and the ‘slimming of the state’? Or perhaps both? The wider 
discussion includes many references to conservative themes: money cannot replace 
human care and understanding, and personal assistance is strongly defended. The 
wider discussion also views assistance by friends and relatives as a remedy for 
escalating social costs. Still, judged by the wider picture, the citation does not seem 
to be right-wing populist. In addition, it seems to advocate general market principles, 
instead of more radical neo-liberal solutions. Hence, the quotation has not been 
included in table 4.
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As a consequence of these borderline cases and uncertainties, table 4 above is best 
seen an indication of the most plausible trends. Having said this, table 4 still 
suggests that the prevalence of the three themes under investigation indeed has 
changed, and that this change can be established with a modest level of certainty.
During the early 1990s, liberal values were being increasingly questioned within the 
party. This trend is also reflected in the 1997 party programme in which virtually all 
explicit references to liberalism have disappeared. The one exception is on page 9, 
where liberalism in the sense of ‘anticlericism’ is seen as ‘outdated’ (LP, p. 9, art. 2). 
In terms of views on immigration, the Salzburg Programme describes Austria as 
densely populated and hence not a country that can absorb immigrants (SP, p. 16, 
para. 240). Yet, there are only 3 explicit references to immigration in the 1985 
programme. The 1997 Party Programme, on the other hand, presents a whole range 
of arguments in which immigration and immigrants are presented in an unfavourable 
light. In total 9 references can be found, which would amount to roughly 18 in case 
the Linz Programme was of the same size as the Salzburg Programme (Table 4). 
While acknowledging that Austria must give asylum to those who are persecuted for 
racist, religious or political reasons, it reiterates the statement from 1985: due to the 
density of the population and its limited resources, Austria is not a country for 
immigration (LP, p. 8, art. 4).66 Yet it goes a step further in emphasising the negative 
implications of immigration and suggesting that ‘full sovereignty in matters concerned 
with the rights of immigrants’ is required to protect the interests of the Austrian 
population (LP, p. 8, art. 4). Further, ‘unlimited immigration would demand too much 
of the resident population’ and would endanger the cultural identity of Austrians. 
Multicultural ‘experiments’ lead to social conflicts, and are hence rejected (LP, p. 8, 
art. 4). Practically, uncontrolled immigration would cause serious distortions of the 
labour market, wage cuts, and rising prices on the housing market (LP, p. 23, art. 8). 
The programme speaks of a need to ‘counter the flood of illegal immigrants and 
those engaged in smuggling refugees.’ Illegal immigrants are furthermore, it is 
claimed, linked to ‘an importation of crime’, further undermining the urgency of 
precautionary measures (LP, p. 19-20, art. 3).
66 Ch. IV ‘The right to a cultural identity’, Art. 4, Para. 4; Ch. IV The right to a cultural identity’, Art. 4, 
Para. 1, Programme of the Austrian Freedom Party -  FPO Die Freiheitlichen 1997 (Vienna: 
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs, 1997)
135
The reference to exerting full sovereignty concerning the rights of immigrants denies 
the basic idea of immigrant rights -  which is precisely about having rights regardless 
of one’s background. As for the notion of cultural identity, it has been used repeatedly 
by European right-wing extremists, habitually in order to package a nationalist, racist 
and right-wing extremist message in the rhetoric of defensive and righteous self- 
determination. Calls for cultural identity are generally linked to a critical stance 
against multiculturalism. The conclusion that multiculturalism leads to social conflicts 
is, however, widely contested among researchers. Brigitte Bailer and Wolfgang 
Neugebauer claim that ‘the rejection of a multicultural society’ has ‘contributed 
greatly to a climate of latent or open violence against foreigners ...’ (Bailer and 
Neugebauer, The FPO of Jorg Haider’, n.d.). Then again, this statement is only 
partly true. While a critique of multiculturalism may hide extreme right views, it may 
also be used simply to defend the nation state against disintegrating tendencies 
along the lines of minority rights, whereby citizens’ rights and solidarity across ethnic 
borders become increasingly difficult to defend.
As for the evidence of right-wing extremist ideas in the 1997 Party Programme, the 
programme can be categorised as right-wing extremist only in relation to its stance 
on immigration-related issues. Even though this Party Programme occasionally made 
use of rather harsh rhetoric (‘flooded by immigrants’) it is difficult to argue that this 
renders the entire 1997 Party Programme right-wing extremist. Instead both the 
Salzburg Programme and, more evidently still, the 1997 Party Programme, show 
clear signs of a typical right-wing populist tone. The earlier programme contains 16 
references of a right-wing populist nature, while the latter programme (recounted to 
equivalent size) contains no less than 90 references to right-wing populism.
The party’s opposition to immigration was also part of the campaign for the 1997 
national elections when the FPO announced: ‘The influx of strangers must be 
stopped!’ Heribert Schiedel (2000, p. 109) argues that the success of this political 
campaign was because the magic flute of racism had caught the attention of ‘the 
down-and-out proletariat and the small merchants’.
In the Salzburg Programme concerns are raised about an escalating cynicism and 
fatigue regarding politics and parties, ‘a consequence of years of political
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depravation’ (SP, p. 6, para. 90). In order to strengthen democratic rights, a 
‘dictatorship of the political apparatus’ along with a sense of impotence and 
insignificance on the part of the individual must be countered (SP, p. 3, para. 54). 
The payment for political work must not ‘deteriorate into a privilege among politicians’ 
(SP, p. 6, para. 89). Instead, the Salzburg Programme advocates flexible and ‘open 
elites’, and a system free from nepotism and under-cover negotiations: ‘We are 
against privileges’ (SP, p. 3, para. 40). Therefore, politics is in need of independent 
personalities; experts free from financial alignments, and impeccable concerning 
corruption (SP, p. 6, para. 88). As for the realm of culture, political interference and 
censorship is ruled out (SP, p. 9, para. 143). More specifically, a cultural policy shall 
neither promote a particular artistic view nor enforce certain moralistic perceptions 
upon the individual artist (SP, p. 2, para. 25). With respect to the media the citizen 
must be protected from an abusive, personally offensive and false media 
broadcasting (SP, p. 12, para. 175). The 1985 Salzburg Programme, while adhering 
to representative democracy, advocates an increased use of direct democratic 
measures (SP, p. 5, para. 75). The above examples from the 1985 Salzburg 
Programme share a common feature: they are all directed against an assumed elitist 
oppression. These views are shared by Luther, who refers to the mid 1980s and 
Haider’s pending seizure of political power as ‘the early years of the phase of populist 
protest’ (Luther 2005, p. 18). In other words, while the populist rhetoric was already 
present, it was not to become forceful until the 1990s and the Linz Programme.
The 1997 Party Programme shows similar anti-elitist, populist tendencies, and their 
weight is notable. Austria in 1997 is, according to the Party Programme, 
characterized by centralistic bureaucratic collective arrangements, where the single 
individual is powerless and anonymous (LP, p. 22, art. 4). Secret agreements 
between the Social Democrats and the People’s Party have created an intransparent 
‘shadow parliament’ cut off from public control (LP, p. 14 art. 1). The public sector is 
used as a ‘self-service store and pension organization of the political parties and their 
auxiliary organisations’ (LP, p. 22, art. 6). In this system, the dignity of human beings 
is lost. Instead, they are kept in bondage by ideological models and made ‘subject to 
... socialisation against their will’; and the individual is being discriminated against 
and oppressed by ‘certain values and political attitudes’ (LP, p. 5, art. 2). These 
tendencies are particularly detrimental in the cultural sphere which has been the
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victim of an intellectual decline for many years, where ‘artists are bound and 
politically instrumentalised by control mechanisms such as the granting of subsidies 
(LP, p. 31, art. 4). As a consequence, a submissive and state-friendly art emerges 
(LP, p. 31, art. 4). Political control is, furthermore, being exercised over the media by 
means of subsidies, leading to political dependency, politically selected reporters, 
and, in general, ‘massive distortion of political competition’ (LP, p. 14).
However, the 1997 Party Programme proposes to address these detrimental 
conditions with a ‘clear reduction of the omnipotence of political parties’, thereby 
reducing their heavy hand over and influence on appointments in education, court 
committees, and supervisory and executive boards of directors. Curtailing political 
influence, it is claimed, will liberate the banking system, the federal postal service, 
the insurance companies and co-operative building societies from the shackles of the 
dual political monopoly of the SPO and the OVP (LP, p. 14, art. 1). If this 
‘bureaucratic, authoritarian government’ can be brought to a standstill, Austria will not 
only limit the influence of political lobbies, but also, notably, acquire a multi-party 
system (LP, p. 14, art. 1).
As for the state’s role in industrial and commercial activities, the 1997 programme 
argues that it has been unsuccessful, ineffective and costly. It has crowded out 
private and possibly more competitive companies and firms. Therefore, ‘the state 
should abstain from any profitable or entrepreneurial activity’ (LP, p. 15, art. 3). 
Similarly, education has to be disentangled from the ideological influence of the two 
big parties. Unless this is done, schools will continue to be ‘abused for ideological 
and doctrinary purposes’ (LP, p. 31, art. 1). As for the realm of art, the role of the 
state must be reversed. Instead of state patronage, the state must ‘guarantee the 
freedom of art and its diversity’ (LP, p. 30, art. 4). The 1997 Party Programme 
reiterates the call for an increased use of direct democratic measures (LP, p. 16, art. 
4).
The above has shown that while the party programmes contain references to typical 
right-wing themes, typically populist themes are far more common. In our findings, 
three tendencies are discerned: (1) liberalism decreases from 41 to (the equivalent 
of) 2 (where liberalism is criticized); (2) immigration and (3) right-wing populism both
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exhibit a six-fold increase -  the previous from 3 to 18; and the latter from 16 to 90. 
Hence, from this empirical analysis, it seems reasonable to conclude that the FPO 
agenda evolved from a very strong liberal platform with certain traces of ‘old’ 
nationalism and right-wing extremism in 1985, to a platform in 1997 where 
immigration and nationalism had experienced only a moderate increase. The most 
noteworthy change, however, was a rather pronounced increase in values and 
themes related to right-wing populism.
The EU Sanctions against Austria
The EU Sanctions against Austria are important in the present discussion mainly 
because they had wide repercussions at the final stage of the period under 
investigation -  not only in Austria but also internationally. Never before had the EU 
so quickly managed to unite and impose sanctions against an EU Member State. 
However, the sanctions are also important because they center upon the Austrian 
political landscape which is the topic of this thesis. The major motivation behind the 
sanctions was an expressed desire by the EU to bring about ‘positive political 
changes’ in Austria. However, numerous circumstances suggest that these changes 
never occurred. It will be argued that the sanctions were aimed at a presumed 
extremism in Austria, when in fact the political tendency was populist, that is, that the 
EU politicians had misinterpreted the political trends in Austria. Instead of leading to 
internal criticism against the OVP/FPO government, the sanctions sparked populist 
counter-reactions against the EU. These aspects -  populism and counter-reactions -  
both play a central role in the present thesis, and this is why the EU Sanctions 
against Austria must be dealt with at some length, including a background discussion 
about the general theories of sanctions.
The EU sanctions against Austria were imposed as a response to the establishment 
of the FPO and OVP coalition government. In the Brussels rhetoric, the sanctions 
were referred to as ‘the Measures of the EU 14 Governments against the Austrian 
government’. As noted by Peter Wallensteen, however, sanctions can take on many 
different labels, such as ‘blockades’, ‘boycotts’, ‘embargoes’, ‘quarantines’, or
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‘economic coercion’ (Wallensteen 2000, p. 1) The sanctions against Austria and the 
Austrian government were at times labelled a ‘quarantine’, or, as above, ‘measures’.
The sanctions against Austria were officially declared on 31 January 2000.67 In the 
‘announcement of the “EU sanctions’” (Document 8 (but see also Document 7, 
Hummer and Pelinka 2002, p. 185)), the following statement was made:
- Governments of XIV Member States will not promote or accept any bilateral 
official contacts at political level with an Austrian Government integrating the 
FPO;
- There will be no support in favour of Austrian candidates seeking positions in 
international organisations.
- Austrian Ambassadors in EU capitals will only be received at a technical level.
On 1 February the European Commission announced that it shared the 'concern 
forming the basis of [the EU-14 Sanctions against Austria]’ (Document 40, Hummer 
and Pelinka 2002, p. 283).
On 3 February under ‘Critique against the creation of a government coalition between 
the OVP and the FPO in Austria’ (Document 42, Hummer and Pelinka 2002, p. 284), 
a key objective of the sanctions was stated: ‘The European Parliament supports the 
view that the inclusion of the Austrian Freedom Party in a coalition government 
brings legitimacy to the European extreme right’ (Hummer and Pelinka 2002, p. 285). 
On 14 February Benita Ferrero-Waldner, then OVP Foreign Minister, made a 
‘Declaration of belief in respect and common values and the inclusion of the Freedom 
Party in the responsibility of a government’ (Document 13, Hummer and Pelinka 
2002, p. 194): while showing respect for the concern expressed, she urged that the 
coalition government should be evaluated according to ‘its concrete action’ 
(Document 13, Hummer and Pelinka 2002, p. 194). On 16 February (Document 43, 
Hummer and Pelinka 2002, p. 287), the EU-14 ‘vigorously condemns any form of 
extremism’, and ‘condemns any insulting and anti-European remarks, as has been 
done by member and chairpersons of the Freedom Party.’
67 Since the original EU documents on the sanctions are not readily available, these documents will be 
referenced as they appear in the authoritative text on the sanctions, Hummer and Pelinka (2002). The 
original enumeration of the documents is also given for clarity.
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There were also repercussions outside Europe. Israel immediately recalled its 
ambassador and the Ambassador of the United States was called back ‘for 
consultations’ (Heinisch 2002, p. 243). Document 42, mentioned above -  ‘A critique 
against the formation of the government coalition OVP-FPO in Austria’ -  states that 
allowing the FPO to participate in a coalition government gives legitimacy to the 
European extreme right. Hence, the Freedom Party was seen as an ‘extreme right’ 
party. The EU-14 therefore feared that there was a direct positive correlation 
between its right-wing extremist propensity and its electoral appeal. The quotation 
also has wider implications. Seeking to persuade Wolfgang Schiissel (Chancellor 
during the government coalition with the FPO) to reconsider the coalition would not 
only prevent a large-scale spreading of right-wing extremist ideas in Austria, but 
would also, it was hoped, counter a surge of similar right-wing extremist parties 
throughout Europe.
Another explanation for the sanctions was to be found in ‘Austrian peculiarities’ as 
Waldemar Hummer and Anton Pelinka, authors of Osterreich unter ‘EU-Quarantane’ 
(2002) -  the most authoritative volume on the matter, have noted. Among these 
peculiarities was the historical lack of interest in dealing with the country’s war-time 
past. They stress that the largest percentage of SS soldiers was not, per capita, 
Germans, but Austrians. Frank discussions about war-time experiences, such as the 
Historikerstreit (battle of historians) in the mid-1980s in Germany, never occurred in 
Austria. The myth of having been the ‘first victim of Germany’s aggression’ has been 
part of Austria’s official self-image ever since the end of the Second World War. 
Another peculiarity was the failure on the part of the other parties to successfully 
isolate the Freedom Party (Hummer and Pelinka 2002, pp. 47-8). This leads on to 
what was to become an additional target of the sanctions -  Austria in its entirety. 
Although the sanctions were officially directed against the coalition between the 
Freedom Party and the People’s Party, they soon developed into a wider critique of 
Austria.
Pelinka and Hummer (2002, p. 44) argue that the sanctions were a clear success: by 
2001 support for the FPO had plummeted drastically. From 26.9 percent in the 1999 
national elections, the support of the Freedom Party declined to 10 percent in 2002. 
Pelinka and Hummer acknowledge that the decline experienced by the FPO between
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February and December 2000 may have had a wide variety of causes, such as the 
fact that the FPO had entered government. It seems at least plausible, they 
conclude, ‘that the “sanctions” against the FPO never triggered any martyr effect’ 
(Hummer and Pelinka 2002, p. 44).
Others have remarked on the ‘double standard’ of the European Union. Why were no 
measures taken when, for instance, Gianfranco Fini’s Alleanza Nazionale entered 
Berlusconi’s government in 1994? The sanctions would likely not have been 
imposed, it was widely believed, ‘if the target country had been a powerful player 
such as Italy or Germany’ (Heinisch 2002, p. 246). While the EU had had many 
opportunities to take political and legal action against a whole number of other 
countries with, if anything, a more tarnished political record than Austria, it had failed 
to do so. The Economist pointed to the fact that the EU had made no move when 
bigger EU countries had welcomed communists and post-fascists with far closer links 
to past atrocities than the FPO (Anon. ’The perils of Austracism’ 2000). Labeling the 
party as ‘thoroughly xenophobic, if not racist’ was, according to Hans-Georg Betz 
(2000, p. 266), ‘a heavy charge’, because ‘major mainstream parties’ throughout 
Europe, had gained popular support by means of ‘xenophobic rhetoric’ and ‘anti­
immigrant policies [...]’. Betz’ criticism points to the fact that the sanctions were 
questioned not only from the right (arguing that the FPO is as good as any other 
party), but also from the left, by organisations such as the Socialist International, 
which claimed that the FPO was not worse than other European parties regarding 
asylum rights, etc (Schwarz 2000).
Comparing the EU’s reaction to Austria with the silence of Brussels when Gianfranco 
Fini’s Alleanza Nationale joined the Berlusconi government in 1994 Hossay and 
Zolberg (2002, p. 309) argue, that ‘the hypocrisy of the European response to Haider 
was thick.’ However, Hummer and Pelinka (2002, p. 30) explain that we cannot easily 
compare 1994 and 2000, because the understanding of democracy was substantially 
altered during that period.68 The self-perception of the EU at the turn of the 
millennium was radically different from that of the early 1990s. While there may be a 
kernel of truth in this, it still raises questions about the EU’s current ability to deal with 
right-wing extremist tendencies. Jobbik (Movement for a better Hungary) -  the
68 Hummer and Pelinka, Osterreich unter *EU-Quarantane”, 30.
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Hungarian right-wing extreme party, gained no less than 16.7 percent in the April 
2010 election, almost winning out over the Socialists, who received 19.2 percent. 
Magyar Garda, Jobbik’s paramilitary wing, was founded in 2007, and despite being 
illegal, continues to be active. By any measures, Jobbik is more radical than the FPO 
ever was during the Haider years. Why, then, has the EU not considered united 
actions against Jobbik?
Officially, it was stated that the EU measures were only aimed at the newly-installed 
government of the OVP and the FPO. No two-party contacts were allowed, contacts 
at the highest diplomatic level were cancelled, and European politicians went out of 
their way not to be seen or depicted together with members of the Austrian 
government. However, numerous actions taken among the members of the EU-14 
were not directed against the government, but clearly against the entire Austrian 
nation or Austrian citizens. Margareta Kopeinig and Christoph Kotanko (2000, p. 27) 
quote the Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, who declared skiing in Austria to be 
‘immoral’. Some of the explicit reasons for the sanctions make it even more difficult to 
describe them as geared exclusively towards the fresh OVP/FPO government. 
Above, it was stated that no Austrian candidates seeking positions in international 
organisations would be supported. Clearly, these candidates are not necessarily 
linked to the Austrian government. As for the ‘Austrian peculiarities’ since the end of 
the Second World War, these also fail to single out the newly-installed OVP/FPO 
government. In fact, this line of criticism covers every single Austrian government 
since 1955. Moreover, in criticising the Austrian parties’ inability to isolate the FPO, 
this party was, by definition, the one party excluded from this criticism. Other than 
that, it is unlikely to assume that sanctions against an elected government would not 
spill over to (at least) the voters who elected that government. Based on these 
observations, it is more than plausible to conclude that the sanctions, while 
ostensibly targeted against the OVP/FPO government, were easily perceived as 
aimed at the entire Austrian nation. This critique -  sanctions against a government 
spill over and affect the entire citizenry -  is common in other sanction regimes 
directed against various third world authoritarian states (Zimbabwe, Iran, etc.).
By early 2000, Europe had been caught up in strong anti-Austrian feelings. As noted 
by Reinhard Heinisch (2002 p. 245), a Belgian museum refused to loan paintings to a
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Viennese art exhibition. The Vienna Philharmonic faced bomb threats and the 
Belgian taxi drivers’ union urged their drivers not to pick up Austrian passengers. The 
episode that caught most attention relates, however, to the experience of a 
delegation of Austrian high school students sent to Strasbourg to represent their 
country at a Europe-wide youth event aimed at mutual understanding and discussion. 
As they mounted the stage, they were screamed at and castigated as ‘Nazis’ and 
‘racists’. Soon after, when the students recounted the event on TV, the programme 
was viewed by almost 1.4 million Austrians, generating, Heinisch notes, ‘an 
enormous nationwide reaction’ (2002, p. 245). In the eyes of the Austrian public, the 
measures were seen as ‘sanctions against Austria’ (Kopeinig and Kotanko 2000, p. 
28).
Patrick Hossay and Aristide Zolberg (2002, p. 307) argue that the European Union 
‘punished Austria for allowing democracy to run its course.’ In a similar vein, Hans- 
Georg Betz claimed that the EU’s sanction against Austria constituted nothing short 
of ‘an attempt to reverse the outcome of a democratic process’, and represented ‘a 
blatant interference in the internal affairs of a small country’ (2000, pp. 265-71). 
Therefore, Heinisch (2002, p. 244) suggests, the sanctions ‘could themselves be 
regarded a breach of legal obligation by the EU 14 with respect to a fellow member of 
an organisation.’69
In the above discussion, it was argued that the European focus of the sanctions soon 
shifted from the Austrian government to the entire country; including, consequently, 
voters who were opposed to the Austrian Freedom Party and Jorg Haider. 
Ostracising Austria in this fashion was seen as grossly unfair by large sections of the 
populace. This leads to one of the most noteworthy outcomes of the EU sanctions. 
While it was hoped that the sanctions would thwart right-wing extremist tendencies 
among the Austrian electorate, evidence seems to support the view that they were 
not only inefficient, but in fact counter-productive. ‘How’, it has been asked, ‘could 14 
European nations impose sanctions with so little forethought that they achieved 
almost the opposite of what had been intended’ (Heinisch 2002, p. XI (Preface)? The 
chasm between the new government and the general electorate never came about. 
Instead, the public quickly mobilized in support of the Schussel-Haider coalition.
69 See also Pernthaler and Hilpold (2000) for more information on the legal arguments relating to the 
sanctions.
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According to a poll published by the Austrian Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Studiengesellschaft about 66 percent of the Austrian population claimed to be 
outraged by the sanctions. Even among voters of the Green Party, normally stern 
critics of anything relating to the FPO, 40 percent claimed to be outraged. The figures 
for the FPO voters and the OVP voters were almost identical -  84 percent and 82 
percent respectively (Document 74, Hummer and Pelinka 2002, p. 350).
The EU report announcing the end of the EU sanctions also expressed concern 
about the possibility of counter-productivity. Acknowledging that the measures had 
already ‘stirred up nationalist feelings in the country', it stated the opinion ‘that the 
measures taken by the XIV Members States, if continued, would become 
counterproductive and should therefore be ended’ (Ahtisaari etal. 2000, p.33).
Many questions are still, however, left unanswered. What are sanctions really about? 
Are they generally effective? Under what conditions are sanctions counter­
productive, and why? In order to shed some light on these issues, we need to turn to 
the theoretical discussion of sanctions. It should be noted that in the debate about 
the EU-14 sanctions against Austria, the theoretical literature on sanctions has been 
virtually absent. Hence, the following overview will contribute to fill this surprising 
lacuna.
How are sanctions defined in the theoretical debate? A succinct definition is provided 
by Peter Wallensteen. Sanctions, he argues, are ‘actions taken to preserve or 
acquire compliance to certain laws or norms’ (Wallensteen 1971, p. 15). Johan 
Galtung defines sanctions as ‘actions initiated by one or more international actors 
(the “senders”) against one or more others (the “receivers”) with either or both of two 
purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make 
the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important’ (Galtung 1967, 
p. 379). As these two key definitions show, sanctions are frequently seen in a 
relativistic light, while the moral component often raised by politicians is absent.
For the purpose of the present discussion, sanctions will be divided into four partly 
interrelated types. In case sanctions seek to solve a very specific problem, they are 
called ‘instrumental sanctions’ (Wallensteen 1971, p. 172). Another form of
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sanctions, imposed exclusively against small countries, has a more condemnatory 
and punishing nature. These are referred to as ‘expressive sanctions’; they are 
intended to protest and express a moral opinion. According to Galtung, an action is 
expressive, because its function is to ‘release a latent intensity’ (Wallensteen 1971, 
p. 63). In other words, the sender is charged with emotions, and the sanctions enable 
the release of these emotions. This type of sanction is rarely preceded by any 
attempt to solve the problem, and the protest itself often seems to be the purpose of 
the sanction. Frequently, diplomatic relations are interrupted (ibid., p. 175). ‘Smart 
sanctions’ have appeared because it has been argued that ‘ordinary’ sanctions as 
too indiscriminate, treating the entire nation as one collective entity. Therefore, 
indiscriminate sanctions are at times referred to as ‘dumb’ sanctions. Smart 
sanctions, in turn, have been questioned on the grounds that they merely assume 
that the population will realize the distinction made between the government and the 
population (Wallensteen, 2000, p. 13; Wallensteen and Staibano 2005; Grebe 2010). 
Smart sanctions are also closely linked to ‘targeted sanctions’ 
(www.smartsanctions.se).
Galtung has presented various dimensions for classifying sanctions. Sanctions can 
be negative (i.e., a punishment for deviance), or positive (offering a reward for 
compliance). They can be aimed at individuals or collective entities (often entire 
nations.) Sanctions can come about due to internal changes in the receiving nation, 
or external, resulting from patterns of interaction with other nations. They can be 
unilateral (only one sanctioning nation), multilateral (several sanctioning nations), or 
universal (where all or almost all other nations take part in the sanction regime). 
Furthermore, in order to have an impact, sanctions are generally a political 
instrument used by great powers (Wallensteen 1971, p. 183). Sanctions can be 
general or selective (involving all possible measures or only some special measures.) 
They can be total or partial (including all or only a few special measures.) In his 
taxonomy, Galtung also distinguishes between types of sanctions. Diplomatic 
sanctions can entail non-recognition, rupture of diplomatic relations, no direct contact 
with political leaders or no cooperation by international organisations. 
Communication sanctions can affect tourism. Last but not least, economic sanctions 
may include internal destruction and economic boycotts (Galtung 1967, p. 381-383). 
Before continuing, it should be noted that sanctions generally follow similar patterns,
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even though they use different methods. Focusing on economic sanctions, Johan 
Galtung still argues ‘that very much of what we have said ... about economic 
sanctions would apply a fortiori to ... other types of sanctions’ (ibid., p. 414).
Why are sanctions implemented? Often, either to punish, or to seek compliance, or 
both. Galtung, however, is skeptical towards the ‘punishment’ approach of sanctions. 
If, he argues, the politician ‘insists that punishment is a sufficient condition for 
compliance, then he is simply naTve; if he insists that punishment is a necessary 
condition for compliance, than he is probably in addition highly punishment-oriented 
in the sense that punishment has become an automatic and probably also cherished 
goal in itself.’ Galtung suggests that punishment-oriented sanctions are quite 
common, and argues that, ‘if compliance is not obtained, there is at least the 
gratification that derives from knowing (or believing) that the sinner gets his due, that 
the criminal has been punished’ (ibid., p. 380). Galtung’s analysis suggests that 
punishment-oriented sanctions may be oriented toward the domestic population than 
the sanction-receiving nation; an idea shared by Wallensteen: it often seems as of 
the solution of a problem in the receiver country is less important than ‘a need to 
appear “taking action”, particularly in the domestic audience’ (Wallensteen, 2000, p. 
18).
Are sanctions in general effective? Sometimes this seems to be true. In his often- 
cited taxonomy, Baldwin (1985) concludes that 34 per cent of sanctions studied have 
been effective. While this constitutes a mere third of cases studied, the figures are 
still far from insignificant. Occasionally, it is also stated that sanctions has been 
effective in the past, and, ‘if used thoughtfully, they can help to solve conflicts with a 
minimal amount of violence’ (Smith 2004).70 Besides, in a situation where military 
action is impossible and yet doing nothing would be seen as tantamount to 
complicity, then ‘there is the value of at least doing something, of having the illusion 
of being instrumental, of being busy in time of crisis’ (Galtung 1967, p. 411).
What are behind these 34 per cent of sanction cases? Under what specific conditions 
do sanctions appear to have the desired impact on the receiving nation? There 
appears to be a negative correlation between diversified economy and successful
70 Smith 2004, http://www.bevondintractabilitv.org/essav/sanctions
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sanctions. An oil embargo against a state exporting oil has reduced chances to be 
effective. Developing countries appear to be better targets for sanctions than 
developed countries (ibid., p. 386). A strong, internal opposition increases the 
likelihood of effective sanctions (Wallensteen 1971, p. 167). In other words, they are 
likely to have a stronger impact on dictatorships than on democracies. These inner 
divisions lead to another key factor making for effective sanctions, namely that the 
sanctions do not affect all relations between the receiving country and the sending 
country or countries. This lends supports to the observation that clearly defined, 
targeted sanctions (such as the freezing of particular individuals’ bank accounts) and 
. ‘smart’ sanctions (such as discreet and ‘secret sanctions’) are more successful than 
more common all-encompassing sanctions (Wallensteen 1971, p. 166; Wallensteen 
1978; Baldwin 1985; Hadar 1998).
In general, there is agreement in the research literature that sanctions are by and 
large not effective. In his investigation, Wallensteen concludes that two of the ten 
sanctions studied were effective (1971). Comparing the effects of sanctions in eight 
different countries, the results in Galtung’s table ranges from 0 per cent to 70 per 
cent. The average level of success was 25 per cent (Galtung 1967, p. 382). Baldwin 
has also been criticised for using an overly broad conceptualization of sanction 
success. In his more strict definition, Pape (1997) claims that no more than 5 per 
cent of cases studied brought about political compliance. In almost all of the other 
cases, the success was due to other factors, such as military intervention (Pape 
1997, p. 93). This is related to the problem of co-variance versus correlation. How 
are we to know that the changes observed in the receiving countries were caused by 
the sanctions (Wallensteen 1971, p. 58)? In this misty landscape, it remains tempting 
for senders to exaggerate the true effects of sanctions for domestic political reasons.
Why, then, are sanctions mostly not effective? Scholars seem to agree that this is 
above all related to an increased feeling of national unity when confronted with 
external threats, and to the general problem of collective punishment. Sanctions 
operating against collectivities, Galtung argues, ‘will always affect the just together 
with the unjust, since collective sanctions correspond to a philosophy of collective 
guilt.’ This matter-of-fact weakens the morality of the sanctions, and boosts 
nationalist, and extremist internal forces. In case the sender perceives the receiving
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nation as an ‘undifferentiated whole’, it is natural that this image will also be exploited 
by domestic right-wing radical groups. Feelings of national unity feed on precisely a 
sense of unjust treatment from the outside world (Galtung 1967, p. 409). By 
definition, of course, the effect of sanctions ‘increases with the increasing 
participation of the senders.’ This, however, says nothing about the moral effect. In 
fact, to ‘feel that the rest of the world is “ganging up” on one may serve as a very 
effective and hardening stimulus, supporting paranoid and psychopathic tendencies’ 
(ibid., p. 411). ‘When hit and hurt [a nation] reacts - like most organisms -  in such a 
way as to try to undo the damage’ (ibid., p. 409). From this line of reasoning, 
sanctions are not only ineffective, but counter-productive (Wallensteen, 1971, p. 
171). Successfully affecting the receiver in the expected direction, Wallensteen 
continues, is ‘extremely rare’. The net result is often the opposite: ‘the receiver starts 
drifting in the ‘wrong’ direction (ibid., p. 181). In fact, Galtung claims, ‘modern 
penology does not seem to warrant much belief in punishment as a general method 
for making people comply’ (Galtung 1967, p. 379).
The theoretical discussion of sanctions gives us a better insight into the 2000 EU 
sanctions against Austria. Regarding the type of sanctions, it is clear that the 
‘measures’ against Austria and the Austrian government were diplomatic sanctions. 
As a consequence of the sanctions, Austrian politicians suffered from ‘non­
recognition’. Diplomatic relations were ruptured. Contact with political leaders was 
reduced to a minimum. Austrians seeking positions in international organisations 
were no longer supported. The sanctions also had a tendency towards 
communication sanction, in the sense that the EU appealed to its citizens not to go to 
Austria on their holiday.
Furthermore, the sanctions were not instrumental or targeted. Instead, they were 
‘ordinary sanctions’, i.e. very general and indiscriminate, explicitly aimed not only 
against the OVP/FPO government coalition, but also against Austrians working for 
international organisations, and against Austria’s inability to come terms with its war­
time past. Hence, they were not aimed at individuals but at a nation -  a collective 
entity. The sanctions were negative, not positive. Austria was punished for including 
the FPO in government: not praised for complying with, for instance, International 
Declarations of Human Rights. The sender was an international big player -  the EU -
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and the receiver was a small country. Hence, they appear to be expressive 
sanctions, focussing more on the moral value of the punishment and on the domestic 
reaction than on the possibility for real and substantial changes in Austria. These 
sanctions were not bilateral but multilateral, involving several sending nations; and 
selective -  not total -  even though the range of measures against Austria and the 
Austrian government was rather wide.
The previous analysis lends support to the conclusion that sanctions by and large do 
not work. But let us still assume that the sanctions against Austria were effective. 
What observations would support this conclusion? First of all, the sanctions were 
powerful and had a large impact on Austria. In addition, the key reason behind these 
international protests -  Jorg Haider -  resigned on May 1st, and was succeeded by 
Susanne Riess-Passer, who was generally seen as a more moderate force in the 
party. From these perspectives, the sanctions were truly effective. However, the most 
important reason why the EU sanctions, in the eyes of many, were a success and 
had a ‘bite’ was linked to the electoral decline of the FPO. At the time of the national 
elections in 1999, the FPO, as noted earlier, was supported by no less 26.9 per cent 
of voters. By the 2002 election, voter support dwindled to a mere 10 per cent. More 
than 60 percent of the previous voters had abandoned the party. As for the trend 
during 2000, it experienced a modest decline from 4 February 2000 until the end of 
the year.
What, then, would support the conclusion -  based on the theoretical background 
above -  that the sanctions were not effective? First of all, the government coalition in 
Austria was installed in a free and fair election. Hence, there is an indisputable link 
between those in power and the citizen. Austria is no dictatorship but a fairly 
homogeneous society, without any strong, internal opposition that might have 
supported sanctions as a domestic political tactic. Austria is a developed, rich 
country. As noted above, the sanctions were ‘ordinary sanctions’ instead of the 
‘smart sanctions’ that are often seen as more successful. Expressive, moral 
sanctions tend to be less effective than instrumental sanctions focused on a specific 
problem.
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Further indication that the sanctions were ineffective is linked to the events that took 
place after they were installed. It is easy to impose powerful sanctions -  in particular 
when the sender is strong and united and the receiving country is small and weak. 
This may also entail the shifting or removing of target individuals. But this says very 
little about the moral impact of the sanctions. First of all, the sanctions failed in its first 
objective -  namely, to stop Schussel from forming a coalition with the Freedom Party. 
Previously, it was shown that a vast majority of the Austrian electorate, including no 
less than 40 per cent of Green voters, were ‘outraged’ by the sanctions. The 
electorate rallied in support of the government. While the sanctions were powerful 
technically, they were weak morally. The main benefactor of the crisis was Wolfgang 
Schussel and the People’s Party. According to Max Riedlsperger (1996b), ‘Schussel 
[came out] of this the real star. The sanctions have helped his party more than any 
other domestically.’ TV-programmes about Austrians who had suffered unjust 
treatment caused a remarkable nation-wide reaction. Even though the sanctions 
were meant for the coalition government only, Austrian citizens viewed it as anti- 
Austrian discrimination. These and other reactions in Austria seem to indicate the 
ineffectiveness of the sanctions. Austria reacted in the way described by Galtung: 
like an organism, a homogeneous entity. Austria started moving in what the EU 
viewed as the ‘wrong’ direction. The result was counter-productive.
In addition, a closer look at the downturn of the FPO electorate from 2000 onwards 
shows that the connection between the voter decline and the sanctions is 
questionable. This suspicion is strengthened by the previous literature discussion, 
according to which the united EU sanctions against Austria would clearly only serve 
to unite the Austrian population. Therefore, an alternative reason for the decline of 
the FPO electorate will be suggested.
In order to proceed, let us recall the social dynamics of right-wing populist parties as 
discussed in the previous chapters. They normally start to disintegrate once they 
must take political responsibility. This also happened to the FPO in 2000, after it had 
entered into a coalition with the OVP. The performance of the FPO representatives 
was initially marked by incompetence and confusion. After decades of opposition, 
they were unable to distinguish between economic and political realities of 
government and populist demands made from outside government. Instead, they had
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become used to adopting virtually any position imaginable in order to attract the 
maximum possible number of supporters (Luther 2005, p. 21). The confusion 
intensified after the resignation of Jorg Haider, when he turned into the most fervent 
inner critic of the party line. In so doing, he not only further sharpened the inner 
tensions of the party. He also made use of precisely the same methods he himself, 
during his period in office, had repressed. Within 12 months, half the FPO ministers 
in the coalition government had been replaced, followed by the two party secretaries 
and two general managers. In September 2002, as a result of ensuing escalating 
inner-party tensions, the party leadership, including the newly elected party leader 
Susanne Riess-Passer, was forced to step down.
Let us review the two hypotheses regarding the effect of sanctions. According to one 
hypothesis, the FPO downturn was the result of the sanctions imposed on Austria. 
This hypothesis, which contradicts the the theoretical insights about sanctions, fails 
to find empirical support in the actual Austrian reactions to the sanction pressures 
exerted by European countries. We postulate a different explanation for the FPO 
decline: that it was unable to adapt itself to the new responsibilities of having political 
power. This explanation not only has support in the literature on populist parties in 
power, but also reflects the political time line: As the FPO executed its new role as 
coalition partner, its voter support as a protest party declined. In combination, the 
theory of sanctions, the actual events in Austria, and evidence from the behavior of 
populist parties, as well as the specific evolution of the FPO all lead us to conclude 
that the sanctions were not a decisive factor in the decline of the FPO.
From a wider perspective, the theory of sanctions, and the conclusions that the 
sanctions against Austria were counterproductive, lends support to a key conclusion 
of this study: that the sudden rise of the FPO since 1986 lay not in its appeal to right- 
wing extremist ideas, but in its ability to tap into a populist, anti-elite undercurrent in 
Austrian society. Sentiments toward an inferior ‘other’ -  Jews, foreigners, refugees, 
etc. -  were of less importance in explaining the rise of the FPO than were the 
sentiments of people who felt oppressed or excluded by an arrogant and abusive 
elite, whether in the form of the coalition rule of the OVP and the SPO or, from 1994 
onwards, of the European Union in Brussels. The European effort to punish Austria 
for electing Haider led to a hardening of Austrian popular attitudes toward the EU.
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Seen from the vantage point of Brussels, the sanctions were counterproductive. As 
the literature on sanctions implies, the international critique against a particular party 
and its political views will only add fuel to the fire of extremist movements. Sanctions 
are nothing but a more systematic and coordinated continuation of a criticism 
against a nation for supporting what are regarded to be the ‘wrong’ political parties.
The sanctions were officially lifted on 14 September 2000 after the above-mentioned 
EU report had concluded that the situation in Austria concerning certain issues of 
particular concern to EU-14 on the whole was praiseworthy. Regarding the rights of 
refugees, the EU report had not ‘discovered any indications that the new Austrian 
Government has deviated from the principles followed by its predecessors’ (Ahtisaari 
et al. 2000, p. 14). With respect to immigrants, the EU report noted that the 
OVP/FPO government was restricting immigration ‘to give priority to the integration of 
the foreigners residing legally in the country’ (Ahtisaari et al. 2000, p. 16). However, 
this process was seen as a continuation of the policy of previous Austrian 
governments. It was added that ‘the policy of the Austrian Government as to 
immigration shows a commitment to common European values’ (Ahtisaari et al. 
2000, pp. 16-17). The report ‘concluded that the present Austrian Government is 
committed to continue the fight against racism, anti-Semitism, discrimination and 
xenophobia in Austria’ (Ahtisaari et al. 2000, p. 20). Regarding the wider implications 
of the sanctions, the EU report stated that the ‘measures taken by the XIV Member 
States of the EU have heightened awareness of the importance of common 
European values, not only in Austria but also in other Member States’ (Ahtisaari et al. 
2000, p. 33).
Haider and the FPO -  Manipulation, Tactics and Hidden Agendas?
Some commentators maintain that a substantial part of the party’s appeal and power 
has to do with the fact that it relies on hidden agendas and codified messages. As 
was noted in the chapter on populism, a hidden agenda is one of the core features of 
any right-wing populist party. Hence, these parties have one radical agenda for the 
insiders and another, considerably more presentable, for the outsiders, political 
opponents, journalists and so on. From this perspective, statements and articles
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addressing ‘the nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are not associated with the rule of law, the 
welfare state or liberalism, but are intimately linked to ‘exclusion’, ‘racism’ and 
‘elitism’. ‘Pluralism’ is not meant to signal diversity and multiculturalism, but carries 
clear links to a collectivist nationalism, closed borders and Volkish sovereignty; 
‘tradition’ and ‘values’ have links to imperialism and so on. This idea of a hidden 
agenda also relates to the use of ‘codified language’. Like a hidden agenda, a 
codified language speaks with two tongues. For example, the term ‘immigration’, 
means to the outsider nothing more than a conservative concern for individuals, for 
Austrians who fear unemployment, and for immigrants who might face permanent 
exclusion. To the insiders, however, ‘immigration’ sends a racist, xenophobic and, 
clearly, a right-wing extremist message.
However, how can one with any level of confidence assume that the hidden political 
motive is racism and racial superiority, when Freiheit und Verantwortung discusses 
the validity of basic concepts such as the nation or nationalism? Many within the left, 
Wolfgang Kowalsky (1992, p. 137) argues, simply regard nationalism as the twin- 
brother of fascism. Why not instead make a slightly less extreme interpretation, and 
perceive any advocacy of the nation as an expression of a conservative critique of 
globalisation and consumerism, and in defence of the state of law, the welfare state, 
and democracy? Must ‘immigration’ and ‘pluralism’ be linked to xenophobia and 
organic Volkish-ness? Why not instead see them as expressions along the lines of 
Edmund Burke, British conservative and critic of the ideas of the French Revolution, 
for whom the Enlightenment was nothing but a set of French views of no interest to 
Britain? While certain of the articles in Freiheit und Verantwortung do express 
problematic views, it is an exaggeration to depict any questioning of a generous 
immigration policy as ‘xenophobic’, ‘racist’ or otherwise ‘extreme’. Restrictions on 
immigration can be promoted by distinctly non-right-wing or non-xenophobic parties, 
as has been the case in several European countries.
Hans-Georg Betz (2000, p. 269) questions the automatic link and association of the 
FPO with racism, arguing that while voters of the FPO may be ‘strongly opposed to 
further immigration and the development of a multicultural society, this hardly 
constitutes racism.’ A critique of multiculturalism is not necessarily a sign of right- 
wing extremism. Multiculturalism can be criticized from a wide array of quite
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justifiable perspectives; such as ‘critical thinking’ (as opposed to relativism), 
universalism (as opposed to group rights), political representation by means of ideas 
(as opposed to a mythical unity by means of ‘ancestry’), egalitarianism (as opposed 
to the hierarchical implications of multiculturalism), solidarity (as opposed to the 
potentially disintegrating consequences of group rights), and also, despite 
multiculturalism’s reputation for being ‘liberal’, from the standpoint of liberalism (as 
opposed to anti-individualist and collectivist entities).71
Hans-Georg Betz (2000, p. 52) also questions how Brigitte Bailer-Galanda with any 
certainty can describe Jorg Haider as a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’, and his party as an 
‘important force in Austria’s right-wing extremist spectrum’ -  when she ‘never 
explains what exactly she means by ’’right-wing extremist”.’ Allegations of a hidden 
agenda are problematic as they are largely based on allegations. When a motive is 
‘hidden’, the critic cannot base his or her analysis on factual statements, but must 
rely on assumptions and interpretation.
Probably the most controversial campaign during Haider’s reign was the Freedom 
Party’s 1993 nation-wide call for a public referendum regarding the ‘Foreigner 
question’ by the name of Osterreich zuerst (‘Austria First’). The end of communism in 
Eastern Europe had caused an increase in immigration into Austria, and Jorg Haider 
sought to capitalise on the issue. No less than 416,000 Austrians signed a petition 
calling for a referendum -  equivalent to 7 percent of the electorate. Still, the 
campaign was widely seen as a failure, because Jorg Haider had hoped for one 
million signatures. In the analysis of Duncan Morrow (2000, p. 52), this ‘anti-foreigner 
campaign’ evoked reactionary ‘pan-German thinking’: by using ‘highly emotive 
issues’, Haider persuaded his audience to turn their backs on globalisation and the 
market, and to seek salvation in authoritarianism and reactionary views.
Critics of the FPO also argue that the racist nature of the party is incompatible with 
democracy. In other words, racism leads to the kind of dictatorship associated with 
the FPO’s relentless charges against the Austrian political elite. According to such 
critics, Jorg Haider’s vindictive tirades against the political establishment were 
essentially products of his imagination or a political tactic. Instead of demanding a
71 For a critical assessment of multiculturalism, see for example Webster (1997).
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progressive political transformation with a transition of power to the general 
electorate, Haider implicitly favours an elite that is even more aloof, less democratic 
and less egalitarian than the one which is the object of his scorn. Instead of assigning 
real and lasting power to the people, the FPO has, in the eyes of Walter Laqueur 
(1979, p. 218), created ‘the illusion of a “participatory democracy”, a euphemism for 
the manipulation of people unhappy with the political parties’ performance.’ Hans- 
Henning Scharsach argues that ‘Haider’s populist proposals of plebiscitary 
democracy pervert the very nature of this democratic instrument’ (2000b, p. 208). 
Thus, plebiscites cease to be a safety measure in the hands of the citizens against 
elitist tendencies within the political establishment. In contrast, the will of the people 
is being exploited for the benefit of disguised authoritarian agendas and a malevolent 
populist elite. From the perspective of Brigitte Bailer-Galanda (1995, p. 61), the 
FPO’s allegations against the Austrian elite were not aimed at democratic flaws 
within a political system. Instead, and in stark contrast, they were described as a 
critique of democracy as such. It was not about liberating Austria, but about 
eliminating liberal democracy. Behind the veneer of democratic concern, it is not 
about opening up but about closing down. This is particularly reflected in one of the 
key chapters in her (1995) book -  titled ’Kritik der Demokratie’ (‘a critique of 
democracy’). The electorate rushed to the Freedom Party believing that they would 
support democracy. But in fact, they contributed to its destruction. Similarly, Piero 
Ignazi, Italian expert on fascism, emphasises the importance of not getting Haider’s 
critique against ‘the establishment’ wrong. At heart, his critique ‘did not limit itself to 
the procedure and outcomes of the democratic government’, but even addressed its 
fundamentals. Hence, Ignazi argues, his ‘anti-establishment, anti-partyism, anti­
politics’ was not a plea for increased democracy but a call for its annihilation (1997, 
p. 59). Haider merely created tempting ‘illusions’ about democracy, whereby the 
electorate failed to recognise the true nature of his intentions. In fact, these critics 
argue, his perception of the electorate, if anything, was far more condescending than 
that of the bureaucrats and politicians who were the object of Haider’s venom.
Rather than arguing that voters were manipulated, Paul Hainsworth has claimed that 
wide strata of the Austrian electorate who began to side with Jorg Haider and his 
party were fully aware of the party’s scorn for democracy. Jorg Haider was not ‘able 
to reach a sympathetic audience’ by means of pretending to be mainstream. Instead,
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his ‘undisguised intention’ was to ‘restructure the political and party system and to 
move it more in the direction of’ his own ‘extreme right’ ideas (Hainsworth 2000, p. 
14). In Hainsworth’s analysis, the voters of the FPO were not weak and manipulated 
victims of classic populist demagoguery, but fully-aware extremists longing for a 
dictatorship. Hainsworth’s view is echoed by Wolfgang Purtscheller, who, in ironic 
terms, states: ‘Today, like yesterday there are no Nazis, only “the seduced ones’” 
(2000, p. 71).
For Hermann L. Gremliza democracy, while still prevailing, has been taken over by 
the Nazi FPO and Jorg Haider: The Nazis’, Gremliza claims, ‘are saving democracy, 
only to the price of transforming the democrats into Nazis’ (2000, p. 11). In other 
words, democracy no longer applies when democracy supports a Nazi movement 
such as the FPO. Gremliza’s analysis evokes strong echoes from Hitler’s seizure of 
power in 1933. Brigitte Bailer-Galanda declared that ‘the echoes of the NSDAP kept 
growing stronger’ when Jorg Haider assumed the leadership of the party in 1986 
(1995, p. 18).
For Roger Griffin the FPO merely wears a mask of modernised phraseology. Behind 
it, the party’s bon mots such as ‘liberal’, ‘progressive’, and, of course, ‘freedom’, are 
mere ‘euphemisms for ultra-right thinking’ (Griffin 1991, p. 167). In other words, the 
party successfully made use of a codified language. While attacking their political 
adversaries in the name of these benevolent phrases, their anti-liberal and anti- 
progressive content were still evident to the party’s sympathisers. Therefore, as a 
consequence of this cunning behaviour, Griffin (1991, p, 167). proposes to define the 
FPO as Crypto-fascist. In 1989 Colette Ysmal, Director for Research at the National 
Foundation of Political Science in Paris, referred to the FPO rise in fame as part of 
’the browning of Europe’ (Ysmal 1989; see also Ignazi 2003, p. 145).
Richard J. Golsan (1998, p. 5) warns that while politicians within the Freedom Party 
did come to power supported by a majority of Austrians, ‘they might not remain 
faithful to the democratic processes and practices that brought them there.’ Golsan’s 
warning is shared by Tony Judt: ‘Haider and his like’, Judt maintains, ‘may not simply 
hark back to fascism’s past, but ‘stand for something far more serious: they are the 
ghosts of Europes yet to come’ (1996, p. 25).
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The party is seen by some observers as deeply embedded in the nation’s fascist 
history. These far-rightist qualities, furthermore, meant that its voters also were 
attracted and inspired by fascist ideas. A reassessment of these views may start with 
a core aspect of the fascist explanation of the rise of the FPO, namely the line of 
continuity between the Nazi era and today. Critics who describe the FPO as fascist 
generally draw historical analogies and parallels with the pre-Second World War 
period, and their strategies for countering the party are often closely related to 
methods from the 1930s and 1940s. Wolfgang Wippermann, researcher in the field of 
fascism, claims, for instance, that the recent rise of the Freedom Party along with the 
German Die Republikaner and other neofascist movements is mainly caused by neo- 
fascist and pro-fascist sentiments among the population (Wippermann, cited in 
Kowalsky 1992, p. 23). Such critics see themes such as ‘cultural identity’ not as a 
new issue, but merely as a rephrased and updated form of racism from the period 
just before and during the Second World War (Kowalsky 1992, p. 31). Generally, this 
line of reasoning is not called into question. According to Wolfgang Kowalsky (1992, 
p. 22) the question is, however, whether the current appeal of parties such as the 
Austrian Freedom Party is the result of an unbroken fascist tradition, or whether 
instead this attraction among the electorate is caused by modern phenomena. 
Modern society, like any society, is replete with social issues and problems, and it 
might be a mistake to describe any concern with immigrants, the elite, social change 
and so on as psychological phenomena with no link to social and political realities 
(These questions will be dealt with extensively in the following chapters.) 
Researchers in the field of right-wing radicalism often, Kowalsky writes, seem to have 
forgotten about ‘the pleasure of investigations (and) the excitement over trustworthy 
collection of material....’ (1992, p. 152).
According to Willibald Holzer, Austrian expert on Historical Fascism, one of the core 
appealing features of the FPO among the Austrian electorate was its critique of 
democracy and the parliamentary establishment (Holzer, cited in Scharsach and 
Kuch 2000, p. 287). Behind the scenes, the party’s fierce rhetoric was not aimed at 
the flaws of the democratic system -  i.e. against a lack of transparency and 
accountability, but against the very foundation of democracy. These conclusions are 
not, however, shared by all commentators. According to Hans-Georg Betz, the 
radical nature of the Freedom Party’s rhetoric should not be exaggerated. Its
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message was simple and easily grasped; it rested on appealing populist impulses 
aimed at the downtrodden ordinary people and against big government. From this 
perspective, the author concludes, ‘rather than representing a danger to democracy, 
[the Freedom Party was] a promoter of greater democracy’ (Betz 2000, p. 269). 
Parties such as the FPO no longer campaign against democracy, but in favour of it; 
more specifically in favour of increased plebiscites and of a general policy more 
closely linked to practical realities and the concerns of the citizen (Kowalsky 1992, p. 
17). The aim of the party was, as maintained by the German and Austrian political 
theorists Claus Leggewie and Rudolf Burger, not to create a fascist state but merely 
‘to liberate the individual from the oppression of big government.’ These modern 
international realities will not be understood by those who instantly bring up parallels 
with a conquered fascist past (Betz and Immerfall, 1998, p. 40. See also 
Riedlsperger 1995b, p. 40).
While it is true that right-wing extremist political propaganda attacks the political 
establishment and (often) argues for ‘the will of the people’, it does not necessarily 
follow that all critique along similar lines must have the same right-wing extremist 
content. Equating anti-elitism with right-wing extremism constitutes, as maintained in 
the chapter on populism, a very useful excuse for any elitist formation. Moreover, this 
knee-jerk reaction is particularly beneficial to elites that cannot justify their views 
other than by means of emotional rhetoric and allegations; that is, right-wing 
extremist elites.
For Richard Herzinger ‘Haider is no second Hitler, and the vast majority of his 
supporters and voters are no Nazis’ (2000, p. 254). This majority has also, as 
claimed by the journalist Hans Rauscher, voted for Jorg Haider and the FPO, not 
because of his Nazi slips of the tongue, but despite them. Moreover, the party’s 
voters are more than anything else, Rauscher adds, protest voters, who rather not 
would have him as Chancellor (2000, p. 23). According to the journalist Hella Pick 
(Pick, 2000a, p. 277) at the British newspaper The Independent, this protest nature of 
the party’s voters was common knowledge in Austria. Rather then being caused by 
any particularly Austrian penchant for fascism or xenophobia, Haider’s steep 
increase in voter popularity had more in common with escalating protests against 
perceived failures by the two established parties. In this light, any explanation must
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be sought in real contemporary European trends beginning to develop in the mid- 
1980s -  such as the new levels of immigration of foreigners as labour migrants and 
refugees and the prominence of Brussels in making decisions about Austrian political 
and economic life.
The claimed historical analogy between the modern FPO and the Nazis of the 30s 
may also be questioned from another perspective. Above, Wolfgang Kowalsky 
observes that ‘cultural identity’ is not seen as new, but as thoroughly traditional. The 
legacy of the war, with its emphasis on Germanic superiority, remains inescapable. 
Still, no other reason for this fateful link is given other that the word or phrase itself -  
cultural identity. But is it not possible to charge ‘cultural identity’, like any phrase in 
the social sciences, with a different meaning? Allegations based on the implication 
that one user of a concept is identical to another user of the same concept are 
dangerously close to the (il)logic of guilt by association. As argued by the 
anthropologist Jonathan Friedman, we are here confronted with a leftist version of 
guilt by association: ‘If x writes a theoretical critique of anti-racism and this is used by 
racists, then x is also a racist’ (1999, p. 4). Or as above, if x uses ‘cultural identity’ -  
which has been used by fascists -  then x is also a fascist. The logic of guilt by 
association underpins analogies between current right-wing ideas and historical 
fascism.
These remarks on using the label ‘racist’ can apply equally to denunciations of a 
party as ‘fascist’. The question is: What does it mean to label the voters of the FPO 
as ‘fascists’? According to Walter Laqueur the concept of fascism ‘conjures up 
visions of hundreds of thousands of brown and black shirts marching in the streets of 
Europe, of civil violence and aggressive war, of terror and relentless propaganda, of 
millions of victims’ (1996, p. 7). This common image of fascism is arguably not one 
that may easily be associated with the voters of the FPO. This lack of congruence 
may offer another argument against portraying the voters of the FPO as fascist (or 
right-wing extremist). In order to qualify as fascist, a contemporary voter of the FPO 
would have to share the actions and the mindset of historical fascists. But this 
certainly does not apply to the overwhelming majority of its electorate. In this sense,
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they are not fascists, and their reasons for voting for the FPO must, it seems, lie 
elsewhere.72
The previous analysis suggests that the allegations against the FPO and its voters 
for endorsing various forms of right-wing extremist views have all shown a certain 
lack of political nuance. However, unless clear distinctions are made it becomes 
difficult to discern the difference between a conservative and a fascist. While there is 
no denying that the party may contain racist and fascist elements, the task is to 
determine whether racism, fascism or authoritarianism is the dominant ideological 
platform or social base of this party. All the data we have indicate that it is not.
The analysis of the party’s rhetoric and its party programme documents shows that, 
despite the party’s right-wing extremist reputation, the main appeal seems to lie 
elsewhere, in its populist, anti-elite message as the following chapter will explain in 
greater detail. A more nuanced interpretation of Freiheit und Verantwortung, the 
party’s yearbooks, suggests that the amount of right-wing extremist material is little 
more than 1 percent. The weight of right-wing extremism in the 1985 and 1997 party 
programmes was, moreover, less than initially assumed. Judging from the material, 
the 1997 programme did not replace liberal values with right-wing extremism, but 
with an elaborate populist agenda. Similarly, a more balanced understanding of the 
discussion of ‘racism’, ‘dictatorship’, and ‘fascism’ shows that the FPO’s views can 
very rarely be labelled as such. Criticising multiculturalism or immigration is not 
necessarily an expression of racism. The party’s attacks on the elite were not, as is 
often argued, a plea for dictatorship. Instead, it was primarily a populist defense of 
‘the people’ against a perceived, distant elite.
This is not to say that radical sentiments of Haider and/or other members of the 
Freedom Party should not be taken seriously. In fact, regardless of their practical 
importance as a boosting factor behind the electoral support of parties, these 
sentiments must always constitute a cause for concern and a call for proper political 
reaction. In the present thesis, however, the key objective is to suggest the 
paramount reason for the rise of the Freedom Party during Jorg Haider’s leadership
72 While it may be argued that refraining from labelling the FPO as a fascist party is to banalise the 
FPO, the truth is the other way around: depicting the FPO as fascist is to trivialise and banalise 
fascism.
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between 1986 and 2000, and this reason is constituted by the party’s right-wing 
populism and critique of the Austrian political elite. This will be further confirmed in 
Chapter 8, in which election results and exit polls showing people’s main reasons for 
voting for the FPO are analysed.
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Chapter 8
Analysing the Appeal of the FPO -  the Electorate
The previous chapter concluded that the role of right-wing extremism in the FPO’s 
rhetoric, publications and its programmes has commonly been overestimated and 
sometimes interpreted out of context. Instead, the analysis has shown that the party’s 
populist and anti-elitist rhetoric has been far more pronounced. This chapter will now 
assess these findings based on a careful analysis of quantitative material. It will 
present extensive statistical material such as election results and the results of exit 
polls. First, we will present the results of Austrian national elections between 1986 
and 2002 and results from elections in Carinthia, Haider’s home province. Then 
indicators of party loyalty in Austria from 1954 to 2002 will be presented, followed by 
an analysis of the socio-demographic profile of FPO voters. Subsequently, racist 
sentiments and the capacity for solidarity on the part of FPO voters will be compared 
to that of voters for other parties. Finally, factors positively affecting people to vote for 
the FPO between 1986 and 1999 will be examined using results of exit polls from 
reputable Austrian think tanks.
Election Results
In the national elections in late 1986, the FPO gained the support of 9.7 percent of 
votes cast, which was a sudden leap compared to the low figures they had had only 
a few months earlier. In Haider’s home region of Carinthia increases of 10 percent 
were registered. The party was now double the size of the Green party, representing 
the third largest grouping in Austria. The SPO and the OVP were each supported by 
more than 40 percent of voters. The FPO had taken votes from former SPO voters 
dissatisfied with what they perceived as an ossified political system, and from former 
OVP voters wishing to send a signal of protest. Another important reason for the rise 
in support in 1986 was the growing number of first-time voters. While the FPO 
previously had been associated with (the naturally shrinking electorate of) old 
German-nationals, it now appealed to the Austrian youth. Whereas a meager 5 
percent of first-time voters had chosen the party in 1983, by 1986 the figure was 14 
percent -  almost three times higher (Heinisch 2002, p. 117) (See also Table 9,
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Chapter 8, p. 173. ‘Support for the FPO by gender and age 1986-1999’). The 
overwhelming reason for this rise was Haider’s new leadership style and personality, 
while ideological factors were rather insignificant, as will be discussed later on 
(Luther 2005, p. 16). Even though the level of participation was still high -  almost 91 
percent, the percentage of party shifters had increased from 10 percent to 16 
percent. During the same period, strong party attachment had decreased from 47 
percent to 39 percent (See below: Table 7, Chapter 8, p. 171, ‘Indicators of Party 
loyalty in Austria, 1954-2002’).
Chart 1: Election Results 
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The national elections of 1990 occurred in the shadow of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. At the time, the FPO had almost doubled its electorate compared to the 1986 
election, and was supported by 16.6 percent. In the regional election in Carinthia in 
1985 the FPO had achieved no less than 29.0 percent, more than 8 percent above 
the support for the OVP. While the SPO remained strong on the national level, the 
OVP dropped by more than 9 percent to 32.1 percent of votes cast. Haider’s 
leadership style continued to appeal to first-time voters, and now the party was 
supported by 20 percent of all first-timers (Heinisch 2002, p. 117). These election
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results should, however, be seen against the background of a rather marked decline 
in election participation to 83.2 percent -  partly, one may assume, an effect of 
Haider’s agitation against the two big parties. During the same period strong party 
attachment went down from 39 percent to 34 percent, and party identification -  
historically one of Austria’s peculiarities -  dropped from 60 percent to 49 percent. 
Ideologically, the FPO was trying to fuse together different, possibly incompatible 
positions. While it sought to distance itself from the liberal position of the short-lived 
government coalition of 1983-1986, it was still trying to retain its liberal voters. Two 
years later, in 1992, Heide Schmidt, a charismatic, forceful member of the party’s 
liberal wing, was even elected Presidential candidate. The late 1980s was also a time 
of public campaigning against the Austrian elite. Two important occasions should be 
mentioned. In 1987, the FPO launched a public referendum to challenge the political 
privileges (of the SPO and the OVP), and in 1989, a similar call in favour of free 
information in the media (and against the monopoly of Austrian State Radio) was 
conducted.
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By the time of the next national elections in 1994, the FPO’s support had 
increased to 22.5 percent, narrowing the gap between themselves and the OVP 
(which had 27.7 percent). Moreover, even the SPO, previously supported by a 
solid block of voters, was suffering losses, and was now only supported by little 
more than a third of votes cast. In fact, these were their worst election results 
since 1923. In Carinthia, with a total of 33.3 percent of voters, the FPO was 
almost 10 percent above the OVP (which had 23.8 percent), and only about 4 
percent below the SPO figure (37.4 percent). These figures had been preceded 
by a quite turbulent period. In 1991, as a consequence of his infamous statement 
about the unemployment policy under National Socialism, mentioned in Chapter 
7, Haider had been forced to resign as Karntner Landeshauptmann. In 1992, 
Haider made a clear statement by selecting Andreas Molzer -  a pronounced 
German Nationalist -  as the leader of the Freiheitliches Bildungswerk (the 
political academy) within the party. The following year, 1993, Heide Schmidt and 
other key members of the party’s liberal wing left the party, and founded the 
short-lived Liberate Forum, an attempt to establish a liberal party in Austria. In 
terms of voter changes, blue-collar support was by 1994 as high as 29 percent 
nationwide, almost three times the 1986 figure, indicating a clear transformation 
of the Freedom Party’s electorate profile (See Table 8, Ch. 8, p. 173).
Table 6
ELECTION RESULTS CARINTHIA 1984 - 2009
Year SPO OVP FPO BZO Grune Lib.
Forum
KPO
1984
51.6 28.3 16.0 0.7
'
0.8
1989 46.0 21.0 29.0 1.6 - 0.6
1994 37.4 23.8 33.3 1.6 2.6 -
1999 32.9 20.7 42.1 - - 0.4
2004 38.4 11.6 42.4 6.7 - -
2009 28.7 16.8 3.8 44.9 5.1 - -
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Sources: Piringer (1998, p. 155 ft), and Khol et al (2001, p. 731 ft)
Results 20 04  and 2009: S O R A  -  Institute for Social Research and Analysis, Ogris and Hofinger, 
ww w .sora.at/de/start.asp?b=1.
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As a consequence of the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe, 
numerous immigrants and workers entered Austria, mainly from Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Moreover, Austria received a great number of refugees from 
Bosnia as a result of the war in former Yugoslavia. According to a public poll 
carried out by the Suddeutsche Zeitung (23 November, 1992), 76 percent of the 
Austrians were in favour of stopping immigration, and as many as 66 percent 
also thought that no exception should be made for political refugees (Anon.
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Suddeutsche Zeitung, 23 Nov, 1992, cited in Krah 1996, p. 225). This was part of 
the background for the 1993 Osterreich zuerst! (Austria first!), a public call 
initiated by the FPO through the issuing of twelve key statements defending the 
cultural, historical and social views of Austrians and demanding a more restrictive 
immigration policy. In 1994 Austria joined the EU. The EU rhetoric of the FPO 
gradually changed from markedly positive to negative. This was because, Flaider 
claimed, of the extent to which nation-states had been deprived of their 
sovereignty by the Maastricht Treaty. In 1993 Jorg Haider published Die Freiheit, 
die ich meine, in which he laid out numerous ideas that he soon set out to 
translate into concrete policies. In the book, Jorg Haider launched, among other 
things, the idea of the Third Republic’ [Dritte Republik].73 These as well as other 
ideas were further elaborated upon and presented in the run-up to the national 
elections the following year.
According to Table 13 in chapter 8, showing an exit poll concerned with the 
factors affecting people in voting for the FPO in 1994, 12 percent voted for the 
party because of its critical stance on immigration.74
The elections in 1995 were preceded by the resignation of the cabinet, social 
unrest in Europe and a polarised public debate about budgetary retrenchments. 
The SPO which had campaigned on stability and social justice came out as the 
real winners -  increasing their share of the vote to 38.1 percent, and leaving the 
OVP almost 10 percent behind. To Jorg Haider and the Freedomites 
(Freiheitiichen - as they labelled themselves during the mid-1990s), the election 
was seen as a relative failure as they lost 0.6 percent. In reality, however, the 
number of FPO voters had increased by some 18,000 voters, but this rise was 
overshadowed by an increasing level of political participation, and so support for 
the party ‘went down’. While there had been talks about a coalition between the 
OVP and the FPO, these hopes were shattered; mainly due to deep cleavages
73 The so-called ‘Second Republic’ has existed in Austria ever since 1945, and ‘the First Republic’ 
lasted between the end of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918 and the beginning of Austrofascism in 
1934.
74 Fessel-GfK, Exit Poll cited in Plasser and Ulram (2000, p. 229)
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between the two parties particularly regarding the EU. While the OVP was 
largely favourably inclined towards Austria’s membership in the EU, the FPO 
had become increasingly against it. On top of this, there were fears within the 
OVP about an escalating extremist agenda within the FPO.
The elections of 1999 were to mark another year of success for the FPO. In 
Carinthia, the FPO gained 42.1 percent of the electorate, more than double that 
of the OVP, and almost 10 percent more than the SPO. More important were the 
results in the national elections. One of Jorg Haider’s primary goals had always 
been to break the dual party rule of the SPO and the OVP, and transform Austria 
into a more ‘normal’ democracy. The fact that the FPO was now on a par with 
the OVP (which had 26.9 percent of the electorate) and only 6.2 percent behind 
the results for the SPO, showed that this goal had been achieved. The election 
results all pointed towards an erosion of old political structures. Overall 
participation in national elections was now not more than 80.4 percent, more 
than 10 percent down from the elections in 1986. This trend towards a less 
predictable electorate is echoed in Table 7 -  ’Indicators of party loyalty in 
Austria, 1954-2002’.
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Table 7
Indicators of Party Loyalty in Austria (all parties) 1954-2002
Y ear Party 
identify 
cation (a)
Strong
party
attachment
(b)
Core
voters
(c)
Floating
voters
(d)
Party
shifters
(e)
Party
members
(survey
data)
Party
members
(membership)
1954 7 3 71 2 7
1969 7 5 6 5 2 4 2 7
1972 61 7 6 8 2 3 2 6
1974 6 5 61 2 6
1979 6 3 5 6 6 6 16 7 2 2 2 6
1983 61 4 7 10 2 4
1986 6 0 3 9 16 2 3 2 3
1990 4 9 3 4 5 8 2 6 17 18 2 0
1994 4 4 31 19 15 17
1995 4 9 2 8 4 4 4 4 2 2
1996 4 6 31 13 16
1997 4 7 2 8 4 6 4 4
1998 51 2 5 4 3 4 5
1999 51 2 6 4 3 4 6 18 15
2000 5 2 2 9
2001 5 5 2 5 4 4 4 2 15
2002 41 5 3 2 4 15
Change -1 8 -4 6 -3 2 + 3 4 + 1 5 -9 -1 2
Notes: (a) percentage of respondents with party identification; (b) percentage of respondents who say that 
they continue to vote for their party even if they are not entirely satisfied with the party; (c) percentage of 
respondents who say that they vote for the sam e party in every election; (d) percentage of respondents who  
say that they occasionally change their voting behaviour; and (e) percentage of exit poll respondents who  
changed their voting behaviour com pared to the previous general election.
Source: FE S S EL-G fK , Representative surveys (1 954 -200 2 ), N = 1 ,000-2 ,000; cited in W olfgang Muller et al 
2004, p. 148.
Compared to figures from only a few years earlier, ‘strong party attachment’ had 
been reduced by almost half since 1983 (dropping from 47 percent to 26 
percent); ‘core voters’ now only accounted for 43 percent, as opposed to 66 
percent in 1979 -  a reduction by almost a third; and the number of ‘floating
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voters’ was almost three times the number in 1979 -  up from 16 percent to 46 
percent. As for changes in voter preferences, two trends should be noted. 
Haider’s youthful style was a stunning success; by 1990 every fifth first-time 
voter had chosen the FPO and by 1999 this figure had risen to an astonishing 38 
percent (Heinisch 2002, p. 117) (See also Tab le  9, Ch. 8, p. 173. ‘Support for 
the FPO by gender and age 1986-1999’). The other trend can be identified in 
the categories of blue-collar workers and marginalised citizens, the so-called 
‘modernisation losers’. In 1986, a mere 10 percent of blue-collar workers voted 
for the Freedom Party, and in 1999, the number was 47 percent (Plasser and 
Ulram 2000, p. 232). Hence, the SPO also had to come to terms with the fact 
that by 1999 the FPO had become the largest working class party in Austria. As 
for the category of ‘modernisation losers’, the FPO had already by 1995 a 
tendency to attract ‘unemployed women’ and ‘skilled workers performing 
unskilled labor’. See ‘Table 8. Social Demographic Profile of FPO Voters, 1986- 
1999’ (below), and ‘Modernisation Losers -  the Freedom Party compared with 
Traditional Party Preference, 1995’ (Table 1, Ch. 4, p. 66). Already by 1986 the 
FPO was attracting mainly male voters, and this did not significantly change 
between 1986 and 1999 (see below: Support for the FPO by gender and age 
1986-1999.’).
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Table 8
Socio-Demographic Profile of FPO Voters 1986 to 1999
In percentages
Election Year 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999
Education:
Compulsory education 6 14 21 18 25
T rade/Vocational/T echnical 11 19 26 27 31
Advanced-secondary/University 11 13 19 16 22
Occupation:
Farmers 5 9 15 18 19
Self-employed, professionals 15 21 30 28 33
Blue-collar workers 10 21 29 34 47
While-collar workers 13 16 22 22 22
Civil servants 9 14 14 17 20
Housewives 8 11 17 14 25
Pensioners 11 22 29 23 28
In Training/School 9 8 18 15 23
Source: Fessel-GfK, Exit Poll, in Plasser and Ulram 2000, p. 232.
Table 9
Support fo r the Freedom Party by Gender and Age 1986-1999
(percentage)
1986 1990 1994 1995 1999
Male 12 20 28 27 32
Female 7 12 17 16 21
19-29 years 12 18 25 29 35
30-44 years 11 15 22 24 29
45-59 years 6 15 22 19 21
60+ years 8 16 22 15 23
Source: Fessel-GfK, Exit Poll, in Plasser and Ulram, 2000), p. 232
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Haider’s position regarding the Austrian nation gradually evolved as Haider 
became increasingly aware that Austria as a country, despite its oddities, still 
was cherished by its citizens. Portraying Austria as a ‘political miscarriage’ 
(Ideologische Missgeburt), as Haider had done in 1988, had not only offended 
the political elite, but had also caused significant protests among his own 
sympathisers (‘ORF -  Inlandsreport 1998). Therefore, the 1997 Linz Programme 
effectively put an end to the old and romantic ideas about a unity of Austria and 
Germany, and replaced the old German patriotism with Austrian nationalism, in 
the hope that this would resonate better with the electorate. Economically Haider 
favoured a fair market economy [faire Marktwirtschaff\ -  an attempt to establish 
a distinctly nationalist middle way between a socialist welfare state and a 
potentially disintegrating free market economy. According to this middle way, the 
state should merely make sure that laws were adhered to; in terms of the 
activities of the market, the state should be absent. These ideas were laid out in 
Befreite Z u k u n ft-  Haider’s book published in 1997 but were also found in the 
Linz Programme (1997), where Faire Marktwirtschaft was the title of the 
proposed economic policy of the FPO. As a consequence of the ascendancy of 
the FPO under Haider the dual party state had, it seemed, ceased to exist. 
Negotiations between the SPO and the OVP over the formation of a government 
coalition came to a standstill, and Wolfgang Schussel, the OVP leader, finally 
accepted the offer from Jorg Haider and the FPO to become chancellor of the 
new OVP and FPO government coalition.
Public Polls -  How Different are FPO Voters?
In order for racism to be valid as a core explanatory factor for the FPO’s 
spectacular rise, it ought to be proven that racist sentiments characterise voters 
of the FPO. If not, the force of racism as a central determining motive for the 
party’s success is reduced. Earlier in this chapter a public poll was quoted which 
showed that no less than 76 percent of Austrian nationals were in favour of
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stopping immigration in 1994 (Krah 1996, p. 225). Christopher T. Husbands 
points out that FPO supporters ‘are not noticeably more xenophobic than those 
of the other major Austrian parties’ (2002, p. 48). Racist sentiments do not, in 
other words, distinguish the FPO from other parties, and the explanatory force of 
racism as a key explanation for the party’s rise in popularity must be questioned. 
Piero Ignazi, Italian expert on European fascism, claims that ‘the xenophobic 
attitudes of Freedom Party voters are not so removed from those shared by the 
average electorate ...’ (2003, p. 121). Ignazi prefers to see this particular 
situation in the wider context of Austria in its entirety: ‘The point is that Austrian 
society as a whole has quite a high level of ‘anti-immigrant sentiment’ (2003, p. 
121). As for one of the more troublesome forms of xenophobia -  anti-Semitism -  
it seems equally difficult to uphold a clear dividing line between the attitude of the 
FPO and that of the political mainstream. In an essay entitled ‘Die FPO -  ein 
Modell fur Europa’ (1989), Walter Oswalt claims that anti-Semitism is embraced 
by a majority of Austrians. Oswalt (1989, p. 78) quotes a 1987 analysis, 
according to which less than 10 percent of the population failed to exhibit any 
trace of anti-Semitism while about 25 percent stood out as strongly anti-Semitic. 
Even though there still may exist a certain difference between the FPO and other 
parties in terms of anti-Semitic sentiments, the figures are still noteworthy, and 
further question the notion that racism (in a broader context) is particular to 
voters of the FPO. It should also be added that observers often describe whole of 
Austria as racist; an idea that seems incompatible with an insistence on a deep 
chasm between a racist FPO and an innocent political mainstream. As pointed 
out by Anton Pelinka (2000), statistics also indicate that the ‘capacity for 
solidarity’ differs only marginally between voters of the FPO and the two major 
Austrian parties -  the SPO and the OVP.
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Table 10
‘Capacity fo r So lidarity ’ among Voters
SPO OVP FPO
Solidarity with refugees 69% 72% 68%
Solidarity with foreigners 36% 37% 20%
Solidarity with foreigners 
as relatives
78% 81% 70%
Source: Pelinka 2000, p. 58
While capacity for solidarity towards the category ‘refugees’ among the three 
parties was very similar, the capacity for solidarity among sympathisers with the 
FPO towards ‘foreigners as relatives’ was merely about 10 percent lower than 
that of the two other parties (Pelinka 2000, p. 58). An explanation for the rise of 
the FPO in which racism is viewed as paramount would require rather clear-cut 
differences between FPO voters and those voting for other parties with regard to 
their respective attitudes towards refugees and foreigners as relatives. However, 
the statistical differences are surprisingly small.75 It seems that on a key index of 
racist/xenophobic sentiment, FPO voters do not differ much from voters from 
other parties.
We now turn our attention to an analysis of the electorate, assessing the results 
of exit polls conducted after the four national elections of 1986, 1990, 1994 and 
1999. W hat motivated voters to support the FPO? What were the key messages 
that resonated with the general electorate?
Before seeking to answer this question, however, the coding of ‘extreme right’ 
and ‘populist’ must be explained. Motivations for voting on the FPO are divided 
into three categories; ‘right-wing populism ’, ‘right-wing extrem ism’, and ‘ideology’.
75 Of course, it should be remembered that people interviewed may not as readily display racist 
sentiments as they would in private, so that the numbers of people with positive sentiments 
towards foreigners and related categories may well be somewhat lower in reality than they seem 
based on these face-to-face interviews. On the other hand, this would probably not affect voters 
of the FPO any more than voters of the SPO or the OVP.
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‘Ideology’ as a category was being used in the exit polls studied. The word 
‘ideology’, vague as it is, will be interpreted as negatively correlated with right- 
wing populism, because ideological tensions are precisely what right-wing 
populism pretends to have overcome. The existence of ideology is therefore a 
weakening of right-wing populism.
Factors for voting on the FPO are found in tables 11-14. The following factors are 
classified as indicators of ‘right-wing populism’:
• ‘Person, image, ideas of Jorg Haider.’ (tables 11-13) This complies with 
the idea of populist charisma (See Chapter 4 on ‘Populism’).
• ‘Because of the personality of Jorg Haider.’ Complies with populist 
charisma.
• ‘Fighting corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals’ (tables 11-13). 
Populism attacks the elite for being corrupt.
• ‘Because the FPO mercilessly uncovers grievances and scandals’ (table 
14). Populism attacks the elite for engaging in serious mismanagement 
and scandals.
•  ‘To send a protest signal to the two great coalition partners’ (table 14). The 
idea of protest against the ruling elite constitutes the very core of populist 
parties.
The following factors are classified as ‘right-wing extremist’:
•  ‘Foreigners in Austria’ (table 13). This kind of statement is often seen as 
hiding right-wing extremist sentiments.
•  ‘Because the FPO is strongly against the influx of foreigners’ (table 14). 
This statement may well hide right-wing extremist views.
This classification of voter motivations contains a few borderline cases. Despite 
the fact that ‘Hope for change, breath of fresh air’ (table 11), “ ‘Sticking it” to the 
“Major Parties” (Government)’ (table 12), and ‘Because the FPO brings fresh air 
into politics and triggers changes’ (table 14) also could be labelled as right-wing
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populist factors, they have not been included in the tables. This is because 
‘change’ and ‘fresh air’ do not clearly express right-wing populist views in the 
same way as the factors included in the discussion below.
Also, even though it may be doubted whether ‘Foreigners in Austria’ and 
‘Because the FPO is strongly against the influx of foreigners’ should be labelled 
as right-wing extremist, they have been included in the tables. While this 
suggested link is not certain, it cannot be ruled out either.
Table 11
Factors fo r Voting fo r the FPO in 1986 National E lections
Person, image, ideas of Jorg Haider 54%
Hope for change, breath of fresh air 10%
Fighting corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals 9%
Ideology of FPO 8%
Source: F e s s e l-G F K  a t h ttD ://m e m b e rs .c h e llo .a t/z a D -fo rs c h u n a /2 0 2 0 0 5 0 4 .h tm I.
sring s c a n d a ls ’ 
jn s e : ‘B e c a u s e
In 1 9 8 6 , 1 9 9 0  an d  1 9 9 4 , th e  re s p o n s e  ‘F ig h tin g  co rrup tio n , p riv ileg e s , uncov< 
is c o d e d  a s  ‘an ti-e litis t. In 1 9 9 9 , a n ti-e litis m  is in d ica ted  by  th e  fo llow ing  respc 
th e  F P O  m e rc ile s s ly  u n c o v e rs  g r ie v a n c e s  a n d  s c a n d a ls ’.
Table 11 shows four of the most widely held reasons given for voting for the 
Freedom Party during the national elections of 1986. At this point, the personal 
qualities of Jorg Haider, his ‘person’, ‘image’ and ‘ideas’, constitute 
overwhelm ingly the most important reason -  being twice as important as the 
other three reasons put together. ‘Hope for change, breath of fresh air’, ‘fighting 
corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals’, and ‘ideology of FPO’ were each 
reported to be the main reason for voting for the party by about 10 percent of 
voters. It should be noted that the questions did not include any right-wing 
extremist theme. The exclusion of right wing extremist themes in the questions 
asked may indicate that at the time, right-wing extremist ideas were not 
commonly seen as being associated with people’s reasons for supporting the 
party.
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Instead, the table indicates a different key factor. In Chapter 4 on populism, it 
was noted that qualities closely tied to a particular person, so-called charismatic 
qualities, constitute an important aspect of a populist ideology. It was also argued 
that a critique of what is perceived as a corrupt elite constitutes the lowest 
common denominator in a populist ideology. In the table above, the first and third 
key factors qualify as populist factors. Together, they suggest that more than 60 
percent of the Freedom Party’s sudden popularity at the end of 1986 -  a time 
when the party had increased its share of the vote from a mere 2 percent during 
the summer of 1986 to almost 10 percent at the national elections -  rested on 
classic populist views. A populist interpretation of the general electoral base of 
the FPO in 1986 is further supported by the fact that a mere 8 percent appear to 
have chosen the FPO because of its ideology. Ideological skirmishes, it is worth 
adding, are precisely what a populist politician purports to have overcome. 
According to Thilo von Livonius, the party’s electorate rise from about 5 percent 
in 1983 to nearly 10 percent in late 1986 showed, furthermore, that Haider, in 
addition to retaining the German National camp (at the time accounting for 
around 5 percent of the electorate), had managed to attract new supporters such 
as protest voters (Livonius 2002, p. 47).
Table 12
Factors fo r Voting fo r the FPO in 1990 National E lections
Fighting corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals 27%
Person, image, ideas of Jorg Haider 23%
“Sticking it” to the “Major Parties” (Government) 11%
Ideology of FPO 9%
Source: Fessel-GFK at httD://members.chello.at/zaD-forschuna/20200504.html.
As indicated in Table 11, the personal and ‘charismatic’ qualities of Jorg Haider 
were seen as a key factor in choosing to vote for the Freedom Party by 
considerably fewer voters in 1990 (23 percent) than in 1986 (54 percent) (See 
Table 12 above). ‘Fighting corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals’, on the
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other hand, had tripled its significance as a key factor from 9 percent in 1986 to 
27 percent in 1990. A possible interpretation of this would be that a rather vague 
appreciation for Jorg Haider’s ‘ideas’ earlier on had by the 1990 election being 
replaced by a clearer appreciation for these ‘ideas’ in more concrete form, 
namely as a determined critique of the Austrian elite. As for the question whether 
right-wing extremism was an influence on people voting for the party, this failed 
to qualify as among the four most important causes.
Those voting for the party because of its right-wing tendencies are likely to fall 
within the category of ‘ideology of FPO’, representing a relatively small number of 
voters. The two most commonly held reasons for voting for the FPO, ‘fighting 
corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals’ and ‘person, image, ideas of Jorg 
Haider’ are both, as was discussed in Chapter 4 typical populist themes. Hence, 
it can be argued that 50 percent of the FPO’s voters in 1990 had a populist 
reason for their choice. This populist, unpolitical impression is further 
strengthened by the fact that only 9 percent had chosen ‘ideology of FPO’ as a 
key factor for voting on the party.76
Table 13
Factors fo r Voting fo r the FPO in 1994 National Elections
Fighting corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals 22%
Person, image, ideas of Jorg Haider 17%
Foreigners in Austria 12%
Opposition, Control of the Government 11%
Source: Fessel-GfK, Exit Poll, in Plasser and Ulram  2000, p. 229.
Two observations can be made from the comparison between the voting 
patterns in 1990 and 1994. First, the previous two key factors, ‘fighting 
corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals’ and ‘person, image, ideas of Jorg 
Haider’ have shrunk by about five percent each. Second, ‘foreigners in Austria’, 
a theme that previously had been absent from the questions, now constituted a
76 These four factors account for the answers of 71 percent of those polled.
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key factor, being cited by 12 percent of the voters of the FPO. From this, two 
main trends will be suggested. On the one hand, the two main populist factors 
above -  ‘fighting corruption, privileges, uncovering scandals’ and ‘person, 
image, ideas of Jorg Haider’ -  now make up 39 percent together. This trend is, 
however, partly countered by the fact that ‘the ideology’ -  a common 
counterweight to populism -  no longer features among the categories. In other 
words, populist factors have shrunk in importance, but so, it seems, have 
ideological causes. In case ‘foreigners in Austria’ is counted as a right-wing 
extremist factor it can be concluded that this particular factor constitutes a factor 
among a clear section of the voters of the FPO even though this section is rather 
small. The four key factors above make together up 62 percent of the total of 
factors presented. The importance of these four key factors has gone down from 
81 percent in 1986 to 71 percent in 1990, and to 62 percent in 1994. This trend 
suggests a diversification of motives for voting for the FPO from 1986 to 1994.
Table 14
Factors fo r Voting fo r the FPO in 1999 National E lections
Note: more than one answer possible
Because the FPO mercilessly uncovers grievances and 
scandals
65%
Because the FPO brings fresh air into politics and triggers 
changes
63%
Because the FPO represents my interests more than others or 
because of tradition
48%
Because the FPO is strongly against the influx of foreigners 47%
Because of the personality of Jorg Haider 40%
To send a protest signal to the two great coalition partners 36%
Source: Fessel-G FK. httD://m em bers.chello.at/zaD-forschuna/20200504.htm l.
Method: A country-wide random selection of N =2200  voters immediately after leaving polling station. 
Question: How did you vote and what was the decisive reason for it?
160 polling stations are selected randomly.
Selection process determined by a quota in terms of gender and age.
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Due to the fact that more than one answer was possible in the exit poll in 1999 
(table 14 above), a direct comparison with the results of 1986, 1990 and 1994 
cannot be made. The ranking of the different causes still gives an indication of 
key factors, in particular regarding the respective weight of populist versus right- 
wing extremist factors. The most common key factor in 1999 -  ‘Because the FPO 
mercilessly uncovers grievances and scandals’ -  is very close to the most 
common key factor in 1994 -  ‘Fighting corruption, privileges, uncovering 
scandals’. As in 1994, it constitutes the most important cause in 1999. The 
second most frequently cited factor in 1994 related to Jorg Haider’s person. This 
factor constitutes the fifth most important multifactor-cause in 1999. The sixth 
factor in the above table -  ‘To send a protest signal to the two great coalition 
partners’ -  is similar to “‘Sticking it” to the “Major Parties” (Government)’ in table 
12, ‘Factors for Voting for the FPO in 1990 National Elections’. As noted above, 
“‘Sticking it” to the “Major Parties” (Government)’ was not seen as exhibiting 
sufficiently clear references to right-wing populism to be included in this category. 
‘To send a protest signal to the two great coalition partners’, on the other hand, 
explicitly refer to ‘a protest signal’. Right-wing populist parties are essentially 
protest parties with a predominantly ‘negative’ political agenda. Therefore, the 
sixth factor in the 1999 table above - ‘To send a protest signal to the two great 
coalition partners’ is included among right-wing populist factors.
These three topics are the clearest expressions of populist reasons for voting for 
the FPO. Together they constitute 47.2 percent of this multifactor-analysis.77 If 
one takes ‘because the FPO pleads strongly against immigration’ to be a reason 
that is closely related to the topic of ‘foreigners in Austria’ from the 1994 polls, it 
can be argued that opposition to immigration and right-wing extremism as 
factors encouraging people to vote for the FPO, have increased in significance 
compared to previous years. Now, 47 percent of the voters of the FPO include
77 141/299.
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this cause as one among their key factors. As above, this amounts to 15.7 
percent of the multifactor-analysis.78
The analysis of election polls during four national elections between 1986 and 
1999 further questions the weight of right-wing extremism as a key factor behind 
the electoral appeal of the FPO. The analyses from 1986 and 1990 did not count 
right-wing extremism as one among four key factors for voting for the Freedom 
Party. In 1994, 12 percent claimed ‘foreigners in Austria’ -  purportedly a right- 
wing extremist reason -  as the key factor in their choice to vote for the Freedom 
Party. Conclusively, in a multifactor-analysis of 1999, 47 percent reported that 
the reason ‘because the FPO pleads strongly against immigration’ -  supposedly 
a right-wing extremist sentiment -  was one of the key reasons for their voting for 
the FPO. This was equivalent to 16 percent of the multifactor-analysis. While 
‘foreigners’ and ‘immigration’ were absent from the poll questions as key factors 
for voting for the FPO in 1986 and 1990, they featured as having an impact in 
1994 and in 1999. This impact was, however, rather weak in 1994, and 
moderate in 1999. In none of the elections did these themes manage to 
constitute a key factor encouraging voting for the FPO. Putting these four 
elections together, the data clearly show that the average propensity for voting 
for the FPO on the basis of its right-wing extremism (if ‘immigration’ and 
‘foreigners’ qualify as such) was quite small. Instead, the data point in another 
direction. The analysis suggested that 63 percent of key factors in voting for the 
FPO in 1986 had a populist quality, 50 percent in 1990 and 39 percent in 1994. 
Finally, the material from 1999 shows that populism constituted the dominant 
key factor in voting for the FPO. While the first, the fifth and the sixth key factor 
in this multifactor analysis clearly had a populist anti-elitist tendency, that which 
had a supposedly right-wing extremist nature ranked only fourth. These four 
statistical investigations regarding attitudes among FPO voters suggest the 
following conclusions: the vast majority of those who supported the FPO in the 
national elections between 1986 and 1999 did so because of its populist appeal.
78 47/299.
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The personal, ‘charismatic’ qualities of Jorg Haider remained an important factor 
in all four elections. Of similar importance was another basic populist feature: a  
critical stance against a perceived corrupt political elite.
The above analysis shows that to understand the appeal of the FPO we need to 
examine the real basis of support for the FPO in a specific historical conjuncture 
of the mid-1980s when two external forces, immigration and membership of the 
EU, coupled with a sense of alienation on the part of traditional working-class 
and small-town Austrians, from an urban, cosmopolitan elite who voiced support 
for multiculturalism and adherence to the Brussels agenda. The reaction to 
these various forces was a populist reaction, and the vehicle for this was the 
FPO, led by its charismatic leader, Jorg Haider. The majority of FPO’s voters 
were not ‘crypto-fascists’ as Roger Griffin has labelled them, or right-wing 
extremists, but angry voters disillusioned by policies and forces beyond their 
control (Griffin 1991, p. 167).
184
Chapter 9
The FPO’s Critique of the Elite
The reason why Austrian corporatism was such an excellent target for the FPO’s 
attacks -  and why it was so valuable in the party’s gaining voter support -  was 
that Austrian corporatism exhibited real and serious deficiencies as the 
discussion of the academic literature on Austrian corporatism in Chapter 5 has 
shown. In this chapter we will turn our attention to the FPO’s perspective on the 
dual rule of the SPO and OVP. This will confirm the observations from Chapter 8 
which showed how this critique has resonated with the party’s electorate and 
contributed largely to the party’s electoral success. An illustrative example of this 
populist critique is constituted by the FPO’s ‘Austrian declaration to the National 
election of 1994’ [Osterreichserklarung zur Nationalratswahl 1994\. In this 
declaration, almost every discussion among the twenty-three themes dealt with is 
dedicated to an explicit criticism of the failure of the dual political rule between 
the Social Democratic Party and the Conservative Party (Haider 1994).
As explained in the methodology chapter, this critique of the Austrian elite will, 
however, chiefly be considered through an examination of two books written by 
Jorg Haider -  Die Freiheit, die ich meine. Das Ende des Proporzstaates. 
Pladoyer fur die Dritte Republik (1993a); and Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links 
und rechts -  Menschliche Alternative fur eine Brucke ins neue Jahrtausend 
(2001 ).79 As will be described in detail below, these two books are very useful in 
detecting populist themes within the Freedom Party. Haider’s Die Freiheit, die ich 
meine offers, in the eyes of Livonius (2002, p. 135), perhaps the best and most 
detailed insight into Freedom Party rhetoric during the period of its opposition 
from 1991 to 1995. It is worth adding that they also represent another aspect of 
populism very well, namely the lack of a core and the ambition to cover all
79 These two texts will be referred to by the shortened titles Die Freiheit, die ich meine and 
Befreite Zukunft throughout this chapter; in citations they will be represented by the 
abbreviations DF and BZ respectively.
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political positions possible. As pointed out by Sonja Puntscher Riekmann (1999), 
in Befreite Zukunft (1997b) Haider deteriously navigates between contradictory 
positions avoiding all standpoints by which his critics could pin him down as a 
Nazi.
However, as this thesis is concerned with reasons for the rise of the party, it 
remains to be proven that these books actually had a practical impact on the 
Austrian electorate, and did not merely end up as party material for the select 
few. Two arguments support this view. First, both books caused debates, and 
were part of a general ideological discussion in Austria. Hence, they had a 
certain real impact on the general electorate. The second reason why these 
books are vital for an understanding of the reasons behind the rise in electoral 
support for the party between 1986 and 2000 is the fact that both books were 
used as a testing ground for Haider’s ideas; i.e. as links between ideology and 
practical rhetoric and party campaigns. As was shown previously, the FPO’s 
1994 call for a total break with the post-war ’Second Republic’ and the start of a 
Third Republic’ had initially been outlined in Die Freiheit, die ich meine. One of 
the key innovations in the 1997 Linz Programme -  the idea of a ‘fair market 
economy’, had also appeared in somewhat different form in Befreite Zukunft. 
Therefore, a more detailed study of these two background documents is of key 
importance for a proper understanding of the reasons behind the electoral appeal 
for the party. Moreover, this will contribute to broadening the understanding of 
the FPO as no similar study of these books has previously been made.
Haider’s Befreite Zukunft does not contain a single chapter, paragraph or title 
explicitly dedicated to the issues of Austrian corporatism (BZ, p. 5). In fact, 
Haider never made use of the term or concept ‘corporatism’, instead describing 
his topics in more critical terms, as in chapter titles such as ‘Do we deserve these 
newspapers?’, ‘How a party can get rich’, ‘ It is impossible without a middle class’, 
and ‘The socialist century is coming to an end’ (BZ, p. 5). Closer scrutiny reveals, 
however, that Haider and the FPO were obsessed with the corporatist nature of
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Austrian politics. Critical discussions of newspapers, the wealth of parties, the 
middle class and the decay of socialism -  all of these focus, more or less clearly, 
on various features of Austrian corporatism. Die Freiheit, die ich meine contains 
subtitles such as The  struggle for cultural hegemony’, The  power for political 
renewal’, and The  welfare state in the balance’ (DF, p. 7). Its all-pervasive 
character was, however, obvious in the full title of that book: The  freedom that I 
mean. The end of the proportional state. A pledge for the third republic.’80 The 
declaration is that proporz, the proportional power-sharing between the SPO and 
the OVP, must come to an end, and be replaced by ‘the Third Republic’.
An investigation into this anti-elitist critique of Austrian corporatism in these two 
key books will now be conducted. What kind of arguments are these? How are 
they interconnected? Are they geared by some common conceptual 
underpinning -  and, if so, does it have a name? Are some aspects of this anti­
elitist critique more frequently visible than others? Would this, furthermore, reveal 
anything about what kinds of ideological critique this is concerned with? These 
are some of the questions that will be dealt with below.
Studies of this kind can be systematised in different ways. In this case, a 
classification was sought that would not only make the material easier to 
understand, but also would offer additional information about the nature of the 
critique raised in Haider’s two books. The critique of corporatism has three 
aspects; a social and cultural critique, in the sense of a leftist value hegemony; 
an economic critique focusing on the socialist economic policy; and a political 
critique which is a critique of liberal democracy. While it is true that Befreite 
Zukunft was written in a somewhat less ominous tone and mainly criticised 
Austrian corporatism from an optimistic and market-oriented perspective instead 
of attacking from a defensive and sentimental point of view, the criticisms raised 
in the two books are still strikingly similar. Therefore, instead of presenting one
80 For a critique of Haider’s political ideas, see Purtscheller 1994.
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book after the other, the thematic discussion below will bring in the two books in 
a simultaneous analysis.
Critics of the FPO often tend to describe Austria as outside the framework of 
normal Western democracies; the reasons being, among others, Austria’s myth 
of being ’the first victim ’ of Adolf Hitler’s aggression, and a systematic 
unwillingness to come to terms with its war-time past. Jorg Haider also finds it 
hard to describe Austria as a normal Western democracy (DF, p. 127). His 
reasons are, however, connected to a different aspect of Austria’s past, namely 
the power of the OVP and the SPO; i.e. Austrian corporatism. According to 
Haider, the extent to which this dual elite rule has influenced the lives of ordinary 
citizens is unparalleled in Western democracies (DF, p. 126). In his view, Austria 
appears rather like a mixture of the Kremlin, the Vatican and Stalinist Albania 
(DF, p. 219).
In his attempt to portray Austrian corporatism as an absurdity within a European 
context, Haider also, in various ways, describes the system as outdated. Austrian 
corporatism reminds him of a suffocating ‘Standestaat-systerrf (the Corporate 
state in Austria 1934-38) from the inter-war period (DF, p. 200). This is a version 
of ‘political apartheid’ belonging to the past, (DF, p. 129) a ‘political apartheid’ run 
by ‘western mandarins’ who also expect gratitude from the Austrian citizen (DF, 
p. 190). The ‘Old-parties’ are depicted as ‘sickly giants’ (DF, p. 143). ‘Political- 
grannies’ soon to be found on the park bench (DF, p. 190), or even 
‘Proporzsaurs’, costly, corrupt, and inefficient political dinosaurs (DF, p. 236). 
Apart from images of autocratic regions and a system unfit for modern times, 
Haider occasionally depicts the politicians within Austrian corporatism in religious 
terms. He sees them as ‘the high priest of a purified ideology’, (DF, p. 58) and as 
‘apostles of neutrality within the ruling political class’ (DF, p. 112). Austria’s 
citizens can no longer ‘breathe freely’ under the might of these ‘dilettantes and 
ignorants’ (DF, p. 33 and p. 205). A mind-stifling consensus is reflected only in 
Orwellian new-thought and new-speak (DF, p. 198). ‘Proud and autonomous
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citizens with their heads held high’ are simply not possible where dissenting 
views might lead to unemployment, or other forms of discrimination (DF, p. 29 
and p. 71).
Social and Cultural Critique
Historically, the right is interested in issues of family and society and the left in 
the labour market. Jorg Haider’s critique of Austrian corporatism in Die Freiheit, 
die ich meine is an illustrative example. His discussion of social and cultural 
matters is substantial, while economic matters receive considerably less 
attention. Haider’s underlying theory for his critique of the system -  the 
Gramscian concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ -  whereby rule of the state is obtained 
by means of a hegemonic control over culture, also seems to support this rightist 
inclination for cultural factors.
In the eyes of Jorg Haider, the advocates of Austrian corporatism have always 
sought to obtain complete control over the minds of Austrians. In other words, 
they have aspired to cultural hegemony. All those leftist ‘battle cries’ are 
evidence of an undercurrent of cultural hegemony (DF, p. 11). Haider does not 
deny the impact of social and economic changes, but, again showing the 
importance of spiritual, cultural factors in his analysis, the true revolution has to 
be a revolution of the mind. Power is in the hands of anyone who manages to 
shape the conscience of the people. It is all about ‘cultural hegemony in our 
society’ (DF, p.73).
What, then, are the reasons for this ‘Kulturkampf -  this cultural battle and 
struggle for cultural hegemony? As maintained by Jorg Haider, it is partly the 
consequence of a void, namely the void left after the demise of socialism. For 
those ‘in charge of a bankrupt socialism’ this cultural battle for hegemony 
became a suitable instrument with which to retain power. With great skill and
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determination, they managed to gain influence in the fields of education and 
information, and eventually transform it according to their own ideological views 
(DF, p. 56). Furthermore, once cultural hegemony has been achieved, in other 
words when a certain -  decisive -  level of general influence has been obtained, 
dissenting views are either no longer possible (or no longer even intelligible), or, 
again, easily countered with the arguments of hegemonic discourse. Therefore, 
by its very nature, cultural hegemony exerts power (DF, p. 196).
What, then, should be done? According to Haider, it is a matter of an ‘ideological 
struggle’ (DF, p. 73). This ‘leftist cultural fascism’ can only be successfully 
conquered by means of a ‘cultural struggle’ where basic values are at stake (DF, 
p. 230). Different areas of society require different strategies of action. In the field 
of education, a systematic replacement of all those bodies saturated with 
ideology will eventually mark the end of leftist hegemony (DF, p. 229). On the 
whole, Haider argues in favour of increased competition within the field of 
knowledge and information (DF, p. 69). The leftist monopoly must be broken. 
This is also, as Chapter 7 has shown, part of the 1997 Linz Programme.
We may start a discussion of the issue of a leftist cultural hegemony as 
expressed in Befreite Zukunft with the question: W hat characterises a fruitful and 
productive debate? It is characterised by an open attitude where nothing is 
sacred. However, Austria is, according to Jorg Haider, very far from this ideal. 
For instance, cultural organisations, often the backbone of unbiased public 
discourse, are either in the hands of the blacks or the reds -  i.e. the OVP or the 
SPO (BZ, p. 69). The author goes even further, arguing that Austrian intellectual 
life has been ritualized by leftist hegemonic power. Anyone who fails to conform 
to these ‘politically correct’ views is guilty of ‘treason’. Who qualifies as a ‘Nazi’ is 
wholly up to the discretion of leftist hegemony. This is not only a problem in 
Austria. The whole of Europe is taken hostage by political correctness, whose 
advocates punish all deviation as ‘fascist’. This is all, he continues, a blow 
against the very spirit of the enlightenment (BZ, p. 11 and p. 243). Tax-payers’
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money is being used to silence unpleasant voices, and people no longer seem to 
care (BZ, p. 39). ‘Our time, Haider claims, is also familiar with various forms of 
political inquisition’ (BZ, p. 231). This is partly caused by the fact that the 
intellectuals -  in Austria and elsewhere -  have been bought by hegemonic power 
(BZ, p. 68). The intellectuals and artists of yesterday, who saw culture and 
civilization as one, no longer exist. As a consequence, intellectuals today have 
lost their moral authority, and are utterly marginalised (BZ, p. 70).
How, then, in the eyes of Jorg Haider, does this cultural hegemony reveal itself? 
Through an alliance between the Ministry of Culture, Federal theatres, and State 
Radio, the entire spiritual world is in the hands of a ‘leftist totalitarianism of 
culture’. Anyone who ‘fails to howl with the wolves’ does not stand a chance as 
actor, painter, or author. Artists, who side with the critics of the cultural situation 
in Austria, are automatically marginalized (DF, p. 226). In particular, Haider 
attacks the media production that, he argues, is firmly in the grip of the left (DF, 
p. 196). In this critique, the author regards the monopolies of the State Radio, 
State TV, and newspapers as particularly bothersome.
Regarding Austrian State Radio, Haider cites public polls in which just roughly 
one in three considered it to be politically independent overall. Furthermore, 53 
percent regarded it as under the control of the SPO, whereas merely 11 percent 
replied OVP to the same question (BZ, p. 64). This clear ideological tendency is 
also, according to the author, supported by the fact that numerous Social 
Democratic politicians found a safe haven in Austrian State Radio (DF, p. 59). 
Party politics dominates decision-making in Austrian Radio entirely, says Haider, 
partly as a consequence of a radio monopoly, one of the last in Europe (DF, p. 
62, p. 68 and p. 300). However, the cultural hegemony within the State Radio 
was not only aimed at retaining or widening leftist influence in Austrian society, 
but also more defensively to dissuade internal critique by means of creating and 
sustaining an atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity (DF, p. 201). Consequently,
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Haider claims, a State Radio journalist who revealed the manipulation of facts 
taking place was accused of irresponsible behavior (DF, p. 134).
Austrian TV and newspapers were no less affected by this ideological tendency. 
Anyone who controls the TV-media has a tremendously efficient instrument of 
manipulation at their disposal, and in Haider’s view, the TV-media was safely in 
the hands of the leftist elite (DF, p. 67). When the Chancellor answers a few 
embarrassingly humble questions by journalists you know that the system of stick 
and carrot works (DF. p. 143). Every year the government spends between two 
hundred and three hundred million Schilling on subsidising newspapers (about 
€15 million); and anyone who wishes to continue to receive financial support has 
to comply with the officially sanctioned ideology. ‘And they all do. Almost without 
exception’ (DF, p. 143). According to Haider’s figures, three newspapers cover 
sixty percent of the total market; supposedly the highest percentage of press 
concentration in Europe (DF, p. 60). The author is particularly upset by the fact 
that Arbeiterzeitung -  a leftist newspaper closely aligned with the SPO -  for 
many years received financial support from the state. In Haider’s view, this was 
but another example of a leftist hegemony within the field of culture and the 
media (DF, p. 60).
Haider also argues that other key Austrian institutions have been monopolised by 
the cultural hegemonic power of the left. In particular, he stresses the situation in 
the field of education: ‘What we need are well-educated children and teenagers, 
not pre-politicised ones. What we need are people open to the world, and not a 
generation who has been released into the world with their heads behind 
ideological blinkers’ (DF, p. 229). As an example of the way the students of today 
are being ‘brainwashed’ at school, Haider mentions a course held in 1993, 
entitled ‘The positive consequences of the employment policy in the Third Reich’ 
-  an ironic comment considering the strong reactions to Haider’s own statement 
in 1991, when he said that the Nazi Regime had a better employment policy than 
the Austrian labour policy at the beginning of the 1990s (DF, p. 199).
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The Viennese Documentation Archive for the Austrian Resistance, mentioned 
earlier in this thesis, is the target of another of Haider’s critiques along similar 
lines. Founded by communists, and run by the most dedicated Socialists, this 
‘so-called Documentation Archive’ has been one of the master-minds in the 
‘political inquisition of the left’. According to leftist black-and-white thinking, the 
institute has effortlessly promoted a dual world-view; either you comply whole­
heartedly with leftist thinking, or you are a rightist radical (DF, p. 244). These 
leftist institutions, in Haider’s view, not only produce heavily biased information, 
and contribute to a highly unfortunate political polarisation; they also have a 
tendency to finance political projects of a distinctly leftist-activist character. 
Rudolf Scholten, for instance, received millions of Schillings for his critical movie 
about the FPO entitled Der Wahlkampfer(DF, p. 224).
To sum up the above elements of Haider’s discussion of various forms of ‘leftist 
monopoly’ and ‘cultural hegemony’, the Austrian media does not fulfill its 
obligation to present information in an objective, reasonably unbiased manner, 
leaving the value-judgments to the citizen. In Haider’s view, the derogatory 
manner in which Austrian radio presented ‘Austria First’ (‘Osterreich zuerst), the 
campaign by the FPO about ‘the immigration problem’, is a good example of its 
‘massive manipulation’ (DF, p. 64).
Jorg Haider stresses the power of stipends as a way of reinforcing hegemonic 
power over cultural life. Unless graduates from the Film University in Vienna 
make ideologically proper decisions regarding what and what not to cover, he 
states, they will fail to gain financial support (BZ, p. 69). Therefore, they are 
forced into submission and compliance: ‘At the feet of the fundraiser the artists 
gather, licking their shoes’ (BZ, p. 74). If stipends and scholarships were to be 
replaced with ‘tax-payers’ money’ -  which is often the financial source behind 
forms of support for cultural and artistic efforts -  then Haider’s critique appears to 
be more of a general tax-reducing nature. A similar combination of cultural 
critique and tax-reduction may be recognized in the following passage: ‘By using
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targeted financial support, the state not only obtains a political instrument, but 
also a cultural monopoly, in relation to which free competition does not stand a 
chance’ (BZ, p. 74). These days, everything appears to be funded by tax money: 
‘action artists, brass bands, artists who paint and those who don’t, mountaineers, 
writers who write and those who don’t’ (BZ, p. 95). However, at the same time as 
a politically correct culture enjoys generous support, hospitals struggle to make 
ends meet (BZ, p. 68).
As for the artists, the current generation has deteriorated into submissive court- 
painters, more familiar with the corridors of state funding than with their own 
studios (BZ, p. 69). Supposedly world-famous sculptors make careers by means 
of commissions from Social Democratic politicians (BZ, p. 69). As for the art as 
such, Haider advocates the ideal of the ancient Greek artist, who sought to 
idealize nature (BZ, p. 72). Be it in the form of programmatic anti-racism or 
aesthetic sanctions of sexual child abuse, current artistic ‘provocations’ utterly fail 
to excite us, as they have long since been institutionalised and, in effect, become 
part of a leftist ‘bourgeois’ establishment (BZ, p. 73, p. 229 and p. 70).
It was previously observed how these two books by Jorg Haider were being used 
as test-balloons for ideas later to be presented to the electorate. At this point, the 
passage above clearly resonates with Kapitel XV: Weite Kultur -  Freie Kunst 
from the 1997 Linz Programme, where ‘Artists are being bullied and 
instrumentalised.’ The result has been a particular Austrian form of artistic 
production surveilled by the state [Staatskunstlertum], whereby ‘artistic freedom 
is severely restricted’ (Linz Programme 1997).
The situation in the media, Haider continues, is no less alarming. Generally, 
journalism is saturated with leftist moralism, and the authors fail to acknowledge 
that independent material requires a distance from those in power (BZ, p. 79). 
Moreover, ‘independent’ voices are being repressed (BZ, p. 80). In private, Jorg 
Haider claims, journalists even confess that any deviation from the party line
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would brand them as ‘sympathisers’ with the FPO (BZ, p. 80). In particular, the 
author deplores what he calls ‘the hysterical anti-Freedom Party cannibalism in 
the State and in the Media’ (BZ, p. 252). Austrians who desire objective 
information about their country read the foreign press, due to this leftist ‘terror of 
opinion’ (BZ, p. 81). Still, the overwhelming majority of this critique is quite 
primitive and unpersuasive (BZ, p. 81). Haider’s view on the principles by which 
the media operate is encapsulated in the following phrase: ‘more important than 
information is manipulation’ (BZ, p. 78). Unlike the broadcast media of other 
Western democracies, Austrian TV and radio are characterised by a peculiar kind 
of ‘court presentation’, programmatically uncritical and submissive towards those 
in power; and as for newspapers, they are all either in the hands of the blacks or 
the reds (BZ, pp. 79-80). Furthermore, the majority of print media is run by this 
red-and-black ‘machinery of stupidity’ (BZ, p. 80). What, then, to do? Open up 
Austrian media for a plurality of independent projects. Put an end to this 
monopoly of opinion (BZ, p. 227).
Historically, the left has fought on behalf of those outside the sphere of power, 
whereas the right and the conservatives have sided with the ruling strata and 
with ‘the elite’. In Haider’s presentation of the situation as detailed above, 
however, this scheme is being reversed; the elite is left-wing and powerful, and 
the critics of the elite are right-wing and of the people. Hence, instead of 
harboring distinctly elitist traits along the lines of conservative ideology, the FPO 
portrays itself as the guardian of the common people. In other words, the party 
highlights the chasm between conservative elitism and populist anti-elitism. Die 
Freiheit, die ich meine contains a number of passages where this conflict 
between .a downtrodden electorate and an abusive leftist elite is brought to the 
fore.81 Austrian mass media, literature, film and theatre are seen by Haider to be 
in the hands of ‘self-elected holy apostles’, who manufacture their own audience 
and dictate their views (DF, p. 22). At present, a classe politique suffers from a
81 Whereas leftist critique against those in power has often been economic by nature, the critique 
made by Jdrg Haider under consideration here is almost exclusively cultural and psychological.
195
‘pathological lack of realism’, and fails entirely to take into account the views and 
the concerns expressed by citizens. In fact, these ‘apostles’ hold ‘the wider 
audience in contempt’. And stronger still: ‘The sickly giants’ ‘keep the threatened 
dwarfs, i.e. the citizens, under control by means of psychological terror’ (DF, p. 
143). In Haider’s world-view, this ‘elitism within the left’ even suggests that an 
enthusiastic audience, if anything, is a cause for disappointment, as if 
appreciation is inevitably a sign of banality or ‘populism’. They would rather in 
their ‘elitist contempt’, stage a play without any audience whatsoever than show 
any understanding for popular desires (DF, p. 23).
An important aspect of Jorg Haider’s critique of the elitist system of Austrian 
corporatism is the various ways in which he portrays this elite as having lost 
contact with the Austrian public. In fact, this type of criticism of the supposed 
abyss between the elite and the people constitutes, as we saw in the chapter on 
populism above, one of the fundamental aspects in any populist ideology.
Generally, Jorg Haider finds evidence of this leftist elitism in a certain lack of self­
reflection seen during times when the electorate is dwindling (BZ, p. 88). This 
was also, many argue, a characteristic of the SPO and the OVP during the late 
1990s. Instead of reconsidering some of their views, these parties started 
criticising their former voters for being uninformed or having the ‘wrong’ 
mentalities. And even at times when the relation between the elite and the people 
is less tense, the electorate, Haider claims, gives the impression of being an 
obstacle to the elite’s own project (BZ, p. 91).
What were these former SPO voters that switched to the FPO called? They were, 
according to Haider, labelled the ‘losers in the process of modernisation’, ‘a 
proletariat of education’, ‘illiterates’, ‘reactionary church folk’, or part of a 
Lumpenproletariat (BZ, p. 88 and p. 252).
196
Overall Jorg Haider presents a grim picture of the social and cultural situation in 
Austria. Freedom of speech no longer exists, artists are being either silenced or 
brainwashed. Students and teenagers are forced into ideological straight-jackets. 
The entire media world is under the influence of socialist hegemony, and the 
official public sphere in Austria is more or less in the grip of a socialist monopoly. 
No aesthetic or ideological deviation is allowed, empty provocations are the 
norm, and the common person is no longer idealised but seen as a narrow­
minded right-wing voter.
Political Critique
In the coming presentation, I have separated Haider’s political critique of Austrian 
corporatism into four aspects. The first aspect -  ‘a nihilistic liberalism and a 
distorted perception of nationalism’ -  deals with what he perceives as too thin a 
version of liberalism along with an overly critical notion of the idea of nationalism. 
‘Power-greedy socialism’ argues that the elite system of Austrian corporatism by 
nature is populist, as it combines a romantic perception of communism with an 
uncritical view of capitalism and consumerism. ‘Daily encounters with the 
Austrian elite’ will bring a few more practical issues into focus; namely 
‘corruption’, ‘anonymity’, ‘uniformity’, ‘the marginalisation of dissent’, 
‘omnipotence’, and ‘incompetence’. All of these clearly express a populist critique 
against an abusive elite cut off from the people.
According to Haider, the current liberalism in Austria as advocated by the elite is 
haunted by a great number of problems; such as egotism, individuals’ 
exaggerated preoccupation with their own fortunes and their lack of connections 
with other people (DF, p. 10). A sense of Gemeinschaft is lacking. Contemporary 
political liberalism is ‘too instable, tolerant and cynical’ (DF, p. 28). When God is 
dead, everything is allowed, and anarchy and nihilism will follow. A society void 
of values in which all is allowed and nothing is seen as illegal is enabled by a
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‘pseudoliberalism’ (DF, p. 28). In the end, this ‘hedonism’ -  ‘this illusory world’ of 
‘fashion, photography and advertising, TV and travels’ -  will lead to spiritual 
bankruptcy (DF, p. 10). Furthermore, politicians who complain about social 
disintegration and shrinking solidarity have no reason to do so, because they are 
to blame for the fact that we are at present surrounded by a ‘nihilistic liberalism’ 
(DF, p. 13). At this point, Jorg Haider shows some skepticism towards the ideas 
of the Enlightenment. Although the Enlightenment indeed has its benefits, which 
‘must be saved’, we must distance ourselves from a reckless and irresponsible 
form of liberalism. And as one of the two major ideologies of the Enlightenment, 
liberalism is outdated, at least in its current form (DF, p. 9).
Jorg Haider’s own version of liberalism stresses the idea that no freedom is 
possible without responsibility. He denies that this view is anything out of the 
ordinary by citing John Stuart Mill, the famous English liberal, for whom the 
concept of liberty was balanced by an idea of responsibility (DF, p. 17). As a 
whole, under the current administration, Austrian society lacks an orientation 
towards the ‘common good’, as well as a spontaneous willingness to make 
sacrifices for it (DF, p. 21).
The idea of the common good leads to the next central aspect in Haider’s critique 
of the political perspective within Austrian Corporatism, namely what he 
perceives to be a distorted -  and far too critical -  perception of the idea of 
nationalism. Haider deplores the fact that, in his eyes, ‘nationalism’ is held 
responsible for any major social problem in Western society. In trying to discern 
the origins of nationalism’s conspicuously bad reputation, the author does not, 
along the lines of mainstream analysis, trace it to the early 20th century, but 
rather to a mistaken interpretation of a political concept. In his eyes, the current 
fate of the term nationalism does not depend on the nationalistic cataclysms 
during the First World War and Second World War but on the fact that the word 
nation for more than forty years had ‘been banned’ from the vocabulary of the left
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(DF, p. 83). Why, then, does Jorg Haider appreciate the idea of nationalism? 
Three explanations can be suggested.
The first has to do with, for want of more appropriate terms, what we may call 
‘the nature of human beings’. Everywhere, people crave a place to belong. They 
need protection and identification. Therefore, Haider denies the idea that 
nationalism and democracy are incompatible. Rather, democracy has always 
operated together with the idea of the nation as a defined geographical area 
aimed at inclusion and exclusion. In addition, the idea of national sovereignty 
expresses and recognises a pluralist world (DF, p. 80). In other words, Haider 
does not primarily see the nation and nationalism as tools in the hands of 
aggressive forces, but as defensive constructions aimed at enabling and 
preserving democracy. Therefore, (an essentially peaceful) nationalism is not to 
blame for aggressive nationalistic conflicts, which are caused by the very 
oppression of nationalism; by denying people the right to self-determination, 
down-playing the significance of a national heritage and so on (DF, p. 81). 
Hence, if the nation-state is dismantled, a common dimension of freedom will be 
lost (DF, p. 276).
The second explanation for Haider’s high esteem for the nation builds on the first. 
At this point, too, the thrust of Haider’s argument is directed against the Austrian 
ruling elite. The question is: who benefits most from a strong nation-state? While 
many would argue that the main beneficiaries are oppressive rulers, in Haider’s 
eyes the very purpose of a strong state is, on the contrary, to protect the freedom 
of those of lesser means (DF, p. 24). Haider here quotes the German radical 
political thinker Hannah Arendt. In her eyes, universalism and human rights were 
badly suited to providing citizens with any form of security and protection. 
Outside the solid boundaries of the nation-state, she argued, nothing is able to 
give the citizen proper shelter (DF, p. 258).
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The third explanation further elaborates on one of the main issues above, namely 
the idea of national sovereignty. At this point, Haider quotes Vaclav Havel, then 
President of the Czech Republic, as having stated that the idea of national 
sovereignty merely expresses cultural borders, and not ideas of dominance and 
subordination. In fact, Haider seems to argue that nationalistic forces were never 
responsible for conflicts. In his view, the war in former Yugoslavia was caused by 
‘imperialistic’ attempts by Yugoslavia to ‘abuse human nature’ (which needs 
protection within a territory) by suppressing national differences and cultural 
richness and variety (DF, p. 80).
Nationalism and liberalism were treated jointly here because the Austrian 
Freedom Party was constructed as an explicit combination of the two. Initially, in 
1955 when the party was founded, it was ‘fully agreed that neither “national” nor 
“liberal” would suffice as a conceptual definition for the future.’ Instead, rather 
than being mutually exclusive, it was argued that these two concepts 
complemented each other (Peter 1986, p. 28, cited in Livonius 2002, p. 22). This, 
in turn, goes back to the fact that the conception of liberty within the FPO was not 
based on the ideas of 1789. Instead, it was founded on the ideas generated 
during the national revolutions of 1848. Hence, the idea of freedom within the 
party was always closely tied to a national component, and invariably critical of 
the universalist ideas of the Enlightenment. The latter was a case of an 
emotionally-founded national-liberal ideology concerning the freedom of the 
German people (Krah 1996, p. 178 and p. 184). In Haider’s own words: 
‘Fundamentally, it is about the completion of the development initiated by liberals 
and national-liberals in the middle of (the 19th century)’ (DF, p. 298).
In Befreite Zukunft, Jorg Haider’s critique of what might be perceived as a 
‘nihilistic liberalism’ is mainly directed against a social policy that he sees as too 
permissive. While recognising the importance of assisting those in need -  the 
unemployed, the weak and the handicapped -  Haider still opposes ‘the 
subsidising of vandalism’, and ‘declaring criminals as mentally instable’ (BZ, p
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91). In his view, this is not a liberal perspective, because liberal values centre 
around the individual, both in terms of rights and in terms of responsibilities. On 
the other hand, he adds, freedom and self-realisation do not require a liberal and 
overly permissive drug policy (BZ, p. 91). Those who fail to acknowledge the 
importance of borders cannot make use of their freedom (BZ, p. 113). What is 
more, our entire political existence rests upon a state governed by law (BZ, p. 
105). From this angle, we reach an interpretation of the nation-state and of 
nationalism that is in direct opposition to that of his critics. For Haider the nation­
state is not a tool in the hands of the strong but is aimed precisely at protecting 
those whose position is weak (BZ, p. 172). The FPO endeavours, in Haider’s 
words, to achieve not the power of the strong, but the strength of the (legal) 
power (BZ, p. 173). On the international scene, where the balance of power 
between the two superpowers has disappeared, the defence of the nation-state 
as a frame of security and democracy seems an even more urgent task (BZ, p. 
213). From Haider’s perspective, all power comes from the people, seen as 
citizens within a given territory. T he  ruling political caste’, in contrast, has 
decided to rule by means of a power cartel, in sheer opposition to any democratic 
legitimacy (BZ, p. 233). Democratic legitimacy -  and a democratic community -  
are obtained by means of ‘Law -  Freedom -  Order’; including the right to take 
measures against disruptive anarchy as well as liberalistic discretion. For Haider, 
these three ‘wonderful pillars’ have been vital for us ever since the start of the 
Second Republic after the Second World War. In fact, they all go back further to 
the revolutions of 1848, when the idea of national identity challenged repression 
and the denial of self-determination (BZ, p. 100). Hence, far from being 
diametrically opposed, the ideas of nationalism and liberalism are, for Haider, two 
sides of the same coin. Still, he continues, our opponents have responded as 
expected, by insinuating that we do not cherish democracy and national 
sovereignty, but a far stronger and more vicious notion of nationalism; in fact 
being opponents to democracy rather than its champions (BZ, p. 86.). The 
emphasis on Gemeinschaft and the denial of a nihilistic liberalism discussed 
above recur in the 1997 Linz Programme. In ‘Kapitel III: Osterreich zuerst!’, the
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programme advocates ‘not only citizens rights’, but also duties, in particular in 
order to uphold a sense of community under the auspices of the state; and the 
concept of solidarity, analysed above, is taken up at great length in ‘Kapitel XI: 
Solidarisch und gerecht’ (Showing solidarity and justice), in the Linz Programme. 
(1997b, p. 6).
Power-greedy Socialism
What are the flaws of socialism in the eyes of the author? First, a discussion 
follows concerning the ways in which Haider accuses socialism of being more 
extreme than it purports to be, and for having failed to adapt to the requirements 
of a modern post-communist Europe. Then, an entirely different kind of critique 
will follow, whereby Haider suggests a link between socialism and consumerism.
In Haider’s eyes, the policy of Austrian corporatism is a ‘metaphysical antique 
store’, unable to offer anything but greed for power. It is nothing but ‘the 
ideological leftovers’ of an ‘outdated “new left"’ (DF, p. 56). Advocates of Austrian 
corporatism believe they have managed to erase inequality, privileges and 
nepotism. In Haider’s view, however, this is wholly false. ‘Instead of wiping out 
class society, socialism has paved the way for it’ (DF, p. 70). Either you are 
inside the boundaries of the system, and enjoy all the benefits, or you are 
excluded. Again, Austrian corporatism repeats the traditional mistakes of leftist 
egalitarianism. In theory, it is all about equality. In practice, it is all about 
inequality. Therefore, Austrian socialism is not full-blown democracy, as argued 
in a party programme by the SPO of Austria, but full-blown demagoguery (DF, p. 
52).
These allegations of being outdated and more radical than ‘socialism’ constitute 
only one form of critique by Jorg Haider. In another critique, he argues that the
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‘socialism’ of Austrian corporatism is not obsolete and too leftist, but far too 
lenient and submissive to the forces of capitalism.
Socialism, he says, has reduced us to mere factors of production and 
consumption (DF, p. 214). As a consequence, we are losing our independence 
and capacity for individual judgements. Haider wants his reader to acknowledge 
that we cannot avoid the question: ‘How thin or how thick is the protective shield 
in society against tendencies to anarchy or the dangers inherent in passive 
consumption’ (DF, p. 21)? Still, Haider does not believe that these two forms of 
supposed flaws within socialism -  firstly that it is too inflexible and outdated, 
secondly that it has surrendered to market forces -  are incompatible. Instead, he 
sees them -  totalitarian oppression and blind materialism -  as two facets of a 
deceitful socialism. Earlier, Haider claimed that any nationalist violence initially is 
caused by attacks against nationalism -  seen, notably as essentially natural and 
civilised. At this point Haider argues along similar lines. Vibrant and aggressive 
religion and nationalism are defensive reactions, and not malicious forces in their 
own right. After the joint attack discussed above, from ‘totalitarian suppression 
and consumerism devoid of meaning’, ‘religion, beliefs, history and the nation will 
announce their return. At this point we must seek to prevent an extreme swinging 
of the pendulum in the other direction’ (DF, p. 12). Socialism, in other words, may 
actually provoke a right-wing radicalisation, and this can only be countered by 
recognising people’s natural and peaceful desire for belonging, history and so on.
Certain groups within rightist thinking, conservatives and right-wing populists 
among them, occasionally criticise the left for an ostensible lack of core values. 
Such criticism is not entirely absent in Jorg Haider’s Befreite Zukunft. Hence, 
Austrian youth, Haider argues, and Austrian workers, are particularly 
unimpressed by leftist ‘hate-and-fear-campaigns’. ‘The opportunistic shifting 
between Schroder’s Neoliberalism and old-Marxist slogans of class-struggle from 
yesterday’ have failed to convince the electorate. The voters seek honest and
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solid politicians and as a consequence the FPO has become the largest working- 
class party in the country (BZ, p. 251).
Daily encounters with the Austrian elite
How, in the eyes of Jorg Haider, did the system, as it were, manifest itself on a 
daily basis? At this point, six such manifestations will be mentioned, each 
exemplifying a different general target area of Haider’s critique: corruption, 
anonymity, uniformity, the marginalisation of dissent, omnipotence, and 
incompetence.
Austrian youth holds party politics in contempt. Why is that? Because the ‘old 
parties’ and the ‘ruling classes’ are incapable of adapting to changing domestic 
and global conditions, and, above all, because the rule of the old parties is 
characterised by corruption, in the form of ‘greed, privileges, and a general 
sleaziness’ (DF, p. 205). Moreover, corruption is intimately linked to anonymity. 
‘What kind of society,’ Haider asks, ‘assigns all responsibility to the hands of 
anonymous state authorities while ignoring the freedom and respect of the 
individual’ (DF, p. 19)? Corruption and lack of transparency both require a 
political structure organised around one single voice governing from above. At 
this point, Haider announces that the FPO is not, as opposed to Austrian 
corporatism, characterised by uniformity but by pluralism. This ‘endearing 
harmony’ inside the ‘pastorate’ of the SPO and the OVP is not even in jeopardy 
when offices are being traded. Instead, in order to preserve the political balance, 
a solemn row of castling between SPO and the members of the OVP is being 
executed. It is worth noting* Haider concludes, that this is always a very quiet 
affair (DF, p. 189). In the eyes of Jorg Haider, this intimacy and sense of 
harmony within the borders of the system is only balanced by a fierce attitude 
towards dissenting voices. This means that the system never appreciates ‘brave 
citizens’, who stand up against the corruption of the system. Instead, they are
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‘cursed as traitors’ (DF, p. 134), and ‘persecuted as heretics’ (DF, p. 52). In fact, 
the left is ruthless against its opponents (DF, p. 59). What is more, the left is also 
ruthless in its relationship wire the entire electorate, should they express other 
views than those of Austrian corporatism. Jorg Haider refers to a political 
statement in relation to Maastricht, where a declaration from the two Government 
parties stated that, in case of a ‘regrettably’ necessary EU referendum, it was 
important ‘not to repeat the Danish mistake.’ ‘That is, consequently, the way 
democratic awareness looks within the ruling class!’ (DF, p. 224). Again, in the 
eyes of the FPO leader, we are confronted with a scandalous case of political 
corruption; when a referendum is termed ‘regrettable’, democracy has been 
overthrown. To sum up the observations above, Haider accuses the whole 
political system for being incompetent, made up by ‘dilettantes and ignoramuses’ 
(DF, p. 198).
Haider’s critique of the corrupt ‘Austrian elite’ reiterates an important aspect 
mentioned in the chapter on populism. One of the pillars of populism is, as will be 
remembered, the promotion of a fairly clean division between an innocent and 
homogeneous ‘people’, and a consolidated, malevolent elite. In his eyes, the 
socialist self-perception of their being in opposition to the upper echelons of 
Austria no longer applies. In fact, the real situation is the exact opposite: ‘At the 
parties of High Society, you can find the Gentlemen of Social Democracy, 
evidently in good spirits among former class enemies’ (BZ, p. 34). Today, the 
essential social dividing lines are no more of a socialist brand -  i.e. running 
between classes -  but between a ‘people’ and an elite comprised by a unity of 
industrial leaders and so-called workers’ representatives. Along this line of 
reasoning, one would conclude that workers’ representatives are corrupt.82
Corruption often leads to incompetence, and Befreite Zukunft contains a number 
of examples in which the administrators, bureaucrats and politicians within
82 From a populist perspective, Jorg Haider’s cynicism is reminiscent in this respect of Marxist 
description of a  corporatist set-up of society, where workers representatives gradually will 
succumb to the temptations from the side of the employers, and eventually abandon the workers.
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Austrian corporatism are portrayed as unfit for the task of governing. For a 
populist, it is natural not only to side with ‘the small people’ but also to defend 
‘small business’ -  corner grocers, small enterprises and others -  against the 
power and cunningness of ‘big business.’ Who pays for the incompetence and 
chaos among those state-subsidised giants? This is, according to the author, 
done by private entrepreneurs of small and modest size (BZ, p. 132). Austria, in 
comparison to other countries within the EU, has the lowest proportion of ‘high- 
tech’ companies, and the highest proportion of ‘low-tech’ ones (BZ, p.131). At 
this point, one should not forget the power of the financial institutions and the 
banks. The problem, Haider claims, is that the banks are also sheltered from 
competition, much like the low-tech companies they are financing. Hence, there 
is no independent assessment of financial proposals (BZ, p. 138). On top of this, 
a general incompetence leads to ossified regulations for conducting business, a 
bureaucratic class in sheer disarray and ‘endless delays of judicial proceedings’ 
(BZ, p. 38). The legacy of ‘close to thirty years of socialism’ is not encouraging 
(BZ, p. 138). Therefore we should stop making fun of the bureaucracy of Eastern 
Europe (BZ, p. 158). Taken all together -  an all-pervasive corruption, workers’ 
representatives who have deserted their own people, a wasteful and useless big 
business weighing heavily on the shoulders of the small merchants and private 
entrepreneurs, an ossified industrial structure and a banking system in tatters -  
all of these features of the political system have not gone unnoticed by Austrians. 
In fact, ‘optimism is hard to find. The future is dominated by a sense of 
uncertainty. Some even fear that the end is coming’ (BZ, p. 139).
Economic Critique
This overview of Jorg Haider’s critical examination of Austrian corporatism during 
the mid-1990s will end with his -  considerably less elaborate -  economic critique. 
Haider starts with the situation of ordinary people, which he depicts as quite 
desperate. Unemployment figures presented by the government are only meant
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to deceive the electorate (DF, p. 206). In fact, the level of unemployment has not 
been higher for forty years (DF, p. 241). In addition, state industry is crumbling, 
and poverty is returning to Austria (DF, p. 240). Still, these harsh circumstances 
fail to have an impact on the upper echelon of society, where managers who 
have brought state-owned industries and banks to the brink of bankruptcy can 
still keep their jobs (DF, p. 134). Meanwhile those who have to go are generously 
remunerated. One bank manager was allowed an early retirement plus almost 
ten million Schillings (DF, p. 154). This is all due, in Haider’s eyes, partly to the 
fact that an ossified, state-owned industrial sector has been kept alive through a 
structural policy of massive subsidies (DF, p. 207). Haider claims, for example, 
that 97 percent of Austria’s gas, water and electricity was produced by state- 
owned companies protected from normal competition (DF, p. 209).
According to Haider, social policy constitutes the most important cause for the 
failings of the system of Austrian corporatism. The power of the system over the 
citizen is nowhere as strong, Haider argues, as within the field of ‘social 
bureaucracy’ (DF, p. 161). The  moral decadence of the systems of social 
insurance’ (DF, p. 153) has degraded the citizens, making them the passive 
recipients of state charity (DF, p. 182). At such a time, it is particularly important 
to fight against the abuse of the social insurance system (DF, p. 159). Still, the 
financial situation of this generous social system is hopeless. It cannot be saved 
(DF, p. 240).
The final point of Haider’s economic critique of Austrian corporatism leads back 
to the moral rhetoric of populism, resting on an opposition between a righteous 
people and an exploitative elite. Haider does not portray Austria as an all-out 
economic failure after the Second World War -  since ‘hard working’ citizens have 
been compensating for the corrupt system. Haider stresses a populist dichotomy 
between a diligent and honest people and an incompetent elite: ‘That citizens 
staggering under the burden of corruption, mismanagement, and squandering of 
resources is, regrettably, intimately linked to the Austrian system’ (DF, p. 183).
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In Befreite Zukunft Haider notes a few problematic circumstances. First, during 
the last few years of the 20th century, Austria’s economic performance has 
plummeted from twelfth to number twenty-seventh strongest world-wide (BZ, p. 
120). Trade deficit is around one hundred billion Schilling, and the number of 
entrepreneurs in Switzerland is almost two hundred thousand more than the 
number in Austria (BZ, p. 204 and p. 201). Unemployment, in particular among 
the young, has reached dramatic proportions, and the quick-fix measures taken 
by the authorities are utterly futile (BZ, p. 129). On top of this, lack of demand for 
trainees reveals that there is something seriously wrong with the basic foundation 
of economic prosperity, namely the middle class (BZ, p. 159). Moreover, the 
Austrian tax quota is, he says, way above that of the OECD average (BZ, p. 
171). Moving from general observations to more practical cases, Haider returns 
to so-called ‘public housing’. Instead of benefitting the poor, or plainly adding to 
Austrian finances, taxpayers’ money disappears into the accounts of the OVP 
and the SPO. If we estimate the market value of these ‘public housing 
companies’, the reds and the blacks enjoy, he claims, the respectable sum of 
some five hundred billion Schilling (BZ, p. 96). A reminder of the shady dealings 
within the Austrian elite, a pension fund of no less than twenty four billion 
Schilling has been placed in the hands of a mere thirteen hundred staff at the 
Austrian National Bank, wholly out of reach of the public (BZ, p. 84). Without 
being able to offer a sufficient number of apprenticeships in the booming 
technological sector, some seventeen thousand functionaries tumble around and 
manage to spend close to nine billion Schillings in the playground of the 
Chambers of Commerce (BZ, p. 21).
In the present chapter, we have presented the critique against the Austrian elite 
as expressed in Jorg Haider’s Die Freiheit, die ich meine and in Befreite Zukunft. 
Both books argue at great length that Austrian corporatism was characterised by 
serious flaws. The FPO and Jorg Haider sought to liberate the electorate from an 
oppressive elite. Within the realm of culture, the left, in disarray after the collapse 
of communism, had held onto its hegemonic power by means of a cultural
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monopoly, discouraging and preventing constructive criticism, financing left-wing 
extremist newspapers and ideological theatre productions. A leftist elitism had 
supported empty provocations and held the common electorate in contempt. 
Citing liberals and republicans such as John Stuart Mill and Hannah Arendt, the 
common ‘thin’ perception of liberalism and the ‘negative stereotype’ of 
nationalism were questioned from a populist view, with the supposed aim of 
increasing political participation among the electorate. Subsequently, Jorg Haider 
depicts an opportunistic, leftist elite with the sole aim of retaining its power at all 
costs while simultaneously supporting communism and consumerism. The 
members of an ossified, greedy elite inept at dealing with the challenges of a 
modern society hide themselves behind closed doors. Political contesters, 
dissuading voices and a dissenting electorate are, however, being treated 
ruthlessly. ‘Proporz’ described the extent to which Austrian society had been 
divided between the interests of the SPO and those of the OVP. Haider’s 
economic critique addressed the hardships and unemployment experienced by 
ordinary men and women while corrupt functionaries were retiring with generous 
pension packages. State industry was disintegrating and poverty was returning.
Die Freiheit, die ich meine and Befreite Zukunft should not merely be seen as 
examples of party material of limited importance to political practicalities and to 
the core questions in the present thesis. Instead, both books constituted a testing 
ground for political proposals later to be presented to the electorate. The 1994 
call for a ‘Third Republic’ had originally been laid out in Die Freiheit, die ich 
meine. The idea of a ‘fair market economy’ -  the title of the economic policy in 
the 1997 Linz Programme had previously been thoroughly discussed in Befreite 
Zukunft. Elaborate discussions in Befreite Zukunft on the lack of artistic freedom 
in Austria later re-emerged in the Linz Programme. Similarly, the Linz 
Programme contains discussions about the need for solidarity, ideas which were 
dealt with at some length in Die Freiheit, die ich meine. Due to these parallels 
between Jorg Haider’s two books and the Freedom Party’s election campaigning, 
Die Freiheit, die ich meine and Befreite Zukunft are therefore vital for a wider
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understanding of the electoral appeal of the Freedom Party between 1986 and 
2000.
To what degree is Haider’s critique an accurate picture of the Austrian political 
system? It would be easy to dismiss Haider’s attack as simply a radical polemic, 
without any basis in empirical reality. In fact, as was described in Chapter 5, 
many elements of Haider’s critique resemble a less ideological academic 
analysis of some of the peculiarities and weaknesses of post-war Austrian 
politics. Haider’s attack to some extent overlaps with the critical scholarly picture 
previously presented. The elitist system of Austrian corporatism exhibited 
numerous defects, and Jorg Haider brought these issues to public attention, 
exaggerated them and used them to capture the attention of potential voters.
This chapter has shown that the dominant rhetoric in two of Haider’s most well- 
known books was made of an unswerving attack against the rule of the SPO and 
the OVP. In the field of culture, in politics, and in the economy, Austria was 
according to this critique seen to be under siege by ‘the big parties’. Therefore 
these two books further reinforce the main argument in the present thesis -  i.e. 
that anti-elitist rhetoric is the key reason for the rise of the FPO between 1986 
and 2000.
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion
In the introduction various newspapers commenting on Jorg Haider’s death and 
his legacy were quoted. While the majority of the clippings from Europe 
highlighted Haider’s right-wing extremist views and controversial statements, two 
major American newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, also 
stressed his and his party’s critique of the Austrian political elite as key factors 
contributing to his popularity. ‘People are fed up with the old parties that never 
live up to their promises’, he was quoted as saying in the Washington Post 
(Schudel 2008); and the New York Times maintained that Haider ‘helped (to) put 
an end to the dominance of the two biggest parties, the left-leaning Social 
Democratic Party and the conservative People’s Party’ (Kulish and Fruend 2008). 
In a similar vein, while presenting his right-wing extremist tendencies at some 
length, The Economist recognised that Austria had been ‘corruptly dominated 
since the war by “black” (conservative) and “red” (socialist) parties, allocating by 
the entrenched Proporz system all seats and posts of any consequence ...’ 
Against this, the paper continued, ‘the blue-flagged FPO (and Jorg Haider) 
offered an eruption of difference’ to the Austrian electorate (Anon. ‘Obituary: Jorg 
Haider’ 2008).
This thesis has assessed the factors behind the rise of the FPO during Jorg 
Haider’s leadership between 1986 and 2000. A thorough analysis has shown that 
the main cause for his and his party’s popularity was right-wing populism. Right- 
wing populism has often been regarded as a mere subsection within right-wing 
extremism. The paramount weight of right-wing populism in explaining the 
electoral appeal of the party is not only important as a statistical observation, but 
also because different explanations for the party’s rise call for different political 
responses.
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The conclusion will start with a synthesis of the main findings of the thesis. 
Subsequently, we will ask whether or not the events after 2000 support the main 
findings. The chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of the wider 
implications of the FPO in the European context.
Synthesis of Main Findings
Chapter 2 presented an overview of the main literature on the subject. While the 
majority of the literature on the rise of the FPO attributes the success of the party 
to its right-wing extremist tendencies, others have also stressed the importance 
of Haider’s anti-elitist rhetoric and populist appeal. While this division is a 
conscious simplification, it clearly illustrates two key lines of reasoning regarding 
the party. Those who claim that the party’s rise was caused by right-wing 
extremism rely on a variety of arguments. One is found in the origins of the FPO, 
when the party was supported by many ex-Nazis and occasionally drifted back 
into German national or even National Socialist ideas and rhetoric. Another line 
of argument scrutinises the right-wing extremist statements, campaigns, and 
actions of the party, presenting these as a central reason for the party’s rising 
electoral support. Jorg Haider’s ruthless behaviour, both within the party and in 
dealing with external critics, has further underscored a right-wing extremist 
understanding of the party’s rise. Last but not least, after 1986, the FPO 
gradually moved away from the liberal views of the early 1980s, and this 
development was interpreted as a trend towards right-wing extremism. In 2000, 
the EU sanctions against the Austrian government provided a good example of 
this international concern.
Far fewer observers have emphasised Haider’s populist tactics and appeal as 
the key to understanding the rise of the FPO. Those who have explored this 
dimension have explained the rise of the FPO after 1986 on the basis of, firstly, a 
conservative and/or right-wing populist response to modern social phenomena,
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such as globalisation, immigration, and (later on) Austria’s EU-membership; and 
secondly, and most importantly, Haider’s success in rallying the support of voters 
alienated by the dual elite role of the OVP and the SPO. The FPO’s isolationist 
and nationalist ideas, and their calls to put a halt to immigration, are not seen by 
these observers as right-wing extremist but rather as largely conservative or 
populist views. Finally, those stressing the importance of populism as cause 
argue that the systematic expulsion of liberal views and key spokespersons from 
the party from 1986 onwards revealed the increasingly populist nature of the 
party rather than mounting right-wing extremism within the party’s ranks.
Chapter 2 also showed that to date there has been no systematic analysis of the 
factors for the FPO’s electoral success looking at both quantitative material such 
as election results, exit polls and voter surveys and the party’s main documents, 
programmes and statements. All this material was presented in its socio­
economic and political context.
The present investigation offers an original and elaborate comparison between 
the two different explanations above. Key material in support of a right-wing 
extremist understanding of the rise of the FPO is brought out, and compared with 
a populist explanation for the party’s rise. The investigation has drawn on exit 
polls and other quantitative material as outlined in the previous paragraph. It has 
shown that, even though a ’national component’ was always part of the agenda 
and the successful public rhetoric during Haider’s leadership, this was still, as 
maintained by Kurt Richard Luther, ’only an aspect within a populist protest 
chiefly based on Haider as a person’ (Luther, 2005).
Chapter 3 elaborated upon the methodology used to assess the factors behind 
the rise of the party. The analysis relied on primary material in the form of party 
documents, party programmes and the party yearbooks and two key books of 
Jorg Haider -  the 1993 Die Freiheit- die ich meine. Das Ende des 
Proporzstaates. Piadoyer fur die Dritte Republik (The Freedom I mean. The end
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of the Proportional State. A Pledge for the Third Republic’) (1993a); and the 1997 
Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts -  Menschliche Alternative fur eine 
Brucke ins neue Jahrtausend, (‘Liberated future beyond left and right: A human 
alternative proposing a bridge into the new millennium’). These two books often 
provided the background to subsequent policy proposals, rhetoric and themes in 
party ‘ programmes in close contact with the voter. Further, controversial 
statements of Haider and senior party members were analysed and 
contextualised. The FPO’s annual yearbooks offered a wider picture of political 
and historical discussions among a wide spectrum of party members and 
sympathisers. In order to move closer to political practicalities the thesis also 
analysed two party programmes (from 1985 and 1997). While the 1985 Salzburg 
Programme offered an account of the party’s views at the onset of Haider’s 
leadership, the 1997 Linz Programme displayed the views of the party at the 
height of its power.
Chapter 4 -  Populism -  provided the theoretical background discussion. 
Populism, being a very loose concept, is useful in analysing right-wing parties 
because it covers a wide range of ideas and views. If the rise of a right-wing 
party can be linked to its right-wing extremism, populism can be associated with 
nationalism and exclusion, xenophobia and racism. If this party is seen as less 
extreme, populism stands for a concern of the nation state, which contributes to 
secure working conditions and the rule of law. Populism can include wholesale 
attacks on democracy and the open society, but also, more modestly, may 
involve taking a critical stance against a particular regime and its purported lack 
of openness and participation. Populism may lead to elitism, but it may also be 
anti-elitist and counter the rule of a perceived unjust minority. Also, it can be seen 
as anything from trying to lure the electorate into supporting authoritarian rule or 
tendencies, to merely trying to create a more egalitarian and participatory 
society. The concept of populism is therefore particularly well-suited to gaining a 
better understanding of the rise of parties on the right-wing fringes, regardless of
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whether populism is seen as a cover-up for right-wing extremism or fascism, or 
as an egalitarian political idea.
T he  people’ (and its opposing force, ‘the elite’) were described as representing 
the core of populism in Chapter 4. Therefore, the concept of populism is a 
valuable tool for assessing a party whose political rhetoric revolves around 
attacking the elite and idealising ‘the people’ -  the downtrodden common 
electorate, the common person, the man and woman on the street, etc. The 
chapter presented two main expressions of populism. Populism as a right-wing 
phenomenon exhibiting a wide variety of general populist features, such as 
political charisma and the reluctant politician that needs to save the nation, is 
often seen as closely associated with right-wing extremism, fascism and racism. 
However, neither political charisma nor being reluctant to assume political power 
have to be seen as inherently dangerous or right-wing extremist.
Chapter 5 turned the attention to the other side of the populist scheme: the elite. 
The chapter began with a theoretical discussion of the concept of corporatism 
and then described the evolution and salient features of Austrian corporatism. 
The elite system of the dual rule of the SPO and OVP as manifested in Austrian 
corporatism is as controversial as the FPO’s critique of it. Many of the observers 
of the FPO pay little attention to the importance of the reaction of the voters to 
the shortcomings in the Austrian corporatist system highlighted by the FPO. 
Chapter 5 therefore presented a critical overview of this system underscoring its 
corruption, nepotism and exclusionary tendencies. The evolution of the system 
was facilitated by the relative weakness of the Austrian state in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, and by the respective strength of the OVP and the SPO.
Yet behind these problematic traits, the Austrian system was very successful in 
maintaining cohesion and stability as well as in achieving economic prosperity. 
Austria’s post-war economic development was among the strongest in Europe.
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Chapter 6 presented an overview of the history of the FPO between 1949 and 
1986. In this chapter, the following points were stressed. Prior to 1986 support for 
the FPO, with the exception of a few years immediately following its initial set-up 
in 1949 (under the name Verein des Unabhangigen), was always hovering 
around the level of 6 percent of votes cast. This was, it is worth adding, not the 
result of passivity or a lack of political initiatives. Rather, the history of the FPO 
during these decades was marked by a constant ideological battle between right- 
wing extremism and reform; between, on the one hand, German nationalist, anti­
communist, elitist, fascist and outright National Socialist ideas, and, on the other 
hand, (National) liberalism, market orientation, and even attempts at ‘neo- 
liberalism’. One should also note that anti-elitism or populism did not seem to 
constitute an elaborate and dominating ideological theme prior to 1986.
Although the FPO barely managed to stay in parliament before the 1980s, it 
should be recognised that probably the weakest years in its history occurred 
between 1983 and 1986, i.e. the coalition years with the SPO. This negative 
correlation between governmental power and electoral appeal recurred follow ing. 
the onset of the governmental coalition between the FPO and the OVP in 2000. 
As was discussed in the chapter on populism, one of the salient qualities of 
populist parties is the fact that electoral support tends to diminish once 
governmental power is achieved.
As a final observation, the FPO prior to 1986 appeared to be a different party to 
Haider’s FPO. Whereas the FPO prior to Haider’s leadership had tried to develop 
a coherent world-view while oscillating between more liberal views and more 
right-wing extremist views, Haider’s party gradually shed ideological consistency 
for the benefit of a more instrumental approach, whereby maximising voter 
support and breaking the dual elite rule of the OVP and SPO became the key 
objective. Another main difference simply had to do with political strength. Prior 
to 1986, the party was very weak, and after 1986 it rapidly became very strong.
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Jorg Haider through his personal style, charisma and populist rhetoric had 
discovered a new formula for electoral success.
Chapter 7 then took a close look at a wide variety of party material: yearbooks, 
party programmes, and famous speeches and statements by Jorg Haider and 
other prominent party members. These were analysed in order to determine the 
respective weight given to right-wing extremist and populist themes. To broaden 
the picture, the EU sanctions against the Austrian government and the 
concluding ‘Report’ were also analysed.
There are plenty of statements by Haider and prominent party members that can 
be taken as clear evidence of right-wing extremist views. Once contextualised 
and scrutinised more closely, however, some of these statements seemed less 
extreme. While the shift from the 1985 Salzburg Programme to the 1997 Linz 
Programme did exhibit an increase in the rhetoric against immigration, which is 
typical of right-wing extremist parties, the majority of the material in the 1997 
party programme indicated a clear shift from (National) liberalism to anti-elitism 
and populism. Chapter 7 concluded with a discussion of the EU sanctions, which 
offered a good example of an international and well-coordinated response to 
what was feared to be escalating voter support for a right-wing extremist party in 
the middle of Europe.
While the public speeches and the rhetoric of the FPO may reveal right-wing 
extremist sentiments, many of these could also be seen to express conservative 
or populist views. There are innumerable shades on the scale from left to right, 
and these nuances should not be forgotten. A thorough analysis of the amount 
and weight of right-wing extremist material in the two party programmes as well 
as in the yearbooks showed that it was very small, and in the yearbook editions 
from 1996 onwards it appeared entirely absent.
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Chapter 8 presented a wide array of quantitative data, election results, exit polls 
and voter surveys conducted by well-established research institutes. The data 
clearly confirmed the findings of the previous chapters. Surveys demonstrated 
that FPO voters are only marginally more susceptible to right-wing extremist 
rhetoric, anti-Semitic views and capacity for solidarity with foreigners, than voters 
of other parties. Moreover, a number of consecutive exit poll surveys showed that 
reasons that may be classed as associated with right-wing extremism remained 
of moderate importance to the rise of the FPO during Jorg Haider’s leadership. 
This is not to say that right-wing extremist views should be underestimated and 
neglected. The FPO was always a safe haven for racists, fascists, ultra­
nationalists and National Socialists, and their presence must always be taken 
seriously. Yet right-wing extremism on its own fails to explain the phenomenal 
rise of the FPO. The data clearly shows that the most important reason for the 
strong increase in voter support for the FPO under Haider was his appeal to 
typically anti-elitist themes -  such as fighting corruption and uncovering 
scandals.
Jorg Haider’s two books, Die Freiheit, die ich meine and Befreite Zukunft focus 
on anti-elitist themes as Chapter 9 expounded in some detail. The themes of 
these two books, their cultural, political and economic critiques of Austrian 
corporatism feature prominently in the party rhetoric, programmes and political 
statements and campaigns. Die Freiheit, die ich meine, published in 1993, offers 
a good insight into the political platform of the FPO at a time when liberal views 
and sympathisers were on their way out. Befreite Zukunft was published in 1997 
at the height of FPO power and influence. This was also the year when the 
’liberal’ Salzburg Programme from 1985 was replaced by the Linz Programme, 
from which references to liberalism had disappeared. Judging from the 1997 
Befreite Zukunft, however, the perspective from which liberalism is criticised is 
not that of right-wing extremism, but that of a systematic and thorough anti­
elitism and populism, spiced up with repeated references to neo-liberalism and 
calls for deregulation. Save for the lack of themes in defence of deregulation and
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the weak state, Die Freiheit, die ich meine displays a very similar outlook. The 
main message of Die Freiheit, die ich meine and Befreite Zukunft takes the form 
of a rather stereotypical and emotional critique of the failure of the ‘big parties’, 
and a strong statement of the urgent need for political change.
What About the Events since 2000?
The introduction discussed the reasons why the period of Jorg Haider’s 
leadership between 1986 and 2000 made this an interesting period to study in 
the history of a controversial European political party. A decade has now passed 
since the OVP, in late 1999, entered into a government coalition with the FPO. 
What has happened to the FPO since then? Do the developments since 2000 
support the findings of this thesis?
Chapter 4 demonstrated that populist parties, once in power and part of the 
governmental elite, typically face the dilemma of either having to shed their 
populist and anti-elitist rhetoric or to join the opposition again in order to remain 
faithful to their populist stance. In this context it is notable that the rise of the 
party started once the coalition with the SPO had come to a sudden halt in late 
1986: this further supports the paradoxical link between being in opposition and 
having electoral appeal for parties with a populist stance.
The initial period of the government coalition between the FPO and the OVP 
corresponded with the EU-sanctions. On 1 May 2000, not long after the 
sanctions were imposed, the FPO responded to the pressure with a substantial 
move: Jorg Haider resigned as a leader of the party and was replaced by 
Susanne Riess-Passer. The subsequent disarray characterizing the performance 
of the FPO as a coalition partner offers a good illustration of what generally 
happens to a right-wing populist party that achieves voter success. This 
incompetence was chiefly caused by long periods of comfortable opposition,
219
whereby the party gradually had forgotten how to discern between vote catching 
tactics and political and economic realities. As a rule, this inner confusion in 
political power leads to escalating tensions, followed by a complete 
disintegration. Within a year, half the FPO ministers had been forced to step 
down; only to be followed by the party secretaries and two general managers. 
Shortly thereafter, in September 2002, as a consequence of accelerating 
conflicts within the FPO, the party leadership along with the newly elected party 
leader Susanne Riess-Passer were forced to resign.
From its peak in the 1999 national elections, when the FPO was on a par with the 
OVP with 26.9 percent of the vote, its support plummeted to 10 percent during 
the next election in 2002, a loss of more than 3 out of 5 voters.
The tensions within the FPO finally resulted in a sudden rift when Jorg Haider 
unexpectedly launched a political competitor by the name of Bundnis Zukunft 
Osterreich (Union for the future of Austria) (BZO) on 4 April 2005. The split had 
drastic repercussions, as suddenly the FPO was left without its most prominent 
leader and had also lost other leading figures at the national and provincial level.
Apart from Haider’s personal ambitions, the ideological motives for the split 
remain unclear. The respective party programmes are very similar. The Party 
Programme of BZO -  ‘Goals, ideas and visions’ contains, for instance, a populist, 
all-embracing agenda that is reminiscent of the FPO. While the party programme 
attacks ‘the destructive power of globalisation’, it also sees ‘the introduction of a 
(neo-liberal and regressive) flat tax’ as ‘a goal and an answer’, and demands that 
the tax system be remade along the lines of a ‘slender, but strong state.’ The 
‘social market economy’ proposed by the BZO appears identical to the ‘fair 
market economy’ of the FPO, while the BZO’s call for ‘strong control over 
immigration’ also mirrors the stance of the FPO (BZO n.d., ’Programm: Ziele, 
Ideen und Visionen’).
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Subsequent to 2000 the FPO faced consequences that are predicted to happen 
to right-wing populist parties once in power. In fact, the fate of the FPO, from the 
moment of governmental co-rule onwards, is a text-book case of the destiny 
awaiting successful right-wing populist parties.
In addition to these examples dealing with what seems to be the inevitable ‘fate’ 
of right-wing populist parties, the FPO also exhibited other traits that clearly point 
in the direction of right-wing populism. Right-wing populist parties are likely to 
respond to criticism in a heavy-handed manner -  often by making extensive use 
of the law. They are also prone to going to some lengths to boost theiir chances 
during an election and, if possible, to taint the reputation of political rivals. On 29 
February, 2000, Dieter Bohmdorfer was elected as FPO Minister of Justice. In his 
previous role as Haider’s personal attorney, Bohmdorfer had made extensive use 
of the defamation clause as a means of silencing critics of Jorg Haider and the 
FPO. Bohmdorfer was personally responsible during the so-called Spitzelaffare 
or the ’police informant scandal’, in which numerous FPO politicians; including 
Jorg Haider were involved in illegally retrieving police data abo>ut Social 
Democrats and other critics. Even though the investigation was called o ff for lack 
of evidence, Bdhmdorfer was left under a cloud of suspicion for statimg that his 
friend Haider was ‘above all suspicion’ even before the investigation had started 
(Gordon 2001, p. 399).
The results of the 2008 national elections were even more startling thatn those of 
1999. While in 1999 the FPO under Jorg Haider gained 26.9 percent, with more 
votes than the OVP (also on 26.9 percent) but coming a clear second t<o the SPO 
(with 33.1 percent), in 2008 the FPO and the BZO together achieved a  stunning 
28.2 percent. The FPO reached 17.5 percent and the BZO, participating in a 
national election for the first time, a remarkable 10.7 percent. Suppart for the 
OVP had plummeted to a mere 26 percent, beneath its previous record low from 
1999 (26.9 percent), and had by now clearly been overtaken by suppart for the 
two right-wing parties. The Social Democrats’ share of the vote had dro/pped by 6
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percent to 29.3 percent, significantly lower than its previous low in 1999. Hence, 
the right-wing force in Austria, seen as an (imagined) united force of the FPO and 
the BZO was, at the time of Haider’s death, only a modest 1.1 percent away from 
becoming the largest political force in Austria.
Shortly after the death of Jorg Haider, there were doubts about the future of BZO. 
In the 2009 local elections in Carinthia, however, the party was supported by no 
less than 44.9 per cent of votes cast, practically the sum total of the shares of the 
SPO (28.7 per cent), and the OVP (16.8 per cent). There has also been 
speculation about a pending merger between FPO and BZO. Already before the 
National elections in October 2008 and Haider’s sudden demise, Ewald Stadler, 
who had moved from the FPO to the BZO, announced: ‘We, including Jorg 
Haider, want a cooperation or union between the FPO and the BZO ...’ (Stadler 
2008). It is, however, too early to tell whether the lasting vigour of the BZO will 
increase the chances of unity between the two parties, or whether the BZO will 
remain a right-wing populist force in its own right.
Right-wing Extremism and Populism and Its Wider Implications
In the recent EU election, a number of right-wing, nationalist parties managed to 
gain seats in the parliament. The above mentioned Hungarian Jobbik 
Magyarorszagert Mozgaiom, (Movement for a Better Hungary), or Jobbik for 
short, went from non-existence to 14.7 percent and became the third largest 
party in parliament. According to its party programme, Jobbik wants to 
nationalise foreign banks, cancel all payments to the IMF and fight ‘gypsy 
criminality’. In Bulgaria, ATAKA (meaning ‘attack’ in Bulgarian) -  widely seen as 
EU-hostile, racist and anti-Semitic -  gained 11.3 per cent.83 In Slovakia, 
Slovenska narodna strana (SNS), (Slovak National Party) labeled racist, entered 
the European parliament, and the Rumanian Partidul Romania Mare (PRM) (The
83 ATAKA stands for a parliamentary community of Bulgarian nationalist organisations.
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Greater Romania Party), advocating a greater Rumania, achieved 7.2 percent. In 
the Netherlands, Geerd W ilders’ Freedom Party -  accused of Islamophobia -  
became the second largest party with 17 percent. The British National Party 
running on a clearly racist and ultra-nationalist platform gained two seats in the 
European Parliament.84
The success of these right-wing fringe parties is a reason for concern. The 
programmes of many of these parties is often much more racist, anti­
establishment, anti-Brussels, anti-IMF, etc. than the FPO ever was. Some 
observers have called for decisive action to counter this menace (Traynor 2009). 
As the present thesis has shown, it is important to understand the real 
motivations and factors behind the voters’ attraction to these parties. Are they 
attracted by the right-wing extremist and vibrant ultra-nationalist views, or are 
they predominantly protest voters, lured by anti-elitist rhetoric? Of course, no 
general answer is possible. As for the BNP or the Hungarian Jobbik, the voters 
are probably predominantly right-wing extremists fuelled by the current economic 
crisis and massive job losses. To counter these political forces and to combat 
this menace it is important to be clear about why voters flock to support them in 
such large and worrying proportions.
A Final Note
This thesis has presented an explanation for the rise of the FPO during Jorg 
Haider’s leadership. The most common explanation, right-wing extremism, failed 
to qualify as the main reason. A variety of quantitative data from different voter 
surveys and election polls pointed in another direction. The party’s increasing 
support among voters was mainly caused by its critique of the Austrian elite. This 
conclusion was underscored by different qualitative material. The system of 
Austrian corporatism started to crumble in the mid-1980s, virtually at the same
84 (www.bnp.org/uk/policies/immigration)
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moment as Jorg Haider was elected party leader of the FPO, and ended when 
the FPO rose above the OVP and became the second largest political party at 
the national level. Contrary to the expectations of its critics, the FPO, once in 
power, did not seize the opportunity and create an authoritarian rule, but 
immediately started to disintegrate, resulting in a sharp decline in voter support 
and an eventual split between the FPO and the BZO. This vigour in opposition 
and haplessness when in power is typical populist party behavior. From the mid- 
1980s, it is increasingly hard to measure the FPO with any ideological yardstick. 
Instead, in classic populist fashion, it kept moving from one position to another, 
trying to appeal to the entire electorate.
The reason why Haider’s FPO became such a central political player in Austria 
was that his anti-elitism struck a chord among the common electorate. From the 
distance, this looks like nothing but a political change among voters. Instead of 
simply criticising Haider and labelling his voters as right-wing extremists, his 
political opponents should perhaps have tried to understand and investigate why 
he was so successful in attracting such a large share of protest voters, and why 
their own efforts in countering the FPO only seemed to bring fuel to Haider’s fire. 
Haider exposed many shortcomings of the preceding system and managed to 
break the dual monopoly of the OVP and SPO. Even though Haider’s motives 
were always somewhat murky, his efforts were still technically liberating, 
because he contributed to Austria becoming a more pluralistic, mature 
democracy.
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Annex 1. National and Local Election Results since 1945 
2. EU-elections in Austria 1996-2009
1.
Table A1
Election Results -  Nationalratswahlen since 1945
Percentage of total number of voters. Number of mandates in Nationalrat in brackets (...)
Year SPO OVP FPO BZO Grune LIF KPO Government 
(Head of Government)
1945 44.6 49.8 - - - - 5.4 OVP/SPO/KPO
(76) (85) (4) (Figl, OVP)
1949 38.7 44.0 11.7 - - - 5.1 OVP/SPO
(67) (77) (16) (VdU) (5) Figl, OVP)
1953 42.1 41.3 10.9 - - - 5.3 OVP/SPO
(73) (74) (14) (VdU) (4) (Raab, OVP)
1956 43.0 46.0 6.5 - - - 4.4 OVP/SPO
(74) (82) (6) (3) (Raab, OVP)
1959 44.8 44.2 7.7 - - - 3.3 OVP/SPO
(78) (79) (8) (0) (Raab, (Gorbach. OVP)
1962 44.0 45.4 7.0 - - - 3.0 OVP/SPO
(76) (81) (8) (0) (Gorbach, (Klaus, OVP)
1966 42.6 48.3 5.4 - - - 0.4 OVP
(74) (85) (6) (0) (Klaus)
1970 48.4 44.7 5.6 - - - 1.0 SPO (Min.gov.)
(81) (78) (6) (0) (Kreisky, SPO)
1971 50.0 43.1 5.4 - - - 0.4 SPO
(93) (80) (10) (0) (Kreisky, SPO)
1975 51.0 43.0 5.4 - - - 1.2 SPO
(93) (80) (10) (0) (Kreisky, SPO)
1979 51.0 42.0 6.1 - - - 1.0 SPO
(95) (77) (11) (0) (Kreisky, SPO)
1983 47.6 43.2 5.0 - - - 0.7 SPO/FPO
(90) (81) (12) (0) (Kreisky, SPO)
1986 43.1 41.3 9.7 - 4.8 - 0.7 OVP/SPO
(80) (77) (18) ((8) (0) (Vranitsky, SPO)
1990 43.0 32.1 16.6 - 4.8 - 0.5 OVP/SPO
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(80) (60) (33) (10) (0) (Vranitsky, SPO)
1994 34.9 27.7 22.5 - 7.3 5.9 0.3 OVP/SPO
(65) (52) (42) (13) (11) (0) (Vranitsky, SPO)
1995 38.1 28.3 21.9 - 4.8 5.5 0.3 OVP/SPO
(71) (53) (40) (9) (10) (0) (Vranitsky, Klima, SPO)
1999 33.1 26.9 26.9 - 7.4 3.7 - OVP/FPO (Schussel, OVP)
(65) (52) (52) (14) (0)
2002 36.5 42.3 10.0 - 9.5 1.0 0.7 OVP/FPO (2003)
(69) (79) (18) (17) (0) (Others) (Schussel, OVP)
2006 35.3 34.3 11.0 (21) 4.1 11.0 - - SPO/OVP
(68) (66) (7) (21) (Gusenbauer, SPO)
2008 29.7
(57)
26.0
(51)
17.5 (34) 10.7 (21) 10.4
(20)
SPO/OVP 
(Faymann, SPO)
Source: Piringer 1998, p. 174, and Khol et al 2001, p. 731 ff.
Information about election results 2002-2008: Bundesministerium fur Inneres, www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi_wahlen
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Table A2
Election Results -  Nationalratswahlen since 1945 -  Number of Votes
Year SPO OVP FPO BZO Grune LIF KPO Election 
Partici­
pation (%)
1945 1 434 898 1 602 227 - - - 174 257 94.3
1949 1 623 524 1 846 581 489 273 - - 213 066 96.8
1953 1 818517 1 781 777 472 866 - - 228 159 95.8
1956 1 873 295 1 999 986 283 749 - - 192 483 96.0
1959 1 953 935 1 928 043 336 110 - - 142 578 94.2
1962 1 960 685 2 024 501 313 895 - - 135 520 93.8
1966 1 928 985 2191 109 242 570 - - 18 636 93.8
1970 2 221 981 2 051 012 253 425 - - 44 750 92.7
1971 2 280 268 1 964 935 248 473 - - 61 762 92.4
1975 2 324 309 1 980 379 249 317 - - 54 971 92.9
1979 2 412 778 1 981 286 286 644 - - 45 270 92.2
1983 2 312 529 2 098 808 241 789 - - 31 912 92.6
1986 2 092 024 2 003 663 472 205 234 028 - 35 104 90.7
1990 1 965 032 1 460 392 754 379 225 084 - 25 682 83.2
1994 1 617 804 1 281 846 1 042 332 338 538 276 580 11 919 81.9
1995 1 843 474 1 370 510 1 060 337 232 208 267 025 13 938 86.0
1999 1 532 448 1 243 672 1 244 087 - 342 260 168 612 - 80.4
2006 1 663 986 1 616 493 519 598 193 539 520 130 - - 78.5
2008 1 430 206 1 269 656 857 029 522 933 509 936 - - 78.8
Information about election results 1999: Bunc 
www.bmi.av.at/cms/BMI wahlen/nationalrat/NRW 1999.asDX
Jesministerium fur Inneres,
Information about election results 2006: 
www.bmi.av.at/cms/BMI wahlen/nationalrat/NRW 2006.asDx
Information about election results 2008: 
www.bmi.av.at/cms/BMI wahlen/nationalrat/NRW 2008.asDx
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Table A3
Local Election Results since 194 5 - Burgenland
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Year SPO OVP FPO Griine LIF KPO
1945 44.9 (14) 51.8(17) - - - 3.3(1)
1949 40.4(13) 52.6(18) 3-9 (1) 
(VdU)
2.9 (0)
1953 44.8(14) 48.4(16) 3.6 (1) 
(VdU)
3.2(1)
1956 46.0 (15) 49.2 (16) 2.9 (1) - - 1.9 (0)
1960 46.2(15) 48.1 (15) 4.6 (1) - - 1.1 (0)
1964 48.2(16) 47.3(15) 3-6 (1) - - 0.9 (0)
1968 50.0(17) 46.6(15) 2.2 (0) - - 0.5 (0)
1972 50.5(16) 45.9(16) 3-0 (1) - - 0.5 (0)
1977 51.9 (20) 45.1 (16) 2.3 (0) - - 0.4 (0)
1982 53.2 (20) 43.0(16) 3.0 (0) - - 0.5 (0)
1987 47.3(17) 41.5(16) 7.3 (3) - - 0.5 (0)
1991 48.2 (17) 38.2 (15) 9.7(4)
1996 44.5(17) 36.0(14) 14.6 (5) 2.5 (0) 1.4 (0) -
2000 46.6(17) 35.3(13) 12.7(4) 5.5 (2) (0) -
2005 52.2(19) 36.4(13) 5.8 (2) 5.2 (2) (0) -
2010 48.3(18) 34.6(13) 9.0 (3) 4.2(1) (0) -
Piringer 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al., 2001, p. 731 ff.
Information about election results 2000: SORA -  Institute for social research and analysis, 
www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b=25
Information about election results 2005 and 2010: Landtagswahl 2005 und 2010, Land Burgenland, 
Bundesministerium fur Inneres, 
wahlen.bgld.gv.at/wahlen/landtag/Wahlerbegnisse/WahlenAuswahl.asp Date of access: July 12, 2010
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Table A4
Local E lection  R esults  s in ce  1945 -  C arin th ia
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Y ear S P O O V P FPO B ZO G rune LIF K PO
1945 48.8(18) 39.8(14) - - - 8.1 (1)
1949 40.7(15) 31.9(12) 20.5 (8) 
(VdU)
4.0(1)
1953 48.2(18) 28.5(11) 16.9 (6) 
(VdU)
4.1 (1)
1956 48.1 (18) 32.7(12) 15.7 (5) - - 3.1 (0)
1960 48.5(18) 33.3(12) 14.9 (5) - - 3 .0(1)
1965 49.3(18) 32.9 (12) 13.4 (5) - - 2 .8(1)
1970 53.1 (20) 32.5(12) 12.1 (4) - - 2.3 (0)
1975 51.4 (20) 32.4 (12) 11.8 (4) - - 2.0 (0)
1979 54.0 (20) 31.9 (12) 11.7 (4) - - 1.0 (0)
1984 51.6 (20) 28.3 (12) 16.0 (5) 0.7 (0) - 0.8 (0)
1989 46.0 (17) 21.0 (11) 29.0 (11) 1.6 (0) - 0.6 (0)
1994 37.4(14) 23.8(13) 33.3(13) 1.6 (0) 2.6 (0) -
1999 32.9 (12) 20.7 (16) 42.1 (16) (0) (0) 0.4 (0)
2004 38.4(14) 11.6 (4) 42.4(16) 6.7 (2) - 0.6
2009 28.7(11) 16.8 (6) 3.8 (0) 44.9 (17) 5.1 (2) - 0.5
In 1945 the ‘Democratic Party’ achieved three mandates.
Piringer 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al. 2001, p. 731 ff.
Information about election results 2004: SORA -  Institute for social research and analysis, 
www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b=62
Information about election results 2009: www.sora.at/de/start.asD?b=517
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Table A5
Local Election Results since 1945 -  Lower Austria
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Year SPO OVP FPO BZO Grune LIF KPO
1945 40.4 (22) 54.5 (32) - - - 5.1 (2)
1949 37.3 (22) 52.5 (31) 4.4 (0) 
(VdU)
5.5 (3)
1954 40.9 (23) 50.7 (30) 2.6 (0) 
(VdU)
5.8 (3)
1959 42.3 (25) 50.9 (31) 3.9 (0) - - 2.9 (0)
1964 42.8 (25) 51.7 (31) 3.0 (0) - - 2.4 (0)
1969 44.6 (26) 50.4 (30) 3.2 (0) - - 1.0 (0)
1974 43.9 (25) 52.1 (31) 3.0 (0) - - 1.0 (0)
1979 45.4 (27) 49.6 (29) 3.2 (0) - - 0.8 (0)
1983 41.3 (24) 54.5 (32) 1.7(0) - - 0.8 (0)
1988 37.4 (22) 47.5 (29) 9.4 (5) 2.4 (0) - 0.8 (0)
1993 34.0 (20) 44.2 (26) 12.1 (7) 3.2 (0) 5.1 (3) 0.2 (0)
1998 30.5(18) 44.8 (27) 16.1 (9) 4.5 (2) 2.1 (0) 0.6 (0)
2003 33.6(19) 53.3 (31) 4.5 (2) 7.2 (4) (0) 0.8 (0)
2008 25.5(15) 54.4 (31) 10.5 (6) 0.72 6.9 (4) (0) 0.9 (0)
Piringer 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al 2001, p. 731 ft.
Information for 2003 and 2008: www.bmi.av.at/cms/bmi wahlen
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Table A6
Local Election Results since 1945 -  Upper Austria
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Year SPO OVP FPO Griine LIF KPO
1945 28.3(18) 59.1 (30) - - - 2.6 (0)
1949 30.8(15) 45.0 (23) 20.8 (10) 
(VdU)
3.1 (0)
1955 39.4(19) 48.1 (25) 9.6 (4) 
(VdU)
2.9 (0)
1961 39.6(19) 48.8 (25) 9 .7 (4 ) - - 1.9 (0)
1967 46.0 (23) 45.2 (23) 7.5 (2) - - 0.8 (0)
1973 43.4 (24) 47.7 (28) 7.7 (4) - - 0.9 (0)
1979 41.4 (23) 51.6 (30) 6.4 (4) - - 0.6 (0)
1985 38.0 (23) 52.1 (30) 5.0 (3) 1.7 (0) 0.6 (0)
1991 31.4(19) 45.2 (26) 17.7 (11) 3.1 (0) - -
1997 27.0(16) 42.7 (25) 20.6 (12) 5.8 (3) 2.1 (0) -
2003 38.3 (22) 43.4 (25) 8.4 (4) 9.1 (5) (0) 0.8 (0)
2009 24.9 (14) 46.8 (28) 15.3 (9) 9.2 (5) (0) 0.6 (0)
Piringer 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al 2001, p. 731 ff. 
Information for 2003: www.bmi.av.at/cms/bmi wahlen
Table A7
Local Election Results since 1945 -  Salzburg
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Year SPO OVP FPO BZO Grune LIF KPO
1945 39.5(10) 56.7(15) - - - - 3.8(1)
1949 33.6 (9) 43.6(12) 18.5 (5) 
(VdU)
3-4 (0)
1954 38.2(13) 45.9(15) 13.2 (4) 
(VdU)
2.3 (0)
1959 38.6(13) 43.3(14) 16.1 (5) - - - 1.8 (0)
1964 40.9(13) 44.9(15) 11.8 (4) - - - 1.2 (0)
1969 40.4(13) 40.7(13) 18.0 (6) - - - 0.7 (0)
1974 36.2(13) 47.2(18) 15.5 (5) - - - 1.2 (0)
1979 39.1 (14) 45.4 (17) 13.3 (5) - - - 0.4 (0)
1984 35.2(13) 50.1 (19) 8.7 (4) - - - 0.5 (0)
1989 31.9(12) 43.9 (16) 16.4 (6) - - - 0.5 (0)
1994 27.1 (11) 38.6 (14) 19.5 (8) - - (0) -
1999 32.5(12) 38.8(15) 19.6 (7) - - 3-7 (0) -
2004 45.4(17) 37.9(14) 8.7 (3) - 8(2) (0) -
2009 39.4(15) 36.6(14) 13.0 (5) 3.7 (0) 7-4 (2) (0) -
Piringer 1998, p. 155 and Khol et al. 2001, p. 731 ff.
Information about elections 2004: www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b=63 
Information about elections 2009: www.sora.at/de/start.asD?b=518
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Table A8
Local E lection  R esults  s in ce  1945 -  S tyria
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Y ear S PO O VP FPO B ZO G rune LIF K PO
1945 41.6 (20) 53.0 (26) - - - 5.4 (2)
1949 37.4(18) 42.9 (22) 14.6(7)
(VdU)
4 .5 (1 )
1953 41.1 (20) 40.7 (21) 13.6 (6) 
(VdU)
4.4 (1 )
1957 43.6 (21) 46.4 (24) 6.8 (3) - - 2.6 (0)
1961 41.7 (20) 47.1 (24) 7.3 (3) - - 3 .8 (1 )
1965 42.2 (24) 48.4 (29) 5 .8 (2 ) - - 3 .2 (1 )
1970 44.7 (26) 48.6 (28) 5.3 (2) - - 1.3 (0)
1974 41.2 (23) 53.3 (31) 4.2 (2) - - 1.3 (0)
1978 40.3 (23) 52.0 (30) 6.4 (3) - - 1.3 (0)
1981 42.7 (24) 50.9 (30) 5.0 (2) - - 1.0 (0)
1986 37.6 (22) 51.7 (30) 4.6 (2) 3.7 (2) - 1.2 (0)
1991 35.0 (21) 44.2 (26) 15.4 (9) 2.8 (0) - 0.6 (0)
1995 36.0 (21) 36.3 (21) 17.2(10) 4.2 (2) 3.8 (2) 0.5 (0)
2000 32.3 (19) 47.3 (27) 12.4(7) 5.6 (3) 1.1 (0) 1.0 (0)
2005 41.6 (25) 38.7 (24) 4.6 (0) 1.7 (0) 4.7 (3) - 6.3 (4)
Piringer 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al. 2001, p. 731 ff.
Information about election results 2000: www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b=109 
Information about election results 2005: www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b=246
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Table A9
Local Election Results since 1945-Tyro l
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Year SPO OVP FPO Griine LIF KPO
1945 28.0(10) 69.8 (26) - - - 2.2 (0)
1949 24.0 (8) 56.4 (24) 17.4 (4) 
(VDU)
1.6 (0)
1953 27.4 (9) 57.5 (23) 9.9 (3) 
(VdU)
1.6 (0)
1957 31.0(11) 59.2 (23) 8.5 (2) - - 0.8 (0)
1961 30.1 (11) 59.6 (23) 9.1 (2) - - 1.1 (0)
1965 30.4(10) 63.6 (25) 6.0 (1) - - No particip.
1970 33.5(12) 60.4 (23) 5 .7 (1 ) - - 0.2 (0)
1975 32.4 (11) 61.1 (24) 5.9 (1 ) - - 0.6 (0)
1979 29.0(10) 63.0 (24) 7.0 (2) - - 0.4 (0)
1984 26.0 (9) 65.0 (25) 6.0 (2) 0.8 (0) - 0.4 (0)
1989 22.9 (9) 48.9(19) 15.6 (5) 8.1 (3) - 0.6 (0)
1994 19.9 (7) 47.3(19) 16.2 (6) 10.6 (4) 3.3 (0) -
1999 21.8 (8) 47.2 (18) 19.7 (7) 8.0 (3) 3.2 (0) 0.1 (0)
2003 25.8 (9) 49.9 (20) 8.0 (2) 15.6 (5) 0.7 (0)
2008 15.6 (5) 40.4(16) 12.7 (4) 10.4 (4) - 1.2 (0)
Piringer 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al 2001, p. 731 f.
Information about election results 2003 and 2008: 
wahlen.tirol.gv.at/wahlenlnit.do?cmd=list&cid=1
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Table A10
Local Election Results since 1945 -  Vorarlberg
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Year SPO OVP FPO Griine LIF KPO
1945 27.3 (7) 70.2 (19) - - - 2.5 (0)
1949 19.1 (4) 56.4(16) 22.1 (6) (VdU) - - 2.4 (0)
1954 26.0 (7) 58.0 (16) 13.7 (3) 
(VdU)
2.3 (0)
1959 29.3(10) 54.7 (21) 14.9 (5) - - 1.1 (0)
1964 29.5(10) 53.5 (20) 15.8 (6) - - 1.2 (0)
1969 27.7 (9) 50.0 (20) 21.0 (7) - - 1.3 (0)
1974 27.0 (10) 56.9 (22) 13.9 (4) - - 0.9 (0)
1979 29.0(10) 57.5 (22) 12.5 (4) - - 1.0 (0)
1984 24.0 (9) 51.6 (20 10.5 (3) 13.0 (4) - 0.9 (0)
1989 21.3 (8) 51.0 (20) 16.1 (6) 5.2 (2) - 0.7 (0)
1994 16.2 (6) 49.9 (20) 18.4 (7) 7.8 (3) 3.5 (0) -
1999 13.0 (5) 45.7(18) 27.5 (11) 6.0 (2) 3.4 (0) -
2004 16.9 (6) 54.9 (21) 13.0 (5) 10.1 (4) - -
2009 10.0 (3) 50.8 (20) 25.1 (9) 10.6 (4) - -
Piringer 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al 2001, p. 731f
Information about election 2004: www.sora.at/de/start.asD?b=32
Information about election 2009: http://www.sora.at/themen/wahlverhalten/wahlanalysen/ltw- 
vbg09.html
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Table A11
Local Election Results since 1945 -  Vienna (Gemeinderatswahl)
Percentage of votes. Distribution of mandates in brackets (..)
Year SPO OVP FPO BZO Grune LIF KPO
1945 57.5 (58) 34.5
(36)
8.0 (6)
1949 49.9 (52) 34.9
(35)
6.8 (6) 
(VdU)
7.9 (7)
1954 52.7 (59) 33.2
(35)
4.6 (0) 
(VdU)
8.2 (6)
1959 54.4 (60) 32.4
(33)
8.0 (4) 5.2 (3)
1964 54.7 (60) 33.9
(35)
5.7 (3) 5.0 (2)
1969 56.9 (63) 27,8
(30)
7.2 (4) 2.9 (0)
1973 60.2 (66) 29.3
(31)
7.7 (3) 2.3 (0)
1978 57.2 (62) 33.8
(35)
6.5 (3) 1.8 (0)
1983 55.5 (61) 34.8
(37)
5.4 (2) 1.1 (0)
1987 54.9 (62) 28.4
(30)
9.7 (8) 4.4 (0) 1.7 (0)
1991 47.8 (52) 18.1
(18)
22.5 (23) 9.1 (7)
1996 39.1 (43) 15.2
(15)
27.9 (29) 7.9 (7) 7.9 (6) 0.5 (0)
2001 46.9 (52) 16.4
(16)
20.2 (21) 12.5 (11) 3.4
2005 49.1 (55) 18.8
(18)
14.8 (13) 1 .2(0) 14.6(14)
P irin g er 1998, p. 155, and Khol et al 2001, p. 731 ff
Information about election results 2001: www.sora.at/de/start.asp?b=108 
Information about election results 2005: www.sora.at/de/start.asD?b=245
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2.
Table A 12
EU- PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS- AUSTRIA
Percentage of voters
SPO OVP FPO BZO LIF Grune KPO
(a) (b)
Liste
Dr.
Martin
Parti­
cipation
1996
2 9 .1 2 2 9 .6 2 7 .5 3 " 4 .3 6 .8 0 .5 " 6 7 .7
1999 3 0 .7 3 1 .7 1 2 3 .4 0 - 2 .7 9 .3 0 .7 - 4 9 .4
2004 3 3 .3 3 2 .7 0 6 .3 - - 1 2 .9 0 .8 1 4 .0 4 2 .4
2009 2 3 .7 3 0 .0 1 2 .7 4 .6 - 9 .9 0 .7 1 7 .7 4 6 .0
Notes: (a) In 2 0 04  KPO  cam paigned along with Opposition fur ein solidarisches Europa - Europaische 
Linke and Unabhangige (b) In 2 0 09  KPO cam paigned along with Europaische Linke 
Liste Dr. Martin is founded by the Austrian EU-critic Hans-Peter Martin. S ee also Martin and  
Schum ann 1996.
Source: Bundesministerium fur Inneres, Wahlen, Europawahlen, 
www.bm i.av/cm s/BM I wahlen/euroDawahl/start.aspx.
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